Democratizing the Criminal: Jury Nullification as Exercise of Sovereign Discretion over the Friend-Enemy Distinction by Delaune, Timothy A.
University of Massachusetts Amherst
ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst
Open Access Dissertations
9-2013
Democratizing the Criminal: Jury Nullification as
Exercise of Sovereign Discretion over the Friend-
Enemy Distinction
Timothy A. Delaune
University of Massachusetts Amherst, delaune@pobox.com
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/open_access_dissertations
Part of the Law Commons
This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Open Access Dissertations by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact
scholarworks@library.umass.edu.
Recommended Citation
Delaune, Timothy A., "Democratizing the Criminal: Jury Nullification as Exercise of Sovereign Discretion over the Friend-Enemy
Distinction" (2013). Open Access Dissertations. 787.
https://doi.org/10.7275/sj7p-bh93 https://scholarworks.umass.edu/open_access_dissertations/787
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Democratizing the Criminal:  Jury Nullification as Exercise of Sovereign Discretion  
Over The Friend-Enemy Distinction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Dissertation Presented  
 
by 
 
TIMOTHY A. DELAUNE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted to the Graduate School of the 
University of Massachusetts Amherst in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 
 
 
 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
 
 
September 2013 
 
 
 
Political Science 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© Copyright Timothy A. Delaune 2013 
 
This Text is licensed under a  
Creative Commons 
Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 3.0 Unported License 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
DEMOCRATIZING THE CRIMINAL:  JURY NULLIFICATION AS EXERCISE OF 
SOVEREIGN DISCRETION OVER THE FRIEND-ENEMY DISTINCTION 
 
 
 
A Dissertation Presented  
 
By 
 
TIMOTHY A. DELAUNE 
 
 
 
Approved as to style and content by: 
 
 
 
_______________________________________________ 
Nicholas Xenos, Chair 
 
 
 
_______________________________________________ 
Joan Cocks, Member 
 
 
 
_______________________________________________ 
Gary Malaney, Member 
 
 
 
____________________________________________ 
            Brian F. Schaffner, Department Chair 
            Political Science 
 
  
DEDICATION 
 
 
 
For Nick, who was patient. 
 
v 
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 
 
I thank first and foremost my dissertation chair Nick Xenos for his years of 
mentorship and helpful advice on matters ranging from scholarship to the politics of 
academic life.  I also thank committee members Joan Cocks and Gary Malaney for their 
encouragement and trenchant critiques of my work, and consulting member Larry Lessig for 
taking the time to read the dissertation and help me think about the ideas it entails in fresh 
ways. 
This project first took shape as a paper for an independent study seminar on 
democracy and the political led by Nick Xenos in the spring of 2007.  I am grateful to the 
participants in that seminar’s day of paper presentations for their valuable input, especially 
Wendy Brown, Antonio Vázquez-Arroyo, Robyn Marasco, Brad Mapes-Martins, Lena 
Zuckerwise, Casey Stevens, Gizem Zencirci, and Lauren Handley.  Jeremy Wolf, Anna 
Curtis and Claire Brault also provided inspiration and helpful comments over the course of 
this project.  Simon Stow deserves special thanks for his guidance at the early stages of the 
work regarding how to turn the paper project into a defensible prospectus. 
Ideas incorporated in the dissertation arose in part from four graduate seminars 
taken during my time at the University of Massachusetts Amherst.  In particular seminars on 
violence and the state, sovereignty, Maciavelli’s Discourses, and democratic theory, taught 
respectively by Srirupa Roy, Joan Cocks, Nick Xenos, and Barbara Cruikshank, were pivotal 
in shaping many of the views expressed herein.  I am grateful to those scholars and my 
colleagues in those courses for in many ways inspiring this work. 
Finally, this dissertation could not have been dreamt, much less achieved, without 
the love, support, and patience of my husband Nick Trépanier.  I am forever in his debt. 
 
vi 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
DEMOCRATIZING THE CRIMINAL:  JURY NULLIFICATION AS EXERCISE OF 
SOVEREIGN DISCRETION OVER THE FRIEND-ENEMY DISTINCTION 
 
SEPTEMBER 2013 
 
TIMOTHY A. DELAUNE, A.B., GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY 
 
J.D., THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW SCHOOL 
 
M.A.L.D., FLETCHER SCHOOL OF LAW AND DIPLOMACY, TUFTS UNIVERSITY 
 
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
 
Directed by:  Professor Nicholas Xenos 
 
This dissertation examines jury nullification – the ability of American juries in 
particular criminal cases to ignore or override valid law to be applied to defendants by 
acquitting them in cases in which the facts are undisputed or clear – as an exercise of 
sovereignty over the friend-enemy distinction as those terms are defined by Carl Schmitt.  It 
begins with a biography of Schmitt and a description of his concept of sovereignty as 
ultimate decisional power.  It then discusses sovereignty in the American context, with 
particular attention to the principles of the Founding and the nature of the fictively 
constructed American people.  It next applies Schmitt’s concept of decisional sovereignty to 
the American context, concluding that sovereignty in America is diffuse, and its exercise by 
particular governmental actors is to some degree cloaked, and that the sovereignty of the 
American people, while crucial to the founding moment, is largely latent in ordinary times.  
This application of Schmitt to sovereignty in America also demonstrates the deep tension 
between democratic popular sovereignty and rule-of-law liberalism. 
The dissertation then turns to Schmitt’s understanding of the distinction between 
friend and enemy as the central political axis, and argues that the criminal in the American 
 
vii 
 
context is functionally the enemy, if not the absolute enemy of the polity.  It then discusses 
in detail the mechanics and history of jury nullification, ultimately concluding that jury 
nullification both operates at the crucial political moment at which enemies are generated (or 
not) through the application of criminal law to defendants, and is an act of popular 
sovereignty, intended by the Founders to help preserve a balance between democracy and 
liberalism by maintaining a central political role for the people. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
This dissertation applies the core theories of Carl Schmitt to jury nullification in the 
American criminal law context.  Jury nullification describes situations in which a jury, in 
addition to determining whether the evidence supports a conviction of criminal defendants, 
also takes the law into its own hands, either by ignoring a judge’s instructions as to how to 
interpret the law, or by otherwise failing to convict where the evidence before it warrants a 
conviction.  In so doing, the jury may be expressing disapproval in general of the law the 
defendant is accused of violating, dislike for the way the law has been applied to the 
defendant, or solidarity with or approval of the defendant.  I argue that when a jury nullifies, 
it engages within the context of American democracy in an act of sovereignty as Schmitt 
understands that term, and does so on the centrally political issue for Schmitt, which is the 
identification of friends and enemies. 
In Chapter 2, I lay the groundwork for my arguments by discussing Schmitt and his 
thought in historical context and explaining and interpreting his theory of sovereignty as 
ultimate power to render decisions regarding exceptional circumstances.  In addition, I 
explore his theories of democracy as popular sovereignty, including his ideal democratic 
constitution, the need for a homogeneous people, and the role of the people before, during, 
and after the founding of a democratically constituted state. 
In Chapter 3, I examine sovereignty in Schmittian terms in America, arguing that the 
Founders deliberately struck a potentially unstable balance by dividing sovereignty among 
multiple actors, including the people as well as multiple government institutions.  Along the 
way, I show that the Founders appear to have invested sovereignty in the Constitution as a 
founding and legally binding text, as well as perhaps in supporting texts such as The Federalist, 
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and that this renders the American polity one that makes the locus of sovereignty hard to 
identify when it is exercised.  I also discuss the construction of “the people” as a fictive 
exercise that renders always problematic claims by various actors to represent the popular 
will, and to that extent undermines American democracy in terms of popular sovereignty. 
Chapter 4 applies Schmitt’s ideas of sovereignty to my analysis of diffuse sovereignty 
in America.  In it I show that American practice exemplifies the tension Schmitt identifies 
between rule-of-law liberalism, which claims that the law is sovereign and thus covers over 
the exercise of sovereign power by human actors on behalf of the state, and democracy as 
popular sovereignty, which the Framers often adverted to, but which is not functionally an 
aspect of day-to-day governance in the US.  I nonetheless argue that sovereignty in America 
under Schmitt’s definition remains in latent form with the people, pursuant to the 
Declaration of Independence and the right to revolt.  Thus the Framers struck a tenuous 
balance designed to keep the American polity relatively stable despite the tensions between 
rule-of-law liberalism and popular sovereignty by balancing the two, against the backstop of 
latent popular power to revolt.  While Schmitt would see this arrangement as unstable and 
likely either to devolve into liberal proceduralism that masks the acquisition of power by 
government against the population, or to erupt into outright violent revolution, my ultimate 
goal is to show in later chapters how this tension can be beneficially maintained by 
preserving the Founders’ allocation of power to the people through the role of the criminal 
jury in deciding upon law as well as fact. 
Chapter 5 turns to a discussion of Schmitt’s concept of the friend-enemy distinction 
as the central axis of the political, with particular attention to the way that his definitions of 
friend and enemy, and extension of the enemy category, developed over the course of his 
writing.  In particular, I address in this chapter the somewhat unstable distinctions among 
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the ordinary criminal, the equal enemy, the subhuman absolute enemy, and the terrorist or 
partisan in Schmitt’s thought, as well as the question whether Schmitt has fully or clearly 
theorized the role of the friend. 
 Following this discussion, in Chapter 6 I apply Schmitt’s concepts of friends and 
enemies to the context of the criminal in America, arguing functionally that the way we treat 
criminals shows that we consider them enemies if not absolute enemies, and that despite 
Schmitt’s insistence on a distinction between the ordinary criminal and the enemy, American 
practice constructs most criminals as members of an internal enemy class.  This lays the 
groundwork for understanding the centrally political role, in Schmitt’s terms, of the 
American criminal jury. 
Chapter 7 outlines the history of jury nullification, tracing it from its origins in 
England to its use before and after the American founding, and describing its decline in the 
nineteenth century.  I describe its mechanics, and its bases in American constitutional and 
criminal law, and provide examples of its use, addressing in particular concerns regarding 
ways in which it deprives some defendants of equality under the law. 
In Chapter 7, I connect jury nullification to Schmitt’s theories of the sovereign and 
the political.  I argue that it is unique within the American context as a site of popular 
sovereignty exercised over the friend-enemy distinction, and intended by the Framers as a 
bulwark against process failures of representative democracy and the potential for tyranny 
exercised by government actors under the guise of the rule of law.  I argue that by taking 
nullification off the table as a right of juries or defendants, American judges and prosecutors 
have undone a key locus of popular sovereignty, one that the Framers meant to be part of 
the delicate balance between popular sovereignty and the rule of law. 
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I conclude by bringing the strands of the argument together, with particular 
emphasis on the way that respect for and faith in American governmental institutions has 
been undermined by their drift away from the popular will, a drift that could have been, and 
could still be, ameliorated by anchoring the criminal law to the views of those randomly 
selected members of the community who can in individual cases decide what the law means 
and how it will be deployed — who can decide to generate criminal enemies, or to refuse to 
do so because where the law itself amounts to an abuse of governmental sovereignty. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
CARL SCHMITT AND THE SOVEREIGN 
 
 
Introduction 
To prepare the way to consider sovereignty in America in general and jury 
nullification in particular in light of Carl Schmitt’s theories, this chapter provides an 
introduction to Schmitt and his work, with special emphasis on his theory of sovereignty as 
the power to decide in exceptional circumstances.  It begins with a brief biography of 
Schmitt, addresses the situational and unsystematized nature of his work, and then discusses 
his membership in and political work on behalf of the National Socialist (Nazi) Party and his 
favorable reception by contemporary thinkers on the political left.  It then describes his 
views on legal positivism and political liberalism, and connects these to his most significant 
positions on the Weimar Republic and its Constitution.  Against this background, the final 
part of this chapter examines the contours of Schmitt’s theory of sovereignty, as well as his 
specific related concerns regarding democratic homogeneity in the context of popular 
sovereignty, the nature of constitutions, and the citizen’s right to resist her government. 
 
Schmitt’s Life and Work, Then and Now 
Brief Biography 
Carl Schmitt was born in 1888 and raised in a Catholic family in Plettenberg, 
Germany, a town in the predominately Protestant Rhineland.1  He was thus born under the 
shadow of the Kulturkampf, which had peaked ten years earlier, in which Bismarck’s 
government had sought to reduce the influence of Catholicism in Germany through a series 
                                                
1 Gopal Balakrishnan, The Enemy:  An Intellectual Portrait of Carl Schmitt.  (London:  Verso, 2000), 11. 
 6 
of discriminatory laws.2  Despite his family’s early wishes that he enter the priesthood, 
Schmitt ultimately studied jurisprudence with their blessing at the Friedrich-Wilhelm 
University in Berlin, writing his as-yet-untranslated dissertation, “On Guilt and the Degrees 
of Guilt,” in the field of criminal law, and making his first acquaintance with a city to which 
he would return in various capacities later in life.3 
Though he served during World War I, Schmitt never saw combat, having been 
relegated to a domestic position as a censor in a regional martial law unit due to a back 
injury.4  He nonetheless witnessed firsthand the violent turmoil of postwar Germany:  his 
office was broken into by revolutionaries, and he saw an officer shot at a nearby table while 
at a café.5 
After rotating through several minor governmental and temporary university 
positions, Schmitt returned to Berlin in 1928 to accept a relatively low-status teaching 
position at the Schools of Business Administration (Handelhochschulen) there.  Within 
Weimar’s nerve center, Schmitt fostered social connections to governmental officials, in 
particular Reich Finance Ministry bureaucrat Johannes Popitz, a conservative monarchist 
who would be executed in 1945 for his support for a coup plot against Hitler.6  Schmitt’s 
connections to conservatives in the Weimar Republic led to his collaboration with President 
Paul von Hindenberg’s inner circle on legal issues, including Schmitt’s advocacy on behalf of 
the federal government regarding whether states (Länder) or the Reich had the right to fill 
railroad administrative positions.  Schmitt used the occasion to develop a theory that the 
                                                
2 Ibid. 12. 
3 Ibid. 13. 
4 Ibid. 16. 
5 Ibid. 21. 
6 Ibid. 116-18. 
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German federal court could not properly be considered to be the definitive interpreter — in 
Schmitt’s terms, the “guardian” — of the Constitution.  Rather, only the president, on 
Schmitt’s view, could play this role, acting as an arbitrating neutral power (pouvoir neutre).7 
This skirmish previewed Schmitt’s involvement in seeking to interpret the Weimar 
Constitution to give the federal government, and in particular the president, the highest hand 
in decisions regarding the form and substance of the Reich.  In 1932, Chancellor Franz von 
Papen sought to consolidate power in the national government and quell often violent strife 
instigated by the Communist and Nazi parties by placing Prussia, the Reich’s largest Land, 
under federal control.   
Prussia had outlawed both these parties as enemies of the Weimar constitution.  The 
Papen government took this opportunity to make use of the Weimar Constitution’s Article 
48, which broadly speaking gave the government emergency powers to, among other things, 
exercise control over Länder using armed force when their governments failed to follow 
Reich statutes or the Constitution, and to use armed force more generally and suspend 
constitutional provisions when public security and order were threatened.  Schmitt provided 
legal advice and advocacy supporting Papen’s action, arguing that what appeared to be words 
of limitation in Article 48 restricting the number of constitutional provisions that could be 
suspended to an enumerated few were in fact more exemplary, and not meant to constrain 
the Chancellor’s imposition of martial law when internal strife threatened the Reich. 
Schmitt argued the issue before the German constitutional court, and though the 
court ultimately rejected his arguments, it held in a somewhat incoherent ruling that both the 
Reich and Prussian governments’ positions had some merit.  On the Prussian side, the court 
held that Papen’s suspension of its government was unconstitutional; on the Reich side, the 
                                                
7 Ibid. 139. 
 8 
court held that Papen’s imposition of a commissar to rule Prussia on the Reich’s behalf was 
constitutionally permitted.  Nonetheless, despite the defeat of Schmitt’s maximal position, 
the outcome of the case provided legitimacy for later power grabs by Adolf Hitler and led to 
Schmitt’s famous sobriquet, “Crown Jurist of the Third Reich.”8 
In the months following the court’s October 1932 ruling in Preussen contra Reich 
(Prussia versus the Reich), Hitler’s Nazi party rose to power through significant popular 
support at least in part influenced by the violent techniques of the party’s military organ, the 
SA.  Following the 27 February 1933 Reichstag fire, and the subsequent destruction of the 
scapegoated Communist party, Schmitt apparently abandoned any reservations he had 
previously entertained about national socialism and embarked on a course of supporting 
Nazi rule.9  On 1 May 1933, Schmitt queued up in a long line (as did Martin Heidegger on 
the same day) to apply for Nazi party membership, though there is little evidence that his 
career would have been endangered by his failure to do so.10   
Membership certainly did not hurt Schmitt’s employment prospects, however.  
Shortly after joining the party, Schmitt moved to Cologne and effectively unseated his Jewish 
academic rival Hans Kelsen at Cologne University.  He subsequently began to produce 
works of increasingly anti-Semitic and pro-Hitler content seemingly designed to bolster his 
reputation as a friend of the Nazi party and its government.11  In March of 1933, Schmitt 
had been called to serve in the Prussian State Council (Staatsrat) and accepted the 
appointment.  He found himself now close to the center of Nazi Power, and in particular 
                                                
8 See ibid. 164-70. 
9 See ibid. 176-77. 
10 Ibid. 181. 
11 Ibid. 181-83. 
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had the personal support of Hermann Göring.  He soon returned to Berlin to become a full 
professor at the University there. 
Schmitt did not remain in the party’s good graces long, however.  In 1936, the SS 
magazine Das Schwarze Korps (The Black Corps) attacked Schmitt for his Catholic background, 
alleged opportunism in joining the Nazi party relatively belatedly, and acquaintances with 
Jewish scholars, all despite Schmitt’s having shortly before organized a conference to 
repudiate Jewish influences on German legal scholarship.12  Schmitt was protected from 
further SS interference by Göring, but while he maintained his academic position in Berlin 
and remained a member of the ineffectual Staatsrat, he effectively withdrew, both practically 
and in terms of his published work, from participation in the Nazi government thereafter.13  
Most of Schmitt’s research in the later years of World War II concerned international 
relations rather than domestic constitutional theory, and in 1943 and 1944 he frequently 
lectured abroad on international legal theory.14 
In the war’s waning days, as the Soviet Red Army encircled Berlin, Schmitt like many 
older Germans was mobilized to defend the city as an air-raid warden.15  Upon the capture 
of Berlin, Schmitt was initially arrested by the Red Army on 30 April 1945, but was released 
after being interrogated for a few hours.  He was again arrested in the autumn of 1945 and 
held and interrogated by the American army for about a year, released in autumn of 1946, 
and rearrested in March 1947 as a possible Nuremberg Trials defendant after claiming as his 
                                                
12 Jan-Werner Müller, A Dangerous Mind:  Carl Schmitt in Post-War European Thought.  (New Haven, CT:  Yale 
University Press, 2003), 39-41. 
13 Balakrishnan, The Enemy, 205-07. 
14 Ibid. 246. 
15 Ibid. 252. 
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profession that of a “freelance scholar.”  After further interrogation, he was again released 
and returned to Plettenberg in May 1947.16 
“Thinking that he, too, had in his own way been victimized by the Nazis, Schmitt 
was surprised to be arrested . . . and held . . . as a potential defendant at Nuremberg.”17  As a 
result, he became increasingly embittered against his American captors as well as returning 
Jewish émigrés during his detention.18  He refused ultimately to sign a de-Nazification 
certificate, and as a result was barred from holding any academic position in Germany 
thenceforth.19  He instead entered semiretirement in Plettenberg at a home he named San 
Casciano in apparent tribute to Machiavelli’s exile home, and continued to engage in 
academic life informally with the support of students and intellectual friends.20  He died in 
1985 at age 96.21 
 
Schmitt’s Unsystematized Thought 
Schmitt’s work was what today’s political scientists would call problem driven.  Most 
of his writing addressed concrete political circumstances, domestic or international, of his 
day.  In particular, “Schmitt [was] basically interested only in situations and problems in 
which he participate[d] personally and to which his fate [was] linked.”22  Moreover, “[t]he 
                                                
16 Müller, Dangerous Mind, 39-47. 
17 Balakrishnan, The Enemy, 254. 
18 Ibid. 254. 
19 Ibid. 255. 
20 Balakrishnan, The Enemy, 260.  San Casciano is also an allusion to the scholar martyred when his students 
stabbed him to death with their pens.  Müller, Dangerous Mind, 54. 
21 Tracy B. Strong, “Foreword:  Carl Schmitt and Thomas Hobbes:  Myth and Politics,” in The Leviathan in the 
State Theory of Thomas Hobbes:  Meaning and Failure of a Political Symbol, by Carl Schmitt, trans. George Schwab and 
Erna Hilfstein.  (Chicago:  University of Chicago Press, 2008), viii.  Balakrishnan incorrectly claims that Schmitt 
died in 1983 at age 95. Balakrishnan, The Enemy, 260. 
22 George Schwab, The Challenge of the Exception:  An Introduction to the Political Ideas of Carl Schmitt between 1921 and 
1936, 2nd ed.  (New York:  Greenwood Press, 1989), 27. 
 11 
themes [Schmitt] explored, the idioms he employed and the range of his references defy — 
even wilfully transgress — the disciplinary classifications of even the traditional era in which 
he lived, let alone those of contemporary Homo academicus.”23  Because of these factors, 
identifying systematic or consistent ideas across the temporal range of Schmitt’s thought is 
difficult,24 a fact routinely noted by those who interpret him — detractors, adherents, and 
neutral critics alike.  It is “widely acknowledged” according to Ulrich Preuss, that “Schmitt 
was an ‘occasionalist’ thinker who did not elaborate a theoretical system.”25   
This causes specific problems for applying Schmitt’s theory, especially when one 
borrows from multiple texts.  Schmitt’s concepts do not readily translate in the same ways 
throughout his oeuvre.  His critique of the concept and practices of liberalism has been 
denounced as inconsistent.26  His distinctions between normal and emergency acts from his 
1921 work Die Diktatur, discussed below, shift so far by his 1932 work Legality and Legitimacy 
that it becomes “almost impossible to recognize when he is discussing normal constitutional 
operations and when he is discussing emergency ones.”27  Indeed, Schmitt’s own critique of 
bodies of thought without clear and consistent positions, apparent in his chiding 
romanticism for lacking definite content, would seem to apply as well to his work as a 
whole.28  One further set of problems caused by Schmitt’s unsystematized and problem-
driven thought is that it is easily put to use for a wide range of causes or hijacked by 
                                                
23 Balakrishnan, The Enemy, 255 
24 Ibid. 3. 
25 Ulrich K. Preuss, “Political Order and Democracy:  Carl Schmitt and His Influence,” in The Challenge of Carl 
Schmitt, ed. Chantal Mouffe.  (London:  Verso, 1999), 156. 
26 Robert Howse, “From Legitimacy to Dictatorship — and Back Again:  Leo Strauss’s Critique of the Anti-
Liberalism of Carl Schmitt,” in Law as Politics:  Carl Schmitt’s Critique of Liberalism, ed. David Dyzenhaus.  
(Durham, NC:  Duke University Press, 1998), 60. 
27 John P. McCormick, “The Dilemmas of Dictatorship:  Carl Schmitt and Constitutional Emergency Powers,” 
in Law as Politics:  Carl Schmitt’s Critique of Liberalism, ed. David Dyzenhaus.  (Durham, NC:  Duke University 
Press, 1998), 235. 
28 Balakrishnan, The Enemy, 22. 
 12 
adherents to multiple and often opposed points of view.  “Schmitt’s insights [can] be 
selectively appropriated and normatively reversed” by subsequent thinkers.29  Because of its 
antiuniversalist and occasionalist qualities, and inherent antinormativity, Schmitt’s thought 
has been subject to takeover by racist categorizations.30  Schmitt has also, in part because his 
thought is so mutable, come into fashion on the political left. 
Ultimately, these facts make it important not to confuse interpretation of Schmitt 
with appropriation of his ideas for purposes beyond his intent (assuming one can identify 
such intent with any certainty).31  This dissertation primarily appropriates Schmitt, and in 
many ways clearly beyond or outside his intent, as I will note as the argument unfolds.  
Doing so, however, necessarily will involve some attempts to understand Schmitt first on his 
own terms, and this dissertation is to that degree interpretive.  I believe that appropriating 
Schmitt is nonetheless on a deeper level consistent with his intent, since it involves a 
commitment to “eternal possibility.”  I thus agree with Heinrich Meier that Schmitt’s 
political theology, once deployed by him, can be “used as a concept of self-determination 
and self-description by political theologians who reject Schmitt’s political options and do not 
share his faith.”32 
Distancing oneself from Schmitt’s political commitments, given his membership in 
the Nazi party and continuing post-war anti-Semitism, is something of a banal ritual among 
those who study him at all approvingly.  On the other hand, scholars such as David 
Dyzenhaus are at pains to demonstrate a continuity in Schmitt’s thought from his seminal 
Weimar works (such as Political Theology and The Concept of the Political, the primary two texts 
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examined here), through his Nazi party years, even while acknowledging Schmitt’s 
deliberately unsystematic thought.33  Though I do not believe it to be centrally related to this 
dissertation, Schmitt’s Nazi past is always in question and deserves at least an attempt at an 
answer here. 
 
Schmitt’s Politics 
The question of Schmitt’s membership in the Nazi party, his participation in that 
party’s governance of Germany before and during World War II, and the relationship of 
both of these to his theoretical commitments arises in part because of his early research into 
the nature of dictatorship, which presaged the emergency legislation and political actions that 
ushered in the Nazi era.  In Die Diktatur, which has yet to be translated into English, Schmitt 
famously outlined a distinction between commissarial dictators, who are commissioned to 
defend existing constitutions in times of emergency through extraordinary means (that is, 
means that are extralegal in light of normally operative law), and sovereign dictators.34  
Because a commissarial dictator is tasked with defending the constitution, he acts to 
maintain republican institutions.  Such a dictator differs from a sovereign dictator in that the 
latter is empowered, again through extraordinary, extralegal means, to end an old 
constitutional order in favor of a new one and dissolve existing republican institutions.35  
Schmitt’s critics argue that this distinction, from which even Schmitt moved away in later 
years, is untenable — that it is ultimately impossible in practice to police the boundary 
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between commissarial and sovereign dictatorships, and that the former inevitably become 
the latter, as arguably occurred at Weimar’s end.36 
Did Schmitt intend to deploy a substantive theory of sovereign dictatorship’s 
inevitability?  Some of his critics insist that despite his development of the idea of 
commissarial, republic-preserving dictatorship, “no matter what else he might [have been, 
Schmitt] was not a democrat.”37  Setting aside for the moment the distinction between 
democracy and a polity governed as a republic under a constitution, this claim too swiftly 
dismisses Schmitt’s reams of theoretical texts on democracy and democratic sovereignty.  
Moreover, Schmitt’s overt critiques of the concrete polities of his day focus not on a 
rejection of democracy, but rather on the dangers of liberalism and legal positivism.  Finally, 
one must be careful in reading Schmitt not to take him out of context.  While Die Diktatur 
was a historical study designed to show that emergency dictatorships need not all threaten 
constitutional orders, in other works he seems more directly to advocate an authoritarian 
“qualitative total state.”  Those latter arguments, however, “applied to Germany only.  
[Schmitt] did not attempt to provide universal answers to questions pertaining to concrete 
situations in Germany.”38 
Nonetheless, Schmitt was politically committed at least at times to highly 
objectionable leaders, actors, and actions.  His anti-Semitism and outright praise for Hitler, 
demonstrated by his organization of the 1936 conference on eradicating Jewish thought 
from German legal theory and his 1934 justification of Hitler’s political authority and the 
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murders of the Night of the Long Knives in “Der Führer schützt das Recht” (“The Leader 
Defends the Law”), are reprehensible.  Yet I agree that “political thought should not be 
evaluated on the basis of authors’ personal political judgments.  Thus the value of Schmitt’s 
work is not diminished by the choices he made.”39  Even skeptical interpreters such as David 
Dyzenhaus have argued that renewed interest in Schmitt is warranted because his criticisms 
of liberalism are so trenchant that they must be taken account of especially by political liberals, 
even though the substance of his conclusions must often be rejected.40 
In the end, I agree with interpreters of Schmitt on the political left, such as Chantal 
Mouffe and Andreas Kalyvas, who seek to learn from Schmitt’s theories and recast them in 
the service of democratic and sometimes even liberal values.  I turn to Schmitt’s reception by 
the contemporary left in the next section but I also should note one further reason for my 
willingness to engage the thought of this man who became a Nazi and remained an anti-
Semite.  I believe that Schmitt was replying honestly when he told his American 
interrogators in 1947 that he was a mere academic and intellectual adventurer.41  While one 
might quibble over whether one can be a “mere” academic, I do believe Schmitt toiled out 
of a thirst for knowledge and understanding of political realities, rather than in an attempt to 
remake those realities in his own preferred image.  Schmitt wrote in 1941, when World War 
II’s outcome was still far from certain, that “[w]e are like sailors on a continual journey and 
no book can be anything more than a logbook.”42  Schmitt logged well his own dark journey, 
and we later sailors ignore his observations at our peril. 
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Schmitt’s Reception by the Left 
I am not alone in reviling Schmitt’s politics while admiring the degree to which his 
theoretical observations can be mobilized in favor of popular sovereignty and political 
liberalism.43  Beginning in the late 1960s, Schmitt first began to receive widespread and close 
attention from leftist theorists in Germany and Italy, and more recently has achieved 
scholarly notoriety on the left in the United States.44  Even before then, Schmitt had been 
followed in the 1920s by such leftist thinkers as Lukácks and Benjamin, and since then post-
Marxist leftists rediscovered him in the 1990s.45  And while Tracy Strong has argued that 
left-leaning political thinkers who have adopted Schmitt’s theories have done so selectively, 
“introduc[ing] elements of democracy by pluralizing his notion of sovereignty and suggesting 
that the decision about the exception is a decision each person can make,”46 such selective 
appropriation is effectively invited by the fact that once decoupled from their concrete 
circumstances, Schmitt’s observations do not lead inevitably to any particular political 
results.  Just as Marxist theorist Mario Tronti could insist that Schmitt’s commitments to 
right-wing politics and saving the capitalist state were irrelevant to the usefulness to the left 
of his criticisms of parliamentary democracy,47 so too is Schmitt seen as increasingly relevant 
to “debates in contemporary Anglo-American legal theory that are fast becoming more like 
                                                
43 The content of the terms “left” and “liberal” here is admittedly imprecise.  The discussion below of Schmitt’s 
views on liberalism will provide some helpful context, but in general liberalism should be understood here to 
include commitments to limited government and individual rights, in particular the subordination of decisional 
sovereignty to the rule of law, and commitments to political and economic equality as well as emphasis on the 
well-being of humans — collectively or individually — over the well-being of institutions, political or 
otherwise.  These values, of course, are not universally shared by those who consider themselves to be, or 
whom others consider to be, on the political “left.” 
44 Balakrishnan, The Enemy, 7-8.  See also Joseph W. Bendersky, “Introduction:  The Three Types of Juristic 
Thought in German Historical and Intellectual Context,” in On the Three Types of Juristic Thought, by Carl Schmitt, 
trans. Joseph W. Bendersky.  (Westport, CT:  Praeger, 2004), 3, noting that an international resurgence of 
interest in Schmitt’s thought began in the 1980s. 
45 Müller, Dangerous Mind, 169. 
46 Strong, “Dimensions of the New Debate,” xix. 
47 Müller, Dangerous Mind, 178-79. 
 17 
the debates of Weimar” in terms of identifying problems inherent in liberalism and legal 
positivism.48 
Apart from its malleability, what attracts leftists to Schmitt’s theorizing?  Perhaps it is 
their proximity along some dimensions to the political thought of many on the right:  
“Inasmuch as the goals of the political right often converge with those of the political left,” 
especially in terms of acquiring political power at the expense of one’s opponents and of 
exercising it beyond liberal rule-of-law constraints “it is not surprising that the left too has 
turned to Schmitt.”49  Perhaps it is because of specific components of his thought, such as 
the argument that all constitutional systems are constituted by external power arrangements, 
an argument that directly confronts liberalism’s claim that constitutions are grounded in 
contractual orders.50  Though she is at pains to distinguish herself and others from “some 
kind of ‘left-wing Schmittianism’ that would agree with Schmitt that liberalism and 
democracy are in contradiction, and conclude that liberalism is therefore to be discarded,”51 
Chantal Mouffe, who is nonetheless often labeled a “left-Schmittian,” argues that “political 
theorists must be willing to engage in the arguments of those who have challenged the 
fundamental tenets of liberalism,” including Schmitt in particular.52 
Notably, in connection with Strong’s criticism above, Mouffe acknowledges that in 
repurposing Schmitt’s theories she occasionally does violence to his intent, questions, and 
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concerns.53  For instance, Mouffe argues that though valuable lessons can be learned from 
the contradictions that Schmitt identifies between liberalism and democracy, we need not 
accept his central conclusion that the two are mutually incompatible.54  In sum, many 
political thinkers on the left who have adopted Schmitt’s views generally have done so to 
confront his challenges head on, in an attempt to rescue liberal democracy from what 
Schmitt sees as its inherent contradictions, while others have used Schmitt to show that 
those contradictions cannot be resolved, and side with him in favor of popular sovereignty, 
however dangerous, over liberal rule-of-law commitments.  This dissertation, in line with the 
former attempts, seeks to show how preservation of democratic citizens’ sovereign 
prerogatives in the context of jury nullification can ameliorate problems inherent to 
positivist, legalistic liberalism without utterly abandoning the rule of law.  In the following 
sections, I examine Schmitt’s views on legal positivism and liberalism and show how these 
played out in the context of his reactions to the Weimar Republic. 
 
Schmitt on Positivism, Liberalism, and Weimar 
Schmitt and Legal Positivism 
Legal positivism, like most political labels, can refer to a variety of strains of thought.  
Most relevant to understanding Schmitt, however, is the new legal positivism that arose in 
Germany in the 1870s, which “sought to elevate[ ] the study of public law to the status of a 
proper academic discipline by eliminating now discomfiting political problems from the 
field.”55  In Weimar Germany, the strongest and most creative exponent of positivism was 
Schmitt’s Jewish rival, Hans Kelsen.  Building on Kant’s theory, Kelsen posited that all 
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constitutional systems are centered on basic norms, which themselves come about “solely 
[as] mental construction[s], [and] products of thought.”56  All talk of the legitimacy of 
constitution makers and constitutions was, for Kelsen, ideological, and thus of no interest to 
legal science.57  Kelsen thus sought to drain law of political content, in the sense of debates 
about who was properly entitled to found a constitution.   
In this sense, both Kelsen and Schmitt understood popular sovereignty (or, for that 
matter, monarchical or other forms of sovereignty), in terms of the power to establish new 
basic norms, beyond legality. They part company in that for Schmitt the question of 
legitimacy is also central and suffuses the legal with the political.58  Kelsen indeed had to 
acknowledge that the basic norm might have to come “from the naked subjective will of an 
individual or a group of individuals who had the force to overthrow the previous basic norm 
and impose a new one,” and that as a result, “the legal system, which Kelsen sought to 
insulate from power,” would turn out to be “firmly rooted in a purely extralegal political 
act.”59  Because of this, perhaps surprisingly, Kelsen’s legal positivism runs the same risk that 
has been identified with Schmitt’s unsystematized thought:  it can suborn any basic norm, 
regardless of content, and is thus just as open to use by dictators or enemies of civil liberties 
— in short, antiliberals — as by democrats or civil libertarians more closely affiliated with 
liberalism itself.60  At least Schmitt’s theory, though equally capable of use by proponents of 
any number of political values, allows for some sovereign actor to inquire into, evaluate, and 
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act upon the normative elements of constitutional and juridical systems, and indeed not only 
acknowledges but highlights the significance of such sovereign action.61 
Because Kelsen’s theory is, at a minimum, agnostic as to the legitimacy of various 
sovereign founders and constitutional orders, preferring rather to take existing orders as 
given and work through their legal consequences from there, it necessarily “detaches the 
legal order and the state from the needs and expectations of the participants.”62  It thus 
cannot and will not differentiate among constitutional orders based upon their legitimacy.63  
For this and other reasons, Kelsen’s legal positivism was seen as increasingly untenable as a 
means of channeling power given the emergence of sociological perspectives on law, and 
greater attention to law’s use as a tool of power, even before World War I.64  Moreover, and 
particularly relevant to the question of jury nullification as a potential democratic corrective 
for moribund law, in the course of casting law as objective, detached norms, positivists such 
as Kelsen make law abstract, and “[i]nstead of being broad and flexible, law becomes rigid.”65   
This happens, for instance, in criminal law because positivism seeks to elevate 
generally applicable rules above concrete instances, such that all acts that might violate the 
law are anticipated (however incompletely or inaccurately because generally) in advance.  So, 
for instance, particular forms of self-defense might not appear in the abstract as defenses to 
murder charges according to preexisting law, but in a case tried before a jury able to examine 
concrete facts of self-defense might provoke an acquittal on the basis that a conviction 
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would be unjust.  “Ought remains undisturbed by is” in such a system, which for Schmitt 
means that positive criminal law is divorced from the world it is meant to regulate, and 
becomes especially so over time as unanticipated concrete contexts proliferate.66  Seeing 
these problems, in particular in the context of Weimar, Schmitt deployed his theoretical 
intervention. 
Though as I have outlined, Schmitt’s theoretical work is far from systematic or 
internally consistent across multiple texts, one of his recurring arguments is that “all social 
and legal problems are, potentially at least, political problems, which involve conflict over 
the monopoly of power,” an argument that not coincidentally endears him to left-oriented 
theorists who seek to highlight power’s role in seemingly politically neutral operations, e.g. of 
law.67  This first demonstrates that for Schmitt law and politics are analytically distinct 
categories, in that he refers to them as discrete before arguing that the former necessarily 
involve the latter.  Indeed, in his view, pairing politics and law, just like pairing politics and 
economy or politics and morality, serves to highlight the distinction between the category of 
the political (to be discussed at length in Chapter 5) and other categories of social 
organization.68  But the fact that politics and law are analytically distinct does not mean that 
there is no political moment inherent in legal determinations.  Schmitt is particularly 
emphatic that at crucial junctures, law devolves into politics.  “[W]hen Schmitt said there is a 
political moment in every [legal] judgment, it was to make the point that this fact cannot be 
assimilated within the positivist system. . . . [Rather,] each judgment contains a necessarily 
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personal moment of decision.”69  This is so for Schmitt because although legal positivists 
such as Kelsen claim that it is not the state but the law that exercises power,70 legal ideas 
cannot translate themselves independently into action, as they cannot specify in advance all 
potential situations to which they might apply, or how or by whom they must be applied.71  
Consequently, for any given legal system, “[w]hat matters for the reality of legal life is who 
decides.”72   
This core theoretical commitment of Schmitt’s, with which I am in deep agreement, 
makes it possible for him to critique Kelsen’s notion of a pure theory of law — a kind of 
self-regulating system that requires no political action — as a tautology, according to which 
law “is valid when it is valid and because it is valid.”73  Or as Schmitt put it in a somewhat 
different context, in the pure Rechtsstaat — that is the classic bourgeois constitutional state 
with a limited government and a positivist rule-of-law-not-men outlook — “the state is law 
in statutory form; law in statutory form is the state.  Obedience will be granted only to the 
statute . . . . There is only legality, not authority or commands from above.”74  For Schmitt, 
on the contrary, law, though analytically distinct from politics, is not a preexisting normative 
obligation, but rather a concrete, factual component of being in a state that results from 
political decisions.75  Law cannot, on Schmitt’s view, be divorced from politics in practice, 
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and a constitution in terms of procedure or moral values cannot entirely check politics.76  It 
is thus clear that Schmitt rejects legal positivism’s attempt to sever politics from law in order 
to cement the latter’s independence from human discretion and power. 
 
Schmitt and Liberalism 
Schmitt is “arguably alone” among political theorists “in having developed a body of 
theoretical work which focuses directly” on such major contemporary issues as “the 
hollowing out of liberal democracy” and “the nature of war and peace in a New World 
Order.”77  He held liberal democracy to be an inherently contradictory political form, 
impossible to achieve with any stability in practice.  
One of Schmitt’s central theses is that “democracy negates liberalism and liberalism 
negates democracy.”78  This contradiction arises because, for Schmitt, democracy as a 
concept refers to the sovereign exercise of power by the people, and sovereignty inheres in 
the power to make ultimate decisions for a polity.  Liberalism, on the other hand, regulates 
political action for the purposes of limiting state power in order to safeguard individual 
(Schmitt would say mostly bourgeois individual) rights, and thus necessarily seeks to replace 
the sovereign substantive will of the people with the formal will of parliament or of 
constitutional law as it stands, rather than as it might be reconfigured through the exercise of 
popular sovereignty.79  The rise of the liberal Rechtsstaat or “rights state” was, in Schmitt’s 
view, a reaction to the leviathan state form that seeks to limit the leviathan’s reach by carving 
out a private sphere of individual rights.  In doing so, liberalism makes the state’s exercise of 
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power “indirect,” and “veil[s] the unequivocal relationship between state command and 
political danger, power and responsibility, protection and obedience, and the fact that 
absence of responsibility associated with indirect rule allows the indirect powers to enjoy all 
of the advantages and suffer none of the risks entailed in the possession of political 
power.”80  In Schmitt’s view, “liberalism does not reject the state, but transforms it into ‘the 
rule of law’ [a central Rechtsstaat feature] and as a consequence dissolves the political into 
ethics and economics.”81  For Schmitt, “[t]he mistake of rule-of-law liberalism lies in its 
outright denial of sovereignty.  But sovereignty, never fully repressed, always finds channels 
for its manifestation.”82 
Schmitt’s understanding of sovereignty centrally involves the ability of some 
exerciser of political power to make ultimate decisions for a polity, in particular in emergency 
or exceptional situations.  Sovereignty, whether held by democratic actors or not, is thus 
threatened by liberal constitutionalism in the sense that the latter seeks to regulate the 
exception by spelling out in detail under what exceptional circumstances law suspends itself 
in order to deal with unforeseen situations.  This goal is for Schmitt definitionally 
unachievable, precisely because at least some unforeseen emergencies are a priori 
unforeseeable.83  Moreover, liberalism, which ultimately cannot succeed in preventing 
sovereign decisions, in seeking to do so merely delays or disguises them, with potentially 
negative consequences for political order.  “The essence of liberalism is negotiation, a 
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cautious half measure, in the hope that the definitive dispute, the decisive bloody battle, can 
be transformed into a parliamentary debate and permit the decision to be suspended forever 
in an everlasting discussion.”84  Thus Schmitt’s pithy remark that liberalism, when 
confronted with the question “Christ or Barabbas?” responds “with a proposal to adjourn or 
appoint a commission of investigation.”85  In short, out of a desire to limit the powers of 
government and thus bolster bourgeois rights, liberalism refuses to decide upon important 
issues, in particular exceptional circumstances, putting statutory law in a democracy in 
increasing tension with the popular will.86 
Yet liberalism’s attempt to dissolve the political, including the politics of the demos, 
which for Schmitt is certainly a viable form of politics,87 is untenable, not only definitionally 
in the sense that law cannot foresee all exceptions or emergencies, but also because the 
liberal attempt to carve out law as a zone free of politics constructs political spaces that, 
because they are outside of law, prevent law from achieving hegemony over the political.  As 
Paul Hirst explains, classical liberalism implies that sovereignty is limited by a constitutive 
political act that occurs outside of normal politics (in Kelsen’s terms, the establishment of a 
basic norm).  Politics on this view cannot be dispensed with, though this is rule-of-law 
liberalism’s goal — to render the state a legal entity, where law decides, and political power is 
thus cabined.  In seeking to create such a rule-of-law state, liberalism requires a moment 
prior to the state at which sovereignty founds it, and then ends.   
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This is visible in the fact that legal orders inevitably construct spaces outside 
themselves that are centrally political, for example the extralegal space available for resisting 
the government and potentially developing a new constitutional order or basic norm.  “A 
constitution can survive only if the [initial] constituting political act is upheld by some 
political power.”88  Thus, Hirst agrees with Schmitt contra Kelsen that “[l]aw cannot itself 
form a completely rational and lawful system; the analysis of the state must first make 
reference to those agencies which have the capacity to decide on the state of exception.”89  
Liberalism in terms of the rule of law, which limits not only government power but also the 
people’s power to constitute and reconstitute government, serves as the means by which 
legal positivism seeks to subsume sovereign decisionism.  Legal positivism avoids sovereign 
decisions; liberalism deploys legal positivism to limit government by marginalizing the 
political — a task that in Schmitt’s view is doomed to failure.  Thus a key problem with 
liberalism for Schmitt is its “fear of the constituent power of the multitude, that is, of 
extraordinary [democratic] power.”90 
Apart from its internal contradictions, Schmitt argues that liberalism is dangerous in 
part because of its postponement and refusal to acknowledge or adequately address 
exceptional circumstances.  Schmitt criticizes liberalism “for attempting to systematize all of 
political phenomena,”91 not only because such systematization is itself inherently 
problematic, but also because liberalism’s denial of the exception puts political leaders acting 
under crisis conditions in the bind of having either to stand by as danger envelops the polity 
or to act in illegitimate ways while trying to pass such action off as legitimate, thus 
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undermining law’s claim to legitimacy just as Abraham Lincoln famously did, for instance, by 
suspending habeas corpus rights during the US Civil War.92  And even if a Lincoln is able to act 
in these ways and still preserve the state against its enemies, liberalism, by embracing the 
argument that the truth can be “found through an unrestrained clash of opinion and that 
competition will produce harmony,” adopts an “eternal competition of opinions” that 
amounts to “renouncing a definite result.”93  In other words, not only does liberalism 
undermine its own legitimacy in times of crisis, but it is not well suited to act as swiftly and 
decisively as such crises demand in order to achieve the state’s highest end of protecting its 
citizens in return for their obedience.  In order to secure individual rights, liberalism operates 
antithetically to politics, but only reactively:  it does not propose any positive counterpolitical 
theory, but only opposes political uses of power in every realm in which it encounters them.  
Liberalism thus “makes of the state[’s] . . . institutions a ventilating system.”94  That is, 
enmity within the state, rather than being acknowledged or even mobilized to strengthen the 
state in its protective functions, is sublimated into endless talk, without result.  In times of 
existential crisis, liberalism’s ventilation cannot adequately handle internal political pressures. 
Contextualizing Schmitt’s critique in pragmatic terms helps demonstrate that his 
concerns with liberalism do not amount to a complete embrace of authoritarianism.  I thus 
disagree here with commentators such as Heiner Bielefeldt who claim that “Schmitt 
systematically undermines the liberal principle of the rule of law” so that it can “be replaced 
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by an authoritarian version of a democracy.”95  Rather, Schmitt’s critique of liberalism is an 
attempt to counter an Enlightenment-era overcompensation.  Enlightenment liberal thinkers 
were disenchanted with a then-dominant consensus favoring prudential and discretionary 
exercises of raw political power in exceptional circumstances, and were concerned in 
particular with the continuation of those exercises after such circumstances receded and the 
accompanying tendency of decisional power to become increasingly abusive and arbitrary.  
They sought to erect bulwarks against such power through liberal proceduralism, limitations 
on government power, and clearly delineated individual rights in the private sphere.96  
Schmitt’s conservative reaction to this “seeks to cut through the web of liberal procedures 
and indirect action . . . and to end the endless liberal postponements of final decisions in 
favour of what is both the ultimate and the immediate.”97 
Beyond these pragmatic concerns, however, Schmitt also foresaw a deeper set of 
threats emanating from liberalism.  In liberalism as well as totalitarianism, Schmitt 
anticipated a tendency toward “depoliticization as a dehumanization of the other (who loses 
his identity and becomes no more than a common criminal).”98  This claim might seem 
counterintuitive:  after all, does not liberalism expressly seek to safeguard individual rights, 
thus making others, who hold those rights, expressly equally human?  Schmitt’s focus here is 
on the mechanical nature of liberalism’s emphasis on the rule of law and attempt to avoid 
the political, which gives it the potential to turn the other into the enemy effectively without 
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human review or choice.  That is, the rule of law makes criminal enemies without human 
intervention, and indeed suppresses legal actors’ urges and ability to intervene when enmity 
is not appropriate.  Thus Schmitt saw in liberalism, as in communism in practice in the 
Soviet Union, a tendency toward a world in which the political is subsumed in 
“organizational-technical” and “economic-sociological” tasks.99  He also discerned in 
liberalism’s bourgeois roots a move toward a culture of falsely guaranteed security.  Rather 
than protect citizens from enemies, liberalism purports to protect citizens from the state, 
while at the same time making the state unable to provide the security for which liberalism 
creates a high demand.  Thus for Schmitt “[t]he bourgeois is the promoter and ultimate 
fulfillment of the ‘age of security’ all in one.”100 
Some Schmitt scholars have argued that, in insisting on seeing democracy and 
liberalism as inconsistent and mutually incompatible, Schmitt obscured an important feature 
of the two original modern liberal democracies, the outcomes of the American and French 
revolutions.  Specifically, they claim, Schmitt overemphasizes the sovereign decision of the 
people to constitute themselves democratically at the expense of both revolutions’ 
enshrining protections of individual liberty in their constitutions.101  While it is true that 
Schmitt clearly favors a decisive sovereign, popular or otherwise, over the attempt to obviate 
the exercise of power through decision in order to protect individual rights, Schmitt’s 
position is actually more nuanced and complex, and at the same time not carefully attuned to 
American or French contexts.  In his view, political liberalism is troublesome in part because 
it claims a legitimacy grounded on a fit between overlapping consensual values:  those of a 
homogeneous sovereign demos, and those liberal values enshrined in a society’s written 
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constitution.  This hypothesized fit, for Schmitt, spells the end of politics, because it fosters 
the wrong kind of homogeneity among the people, “one of bourgeois individuals content to 
be passive consumers of the space accorded to them by the state.”102  The touchstone for 
Schmitt’s claim in this regard was not abstract theoretical analysis of liberal democracies, 
however, or historical experiments with liberal democracy in general.  Schmitt developed his 
theory of the antithesis between liberalism and democratic sovereignty in the specific context 
of the Weimar Republic,103 and it is to this context that I now turn. 
 
Schmitt in the Context of Weimar 
As noted above, Schmitt was intimately involved in the interpretation and use of 
Germany’s Weimar constitution, in particular during a time of crisis for the interwar Weimar 
Republic.  While his legal advocacy on behalf of the Papen government concerned primarily 
the government’s emergency powers under Article 48, Schmitt engaged in a broader overall 
analysis of the Weimar constitution that can be found in many of his theoretical writings, 
including especially his 1928 work Constitutional Theory (Verfassungslehre).  Germany’s adoption 
after World War I of a “ramshackle” constitution that deliberately avoided resolution of key 
founding issues, and was overlain on a long and crosscutting tradition of Roman law in 
Germany, left the Weimar Republic with numerous unresolved issues of constitutional 
interpretation.104  Like many other civil law states, and in contrast to such common-law 
states as Britain and the United States, Germany lacked a long tradition of the study of 
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sovereignty in connection with the contours of the public-private distinction.  Schmitt’s 
work, especially in Constitutional Theory, helped fill this gap for Weimar.105 
In turn, living through Weimar significantly changed Schmitt’s views.  Ever attuned 
to the concrete contexts in which law and politics subsisted, Schmitt modified for one thing 
his views as expressed in Die Diktatur on the distinction between commissarial and sovereign 
dictatorships.  For Schmitt, the difference between the two arose from the latter’s bearing 
the people’s constituent power (pouvoir constituant).106  That is, the sovereign dictator does not 
merely rule under commission to maintain an existing constitutional order as does the 
commissarial dictator, but rules by dint of sovereign power — one that in a democracy is 
ceded to him by the people — to remake a constitutional order and in the meantime to rule 
in its stead.  “Schmitt coined the term ‘sovereign dictatorship’ to designate the provisional 
legislative authority, exercised in the name of the people, which dissolves an old constitution 
and enacts a new one.  This sort of revolutionary political authority is usually called a 
‘constitutional convention,’ ‘constituent assembly,’ or ‘pouvoir constituant.’”107   
But while in early works Schmitt insisted on a bright-line distinction between the 
two, remarking:  “Either sovereign dictatorship or constitution; the one excludes the 
other,”108 he recognized that in practice the Weimar constitution permitted the Republic’s 
president, even if acting in the mode of a commissarial dictatorship, and even absent popular 
will or command to do so, to alter the constitution itself in conjunction with a parliamentary 
majority, thus rendering them together bearers of the pouvoir constituant, and therefore 
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themselves sovereign rather than the people.  This evidence from Weimar, though in general 
terms simply one more example of that constitution’s inherent contradictions, soon led 
Schmitt to reconsider the firmness of the distinction between commissarial and sovereign 
dictators, which in later works he tended to blur.109 
The lack of a clean line between commissarial and sovereign dictatorship in the 
Weimar constitutional scheme was far from the only concern Schmitt had.  For Schmitt, the 
benefit of the law inhered not in its own justice (as it did for instance for Kelsen), but rather 
in its ability to end (or at least settle for the life of the state) the struggle over justice.110  But 
the Weimar constitution enshrined a liberal Rechtsstaat version of pluralism that allowed 
parties and interest groups — beholden not to the state as a whole, but to their own 
fractious constituencies — to compete internally for power, including the power of 
parliament to rewrite parts of the constitution itself.  This pluralism, rooted in the 
constitutional system, Schmitt saw as tantamount to a barely contained civil war, in which 
parties and interest groups eviscerated the leviathan state from within.111  Schmitt saw 
pluralism, particularly in the context of Weimar, as an attempt to keep governmental power 
at a minimum so that it could not disrupt a fragile, trucelike status quo among parties and 
interests with vastly divergent and often existentially contradictory political views.  He thus 
argued that the Weimar truce would devolve into a radically decentered polity set on the 
road to catastrophe.112 
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This conception of Weimar as a kind of slow-moving civil war is vital to 
understanding Schmitt’s seeming advocacy for sovereignty being placed in a single 
presidential or dictatorial figure.  Schmitt’s point is not, as is often asserted, that single-
person sovereigns are always preferable to democratic sovereignty (though the focus of 
much of his work seems to indicate a personal preference for such sovereigns in the German 
context), but rather that when democratic sovereignty is combined with the liberal Rechtsstaat, 
including especially one that divides power among governmental branches and allocates to 
parliament the power to amend the constitution in the context of an interest-group based 
multiparty system, the popular will gets ignored or distorted.  In that case, some single 
person, preferably in the executive branch, is best positioned to serve as the guardian of the 
constitution and thus the people’s sovereignty in a democratic state.  In this connection, the 
Weimar constitution was further flawed on Schmitt’s view in that it left the guardianship of 
the constitution in the hands of a constitutional court tasked with deciding disputes about 
constitutional provisions.113  We have seen above how well the constitutional court 
performed in the instance of the Republic’s exercise of emergency power over Prussia.114 
In the end, Schmitt’s concerns about the proper holder of authority to render 
decisions on constitutional interpretation and crisis situations is consistent with those parts 
of his theories that advocated democratic popular sovereignty.  The Weimar system’s central 
weakness, resulting from the contradictions and flaws noted above, was that it failed to save 
the German state “from a form of jurisprudence that refused to pose the question of the 
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friend and enemy of the constitution,” much less resolve that question.115  Indeed, his Legality 
and Legitimacy was aimed in chief at demonstrating that the emergency powers granted in 
Article 48 of the Weimar constitution were intended to permit executive bans on such 
parties as the Nazis and the Communists who, should they rise to power, had vowed to 
implement their own constitutive political views through constitutional amendment.  As 
enemies of the constitution itself, such parties could properly be resisted by the existing 
government acting as the constitution’s protector.116  And despite Schmitt’s many criticisms 
of the Weimar constitution, he wrote especially approvingly of two of its provisions.  Both 
its Preamble and its First Article specified that it, and the power of the Republic under it, 
derived ultimately from the people as “concrete political decisions” thereof.117  At the very 
least, Schmitt’s theories at times supported popular sovereignty.118  I turn now to Schmitt’s 
understandings of sovereignty and democracy, and their relationship to constitutional 
polities and orders. 
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Sovereignty, Democracy, and Constitutionalism in Schmitt 
Sovereignty in Schmitt 
In one of his most ambitious theoretical moves, Schmitt sought to reconceptualize 
sovereignty within the state form.  Schmitt argued, with an eye toward Max Weber, that 
because the modern state was losing its traditional monopoly on legitimate violence, classic 
theories of sovereignty were no longer adequate to explain how state power functioned and 
whence it derived.119  We have seen above that Schmitt sought to investigate the meaning 
and role of the rule of law in connection with political systems, inquiring in part to what 
degree lawfulness of rule was connected to legitimacy, and under what circumstances.120  As 
we know, Schmitt concluded that law could not be insulated from politics in terms of 
ultimate decision-making authority vested in human actors.121  Schmitt’s attempt to theorize 
the content of modern sovereignty led to his seminal work 1922 work Political Theology 
(Politische Theologie), in which he identified sovereignty with the political capacity to decide 
upon both the existence of and the solution to interpretive gaps in existing law and norms 
with respect to exceptional circumstances.122 
Politische Theologie famously opens with the German sentence, “So[u]verän ist, wer über 
den Ausnahmezustand entscheidet,”123 usually translated into English in accordance with George 
Schwab’s reading:  “Sovereign is he who decides on the exception.”124  Two translation 
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issues immediately present themselves.  The first is relatively minor:  the German preposition 
über ordinarily means above, but in this context can mean on, upon, or about.  Thus in 
German as well as in Schwab’s English representation, the sovereign somewhat ambiguously 
decides “whether there is an extreme emergency as well as what must be done to eliminate 
it.”125  In the former instance, when the sovereign decides that an exceptional circumstance 
obtains, she is not identifiable in advance, but rather reveals herself as sovereign by 
authoritatively declaring the existence of an exception.126  Schmitt himself notes that because 
“[p]ublic order and security manifest themselves very differently in reality” depending upon 
who decides what they are and when they are in jeopardy, figuring out who is sovereign is in 
part a function of figuring out who defines authoritatively, in the sense of being capable of 
implementing that definition decisionally, public order and security.127 
The second and thornier translation question, in particular for my appropriation of 
Schmitt’s theory in the microsovereign context of jury nullification, involves the precise 
meaning of Ausnahmezustand.  In various contexts, even the same translators will sometimes 
render Ausnahmezustand differently.  For example, George Schwab, Giorgio Agamben, David 
Dyzenhaus, and Michael Hoelzl and Graham Ward translate it as “exception” or sometimes 
“state of exception.”128  Gopal Balakrishnan, Robert Howse, and John McCormick translate 
it as “emergency” or “emergency situation.”129  Renato Cristi variously translates it in the 
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same essay as “extreme conflict,” “extreme case,” and “exceptional circumstances.”130  And 
Joseph Bendersky translates it as “exceptional case.”131  In some instances, Schmitt’s English 
translators comment further on their linguistic choices.  Heiner Bielefeldt claims that while 
Ausnahmezustand can correctly be translated as “state of exception,” its true meaning in 
Schmitt’s usage is “state of emergency.”132  Schwab elaborates on and limits the scope of his 
translation in Political Theology by remarking in a translation note that “a state of exception 
includes any kind of severe economic or political disturbance that requires the application of 
extraordinary measures.”133  Bendersky refers to the central meaning of Ausnahmezustand as a 
disruption or endangerment of the normal order.134 
Andreas Kalyvas argues that scholars and translators have conflated two concepts 
both signified by Ausnahmezustand, namely the extraordinary, which refers to sovereign 
constitutional foundings and refoundings, and the exception, which involves emergency 
situations not originating in sovereign acts that threaten the present constitutional order’s 
existence.135  For Kalyvas, “[d]uring [ ] extraordinary moments, the slumbering popular 
sovereign wakes up to reaffirm its supreme power of self-determination and self-government 
and to substantially rearrange or alter the fundamental norms, values, and institutions that 
regulate ordinary legislation and institutionalized politics.”136  This differs of course from 
what happens during exceptional emergencies, when a sovereign guardian of a republic takes 
on the power to act extraconstitutionally in the name of preserving constitutional norms.  
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Indeed, for Kalyvas, this conflation, which is also Schmitt’s responsibility, accounts for the 
failure of his theories of constitutional democracy and popular sovereignty to differentiate 
clearly among distinct sovereign moments.  On his view, this conflation led Schmitt to 
“endors[e] an omnipotent personalistic executive power with a plenitude of dictatorial 
powers, thus substituting the extraordinary with the exception, foundings with 
emergencies.”137 
What is at stake in this battle of translations is whether Schmitt sought to mark as 
sovereign only decisions regarding an empirically verifiable emergency — a situation that 
threatens the state — or whether his theory of sovereignty can be extended to other 
exceptional or extraordinary circumstances, and if so, how far into situations that while 
exceptional in the sense that they were not foreseen by ordinary law are not significant in 
terms of their threat to the state or its ongoing viability.  Schmitt himself states that the 
exception “can best be characterized as a case of extreme peril, a danger to the existence of 
the state, or the like,” but nonetheless “cannot be circumscribed factually and made to 
conform to a preformed law.”138  He also insists that “the exception is to be understood to 
refer to a general concept in the theory of the state, and not merely to a construct applied to 
any emergency decree or state of siege,” thus delinking it to an extent from particular state 
crisis situations.139  Schmitt also uses a different vocabulary in The Concept of the Political, 
discussed in greater depth in Chapter 5, employing the term Ernstfall (typically translated as 
“emergency”) to designate a dire emergency of the state in which everything is at stake.140  
Elsewhere, in his Constitutional Theory, Schmitt holds that “[t]he question of sovereignty [ ] is 
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the decision on an existential conflict.”141  Thus it appears that the political or apolitical 
intent of his English translators notwithstanding, Schmitt vacillated at least somewhat 
between his commitment to keeping the “exception” sufficiently open and ambiguous to 
encompass any unforeseen legal-political circumstance of some significance to the state, and 
his commitment to examining first and foremost exceptional circumstances in which the 
state’s existence is fundamentally threatened.   
Characteristic of the confusion this ambiguity breeds is Balakrishnan’s claim, despite 
his translation of Ausnahmezustand as “emergency situation,” that “Schmitt thought that even 
short of an extreme emergency in which all legal protections and jurisdictional boundaries 
are suddenly suspended, the problem of the exception, of ‘gaps’ in the legal order, was 
unavoidable,” such that decisions even on nonemergency interpretive gaps in the law 
amount to sovereign decisions.142  And this “softer” read of the exception is implicit in 
claims Schmitt makes outside of Political Theology, as, for instance, in his Constitutional Theory.  
There, Schmitt differentiates between the bourgeois Rechtsstaat’s and its defenders’ rhetorical 
emphasis on equality before the law, which is generally an attribute of legislative, statutory 
law, and the inevitably personalistic decisionist character of administrative or executive acts, 
which necessarily aim at particular people, and thus never are applied equally, noting that 
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“[t]here is no equality before the individual command because, in terms of its content, it is 
entirely determined by the individual circumstance of the single case.”143 
For Schmitt, “[w]hat characterizes an exception is principally unlimited authority, 
which means suspension of the entire existing order.  In such a situation it is clear that the 
state remains, whereas law recedes.”144  From this, two important questions arise:  First, who 
is the source of this authority — that is, in whose name does the unlimited authority act?  
And second, who actually exercises this authority in the time during which law has receded?  
In Schmitt’s view, the critical and more important of these two questions was “Quis 
judicabit?” or “Who decides?” among the multiple interpretive perspectives laying equal claim 
to morality or legitimacy in the context of political power.145 
Recall from the discussion above of Schmitt’s critiques of legal positivism and of 
liberalism that the answer for him to the question as to who decides cannot slough decision 
off onto law or a constitution. “‘Rule of law’ is an empty manner of speaking if it does not 
receive its actual sense through a certain opposition.  This fundamental idea of the 
Rechtsstaat contains . . . the rejection of the rule of persons.”146  Rejecting a line of thought 
tracing back to Aristotle’s claim that absent rule of law one has rule by people, which 
amounts to demagoguery, Schmitt argues that the rule of law is only ever fictitious, and that 
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failing to see through this fiction leads one to misunderstand how politics works.147  In 
Schmitt’s words: 
Law in the sense of the political concept of law is concrete will and command and an 
act of sovereignty. . . . Law in a democracy is the will of the people . . . . A logically 
consistent Rechtsstaat aspires to suppress the political concept of law, in order to set 
a ‘sovereignty of the law’ in the place of a concrete sovereignty.  In other words, it 
aspires, in fact, to not answer the question of sovereignty . . . . [T]his must lead to 
concealments and fictions, with every instance of conflict posing anew the problem 
of sovereignty.148 
 
Emphasis on the sovereignty of a constitution “diverts attention from the concept of 
sovereignty proper, or more abstractly, the concept of a [spurious] ‘sovereignty of justice and 
reason’ in the place of a concrete existing political sovereignty.”149  Rather, Schmitt holds 
with Thomas Hobbes that “sovereignty of law means only the sovereignty of men who draw 
up and administer this law.”150  The idea that law can be sovereign is thus expressly and 
repeatedly excluded from Schmitt’s theory. 
What about the people?  In the next part of this section, I outline Schmitt’s 
understanding of democracy, the role of the people as sovereign in democratic contexts, and 
his view that a people must be in some sense homogeneous.  First, though, we must 
confront the question whether Schmitt’s theory really comprehends the people as capable of 
sovereignty at all, and if so, in what ways.  Secondary scholarship on Schmitt reveals no 
consensus as to his views on the possibility of popular sovereignty.  Henrich Meier argues 
that “[n]o theoretician who intended to support the sovereignty of the people would think of 
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presenting the teaching of sovereignty that Schmitt presents.”151  George Schwab holds that 
in Schmitt’s theory, the people cannot properly be understood to be sovereign because they 
recede after deciding upon constitutional norms, laws, or political acts.152  Other scholarship, 
however, emphasizes ways in which Schmitt’s analysis of sovereignty might be interpreted to 
favor democratic sovereignty.  Schwab, for instance, elsewhere writes that despite all the 
many instances in which Schmitt appears to favor a single powerful state leader, “by 
postulating a grassroots form of political legitimacy, Schmitt implicitly expressed his 
reservation about one-man rule.”153  And in Renato Cristi’s view, Schmitt’s analysis can serve 
to ground sovereignty in the people:  “Acts of sovereignty will inevitably occur.  But ‘these 
acts of inevitable sovereignty’ are better justified when they are seen as grounded on the 
constituent power of the people.’”154 
Some of this may be a result of the temporal development of Schmitt’s theory.  
Though in his early works Schmitt generally identified decisionism with authoritarian action 
restraining popular sovereignty, his emphasis later on the element of the sovereign will could 
equally support popular sovereignty in the sense of the people’s will.155  But a more subtle 
distinction is at work here.  Schmitt’s interest in popular sovereignty arguably limits it to 
specific moments in the life of democratic polities.  In particular, Schmitt’s interest in 
popular sovereignty centers primarily on founding moments, when, for him, the people’s 
power is at its zenith.  For Schmitt, at times of founding, “the sovereign is the constituent 
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subject.”156  Thus Schmitt characterizes approvingly popular sovereignty in Hobbes’s 
conception as being asserted momentarily only to be destroyed in favor of the newly 
constructed sovereign leviathan.157  Schmitt sought to show how political power could 
originate democratically as part of his project of rethinking sovereignty in the democratic age, 
and did so by mobilizing both Hobbesian absolutism as well as the concept of the pouvoir 
constituant propounded by French revolutionary theorist Emmanuel-Joseph Sieyès.158  Under 
this theory, the sovereign people is always extant potentially, but its active force is limited to 
moments of founding.  Thus constituent power, no matter how radical and insurgent, is not 
the same as a theory of ongoing participatory democracy in Schmitt.159  Rather, “political 
stability demands from the sovereign people that it express[ ] itself only in extraordinary 
moments and that it refrain[ ] from exercising continuously its constituent power at close 
intervals.”160  The people’s exercise of “[a] true sovereign decision . . . escapes subsumption 
under any rules or norms because it constitutes their ultimate origin.”161  That is, popular 
sovereignty in a sense derives from a role in the extraordinary case — the founding moment. 
Popular sovereignty in Schmitt thus appears not to have a central role in the 
quotidian operation of the state, but rather sits next to, or hovers above, the popularly 
constituted state, always ready to be mobilized to decide — in Schmitt’s theory by majority 
vote or by acclamation — what to do in the exceptional crisis of founding or refounding a 
new state when the old one has failed.  For Kalyvas, this limited role for the demos 
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nonetheless represents an importantly radical claim on Schmitt’s part.  “By locating parts of 
the constituent power of the people next to the constitution, Schmitt’s approach opens up the 
possibility for rethinking the survival of democratic participation within a lasting 
constitutional state.”162  In a Schmittian democracy, the continuing existence of a sovereign 
people after establishment of the constitution ultimately prevents the constitutional order 
from achieving complete closure; precisely because it is sovereign, the sovereign people 
could always shatter any constitutional formulation, and replace it with a new one.163   
 
Schmitt’s Views on Democracy and Popular Homogeneity 
Given the debate over whether Schmitt can be considered to have favored 
democracy at all, it is not surprising that the nature of his understanding of “democracy” 
itself raises considerable controversy.  First, both in ordinary usage and in Schmitt’s theory, 
“democratic politics has [ ] come to mean the regime of popular sovereignty.164  Second, 
Schmitt does not equate democracy or popular sovereignty with a representative regime.  
Indeed, he sees the latter as a dangerous institution that undermines the quintessential 
characteristic of a demos:  its political unity.  Thus in a democracy, the necessary participation 
of all state citizens (even if such participation numerically fictive in the sense that some 
citizens do not participate, or do not agree with the outcome of a majoritarian or 
supermajoritarian decision) produces the self-identity of these participants as a people with a 
political unity in a process that does not allow for any kind of representation.165   
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Representation is, for Schmitt, an undemocratic element in a democracy.166  If the 
representative body in a polity becomes too strong, it violates the democratic principle of 
identity of the people with the sovereign government, a concept Schmitt borrows from 
Rousseau.167  This is so because identity and representation are opposing concepts.  A state is 
born when a people exercises pouvoir constituant to bring itself into being as such, and at this 
point and thereafter “[i]t need not and cannot be represented.”168  “[O]nly all adult members 
of the people act and then only in the moment when they are assembled as the community 
or as the army.”169  There is no popular sovereignty in representative bodies, which break the 
unity of the people by identifying some as decisive and others as merely capable of electing 
deciders.  In addition to the identity of the sovereign people with their government that does 
not allow for representation, Schmitt’s understanding of democracy also carries the 
requirement of unity, which connects to a kind of homogeneity of the people, and thus goes 
beyond Rousseau’s more technical formulation of the identity of the ruler with the ruled.  
For Schmitt, “[d]emocracy is a state form that corresponds to the principle of identity (in 
particular the self-identity of the concretely present people as a political unity).”170 
What exactly constructs the homogeneous unity of the democratic principle is very 
much in question among Schmitt scholars.  Schmitt himself left the field relatively open, 
though he is often accused of having done otherwise.  In a discussion focused more on 
international relations than the internal workings of states, Schmitt argued for a restructuring 
of the international order around a system of Großräume or “great spaces,” rather than nation 
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states, each of which should be organized around a homogeneous Volk or “people” who 
would rule over all others living within that great-space territory.  Yet his version of a Volk, 
rather than centering on supposedly natural racial or ethnic characteristics, required “a great 
measure of conscious discipline, increased organization, and the capacity to create out of 
one’s power what could only be created and secured with enormous resources of 
understanding, namely a modern polity.”171  Schmitt’s homogeneous people, at least in this 
context, is more functionally defined than based on race or ethnicity.  Likewise functionally, 
for Schmitt “the state rested on the identity of the Volk as a political unit constituted 
through its national will to distinguish friend and enemy.”172  This latter claim is mirrored as 
well in Schmitt’s identification of political unity with equality.  Because in a democracy the 
people are in some important sense alike — again, precisely in what sense is left open — 
they are in this sense equal.  “The equality that is part of the essence of a democracy thus 
orients itself internally and not externally:  within a democratic state system, all members of the 
state are equal.”173  Thus the homogeneous state can establish and recognize its members as 
internally equal, while at the same time setting apart nonmembers (including members of 
other states) as unequal to them and as potential enemies.174 
Nonetheless, most scholarly commentary has focused not on functional definitions 
of political unity in Schmitt’s thought, but rather on finding in Schmitt’s work definitions 
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tied to race, nationality, and ethnicity, most likely because these cohere with Schmitt’s 
participation in the Nazi movement and criticism of his work based thereon.  Thus, for 
instance, Jeffrey Seitzer and Christopher Thornhill claim that “Schmitt argues that modern 
democratic states in societies with complexly structured [i.e. racially or ethnically pluralistic] 
populations and franchises, can never obtain fully democratic legitimacy, for democracy in 
the strictest sense means that government is conducted on the basis of a self-identical will, 
formed and shared by all constituents of the state.”175  Yet this overlooks the possibility that 
the self-identical will could be grounded on something other than shared race or ethnicity.  
This same urge to connect Schmitt’s homogeneity to something antithetical to all forms of 
pluralism inclines John McCormick to claim that Schmitt is “simply wrong” to claim that 
democracy must be founded on the presupposition of a homogeneous, unified people, citing 
“many theories of democracy that allow for pluralism among parties, diversity among 
individuals, negotiation among classes, and so on.”176  Schmitt’s theory, however, can be 
applied to radically plural populations within a single state, provided that there is, over against 
such pluralities, some other source of political unity. 
What exactly does Schmitt have to say about the nature of political unity in a 
democracy?  Though he often asserts the need for it, he rarely supplies such unity with any 
substantive content, a move, I argue, that allows his theory to be opened up to novel forms 
of unity he may not have foreseen or even understood as unifying.  In this respect I agree 
with Heiner Bielefeldt that “[t]he question of what [ ] substantial homogeneity should consist 
of [in Schmitt’s thought] is deliberately left open.  One may think of common tradition, 
language, ethnic origin, religion, or ideology,” but of course if deliberately left open, this list 
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cannot be exclusive.177  And those who have tried to work through Schmitt’s understanding 
of this concept have not done much better:  both theorists on the left and on the right have 
sought to find resources for creating homogeneous political forms in traditions and organic 
communities, for instance, “without revealing much about where exactly such integral 
resources were to be found.”178  For Schmitt, “[e]very democracy, even the parliamentary 
variety, fundamentally rests on a presupposed homogeneity that is thorough and 
indivisible.”179  This political unity is coterminous with the unity of a nation, because a nation  
denotes a people as a unity capable of political action, with the consciousness of its 
political distinctiveness and [ ] the will to political existence, while the people not 
existing as a nation is somehow only something that belongs together ethnically or 
culturally, but [ ] is not necessarily a bonding of men existing politically.180   
 
So by negative implication, ethnicity and culture do not suffice as unifying political factors, 
yet at the same time may be among the potential sources of political unity. 
In perhaps his most explicit statement of possible factors involved in constructing a 
political unity, Schmitt claims that “[t]he quality of belonging to a people can be defined by 
very different elements (ideas of common race, belief, common destiny, and tradition).”181  
Schmitt also adds another source of unity, arguing that “[t]he substance of democratic 
equality can be found in commonly held religious convictions.  Inside religious communities, 
an equality of all members arises to the extent that all sincerely agree on essentials.”182   
Taken together, these hints at what a political unity could be for Schmitt simply do not 
support the claims of his detractors that his homogeneous democracy thesis amounted to a 
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national socialist-type insistence on racial or religious purity.  Ulrich Preuss, for instance, 
denounces Schmitt’s homogeneity requirement as mandating a “‘sameness’ based on race, 
ethnicity, common history, culture, or language.”183  This both misstates the list of factors 
Schmitt provides in Constitutional Theory, and closes it off, misinterpreting Schmitt’s example 
factors as an exclusive list.  Preuss later truncates even his own list to “ethnic and national 
sameness,”184 implicitly damning Schmitt’s theory by linking it to Nazi doctrines of racial 
purity.  Nor is Preuss alone.  Andreas Kalyvas takes to task Jürgen Habermas and William 
Scheuerman, among others, for improperly promoting misleading views of Schmitt’s theory 
in this regard.  Habermas, for instance, “caricature[s democratic homogeneity] as an ethnic 
and racist theory,” even though nothing in Schmitt’s Weimar era writings demonstrates a 
necessary connection between constituent sovereignty of the people and common ethnic 
origins.185  He notes further that Scheuerman, who makes roughly the same claim, provides 
no textual evidence for it.186  Likewise, Ellen Kennedy points out that “[a]lthough Schmitt’s 
conception of democratic homogeneity has frequently been misinterpreted as simply 
requiring that the people be a naturally (or racially) homogeneous community, in fact the 
argument . . . does not depend on any such homogeneity.”187  Indeed, “Schmitt never 
postulated that [ ] belonging to a people could only be envisaged in racial terms.”188 
What these limiting characterizations of the scope of homogeneity in Schmitt also 
obscure is the possibility for new forms of homogeneity, including some that would do 
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violence to the core of Schmitt’s theory, but nonetheless render it useful in modified form 
for pluralistic modern states.  Chantal Mouffe, for example, agrees with Schmitt that a 
political democracy can only belong to a specific people, while noting that in this connection 
Schmitt 
never postulated that this belonging to a people could be envisaged only in racial 
terms.  On the contrary, he insisted on the multiplicity of ways in which the 
homogeneity constitutive of a demos could be manifested.  He says, for instance, 
that the substance of equality “can be found in certain physical and moral qualities, 
for example, in civic virtue, in arete, the classical democracy of vertus (vertu).189 
 
Admittedly Mouffe’s aim in emphasizing the open-endedness of Schmitt’s homogeneity is to 
move beyond Schmitt’s core conception, “since his main concern is not democratic 
participation but political unity.”190  In fact, Mouffe, like other left-leaning students of Schmitt, 
seeks to rework his theory of homogeneity in order to ground it on a concrete participatory 
commonality based on constitutionalism itself. 
Taking a hint from Schmitt student Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, who argues that 
constitutional law can itself serve to construct political unity,191 Mouffe and Reinhold 
Mehring, among others, see possibilities for democratic homogeneity built on an ideational 
ground.192  Mehring in particular reviews a 1961 proposal by Dolf Sternberger that the 
horizons of Schmitt’s democratic theory be expanded to include a kind of “constitutional 
patriotism” defined as a “loyal identification with the political constitution as a form of 
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general consensus regarding one’s political identity.”193  Likewise, Mouffe, admittedly using 
Schmitt selectively, in particular resisting his critique of liberal democracy’s contradictions 
and instead trying to find ways to acknowledge them without conceding that they make that 
combination infeasible, argues that advocates of liberal democracy should, contra Schmitt, 
“put[ ] into question any idea of ‘the people’ as already given.”194  Mouffe takes Schmitt’s 
conceptions as leaving open the inevitable possibility of a political unity founded on 
constitutional norms.195  One result of this theoretical commitment on her part is that it 
leaves permanently open a space for contestation between the liberal principles of a 
Rechtsstaat constitution and the latent but always potentially active constitutive power of a 
democratic people united either in dormant form by the extant constitutional order, or in 
ascendant form by the values of a newly constituted order.196  In this way, Mouffe would 
seek to avoid the related tendencies, identified by Schmitt as inherent in liberal democracy, 
that democracies’ dominance in modernity would lead to conservative rather than liberal 
political outcomes, and that democracies would have great difficulty, despite the liberal 
Rechtsstaat’s commitment to doing so, in protecting minorities from the will of the 
majority.197   
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There is moreover some indication that Schmitt might have left room in his own 
theorizing for a democratic homogeneity established upon shared constitutional 
commitments, although he appears not to have said much about precisely how this would 
work in practice in light of the dilemmas Mouffe elucidates.  In a 1930 lecture, “Ethic of the 
State and Pluralistic State,” Schmitt argued that democratic unity in some cases “rests in 
particular on the constitution recognized by all parties, which must be respected without 
qualification as the common foundation.  The ethic of state then amounts to a constitutional 
ethic.”198  Kalyvas cites this lecture in the course of arguing that Schmitt’s concepts might be 
useful to support a kind of constitutional democratic unity, grounded in shared ethics 
cemented in an existing constitution, while also noting that Schmitt saw such unity as 
capable of resisting the centrifugal forces of other kinds of pluralism, and one that moreover 
required a commitment of at least some pluralist institutions (specifically political parties) to 
remain viable.199 
Whether Mouffe’s attempt to meet Schmitt’s claim of contradiction between 
liberalism and democracy with a proposed democratic hegemony based upon constitutional 
or legal values can succeed depends in part upon the role of the people with respect to the 
constitutional order.  It is to that issue, and specifically the question of distinct moments in 
the relationship between a democratic people and a constitutional order, that I next turn.  
Borrowing from Kalyvas and, from Hinduism, a metaphorical shorthand, I identify three 
such moments in Schmitt’s thought.  In the first, the people (as self-constructed unity — for 
Schmitt ordinarily bound by majority decisions of those empowered to decide) decides upon 
norms, laws, and a constitutional order for a newly founded (or refounded) state.  This 
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moment involves the people’s use of its pouvoir constituant, and can be thought of as 
comparable to the role of Brahma, the creator, in the Hindu grand trinity.  In the second, the 
people are quiescent, and stand next to (or above) the constitutional order, which has been 
founded, settled, and is intended to remain stable at least for the time being, though always 
potentially subject to popular sovereignty.  This moment resembles Vishnu, the preserver.  
Finally, when the constitutional order’s stability decays sufficiently, usually because it falls 
out of step with the latent popular will, the people exercises its right to revolt, destroying the 
constitution and clearing the way for a new refounding.  This moment is reminiscent of 
Shiva, the destroyer.200 
 
Founding the State:  The People in Action 
For Schmitt, the founding moment in a democracy is a moment of constitution, both 
in the sense that a written constitution is created that will preserve the democratic 
characteristics of the state, and in the sense that the act of founding establishes both a state 
and a demos.  “Constitution in the positive sense means the formation of [ ] political unity by 
conscious act, through which the unity receives its particular form of existence.”201  
Constitutions in this sense result from conscious decisions “which the political unity reaches 
for itself and provides itself through the bearer of the constitution-making power.”202  That 
bearer of the pouvoir constituant is, in democracies, the unified people, which comes into being 
precisely by and in the moment of constituting itself as such.  In Schmitt’s understanding, 
the decisive action of the people in founding a constitution is an absolute necessity.  “For its 
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validity as a normative regulation, . . . even constitutional law[ ] ultimately needs a political 
decision that is prior to it, . . . reached by a power or authority that exists politically.”203  Thus 
before constitutional rules or norms in the textual, preserving sense can be established, the 
people must first decide to declare itself as the unified bearer of the pouvoir constituant, a 
declaration which is in some sense fictive, given that there will inevitably be some degree of 
dissent among the people however constructed.  In the American context, as will be seen in 
greater detail in Chapter 3, the Preamble to the Constitution’s declaration that “We the 
People” found the state amounts to a memorialization of such a decision in Schmitt’s 
terms.204  The temporal priority of the founding constitution of the people is also important 
in Schmitt’s theory:  textual constitutions for him are not social contracts that in turn found 
the state.  Rather a founding of the people itself is necessarily prior to and presupposed in 
the creation by that people of a textual constitution containing norms and rules for the 
preservation of the democratic state.205  Some number of actually existing humans bound by 
some form of homogeneity simultaneously identify themselves as “the people,” develop 
some basis for knowing how they, united as a singular if fictive subject, will make and 
recognize their decisions, and constitute themselves as a unity.  Only after this do they make 
a constitution in the legal or contractual sense.  Thus “[t]he very act of creating a 
constitutional order [amounts to] a sovereign act of decisionism on the part of those . . . 
instituting that system”206 — meaning in a democracy, the persons who have made of 
themselves a people.  This people thereafter may act directly, or through specific, revocable 
delegation of power to a constituent assembly, but does not need and is not properly served 
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by permanently empowered representatives.207  That is, if the people as pouvoir constituant acts, 
it does so only through its own decisions, which it may delegate to others to enact, but which 
it may not leave up to representatives to make on its behalf.  It is in this sense that 
constitution-making assemblies of delegates differ from conventional representative 
legislative bodies.208 
This understanding of the role of the pouvoir constitutant in connection with the 
founding of states and constitutional orders helps make sense of other components of his 
theorizing.  For example, it connects to his deep suspicion of legal positivism, in that for 
Schmitt a constitution, like ordinary law, cannot serve as a basis for sovereignty in terms of 
authoritative decision making.  Rather, the sovereign authority of the people is what makes a 
constitutional text possible.209  The idea of a constitution being a potentially sovereign 
document specifying the source, use, and limits of state power is, for Schmitt, a modern one 
of bourgeois origin, and deeply in tension with the facts of sovereignty as he sees them.210  
Because, in Schmitt’s view, the will of the people stands before the constitution, no textual 
constitution can properly be understood to embody this will.211   
Worse still, on Schmitt’s read, considering constitutions to be sovereign is evasive:  
“[T]he actual political question whether the prince or the people are sovereign is evaded. . . . 
Neither the prince nor the people but rather ‘the constitution’ is sovereign.”212  Speaking of a 
“sovereignty of the constitution . . . only sidestepped and veiled” the question of sovereignty 
“behind the somewhat occult-like image of constitution making power of the 
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constitution.”213  The “sovereignty of the constitution” is thus a false portrayal and means of 
evading core political questions.214  Focusing instead on the people (in a democracy) as 
sovereign accords with Schmitt’s view that “[u]nder democracy, the people are the subject of 
the constitution-making power.”215  And that focus in turn can help make sense of the 
functions of various founding documents.  For instance, Schmitt, citing the United States 
Declaration of Independence as an example, notes that 
[t]he declaration of basic rights means the establishment of principles on which the 
political unity of the people rests and whose validity is recognized as the most 
important presupposition of the fact that this unity always produces and forms itself 
anew. . . . If through a great political act a new state system is founded or through a 
revolution a completely new principle of state integration is established, then a 
declaration is a natural expression of the intention, in the decisive moment, to give a 
certain turn to its own political destiny.216 
 
Here the link between founding (the Brahma moment) and revolution (the Shiva moment) is 
visible.  When the people of a state turn to a new political system, they sweep away the old 
one and announce new founding principles for themselves through their pouvoir constituant. 
Likewise, Schmitt theorized the connections between foundings of new states and 
ongoing maintenance of newly founded constitutional orders (the Vishnu moment).  For 
instance, as I will cover in greater detail in Chapter 3 with respect to the American system, 
constitutions tend to enshrine the exclusive means for their own alteration through 
amendment procedures, raising the question whether and when constitutional orders can be 
altered in ways not set forth within their own texts.  Schmitt saw this problem clearly and 
addressed it directly.  For him, oaths to constitutional texts could never properly include 
oaths to be bound by their amendment procedures, because an oath to a constitution is only 
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truly binding with respect to the form of political existence it establishes, e.g. democracy.217  
Likewise, “[t]here cannot be a regulated procedure, through which the activity of the 
constitution-making power would be bound.”218  Ultimately, constituent power is not 
restricted by constitutional amendment rules, because that power, having constituted those 
rules, remains always outside them and ready to act to alter an existing constitutional order 
other than through those means.219  Or as Schmitt put it inversely: 
The authority to undertake constitutional amendments resides in the framework of 
the constitution . . . and does not extend beyond it.  This authority does not include 
the power to establish a new constitution, and no power of the constitution can be 
gained in reference to this authority.220 
 
The power to constitute or reconstitute a state, which rests in the people in a democracy, is 
thus an extraordinary power — one that is prior to and outside any established constitutional 
order. 
 
Preserving the State:  The Constitutional Order and Latent Popular Will 
What roles do the people and the constitution play once the state is founded?  First, 
it is important to note that at a constitution’s core is its requirement that it not be altered 
through ordinary law, but only through specified amendment procedures.  A constitution 
thus stands above ordinary law.221  Ordinary law, on the other hand, is changeable.  “In a 
democracy, law is the momentary will of the people present at that time, that is to say, in 
practical terms, the will of a transient majority.”222  The constitution’s elevated status allows 
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it to stabilize the founding decisions of the people as a whole, rather than transient majorities 
of the people, in light of such transient majorities’ changeability.  A constitution cements 
founding principles and decisions of the people by safeguarding them both from changing 
views of the people itself and from action by their representatives or agents.223  Because of 
this, “a constitution of a politically existing people cannot only consist of [procedural] 
Rechtsstaat principles[, which] only form a moderating component of the constitution, 
which supplements the political principles.”224  That is, constitutions not only spell out legal 
protections for citizens and rules of government in the Rechtsstaat sense, but also have a 
component that enshrines the decision of the bearer of the pouvoir constituant in favor of some 
particular form of sovereignty within the state, such as that a dictator, or the people 
themselves, or representatives will render fundamental decisions. 
Of course as we have seen, Schmitt believed there were significant tensions between 
modern constitutions’ Rechtsstaat (liberal-procedural) and political (sovereignty allocating) 
elements, in particular in bourgeois democracies.  But despite his wariness of these tensions, 
he appears to have recognized that they were more or less inevitable within the modern state 
form.  Once the people have founded a constitution, they “become a ‘normalized’ and 
institutionalized constituent sovereign,”225 such that popular sovereignty “becomes, in other 
words, a proceduralized and institutionalized representative sovereignty.”226  Knowing this, 
Schmitt did not dismiss procedures out of hand, but rather opposed their appropriation by 
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liberal political discourses seeking to cement them for all time and so undermine the 
constitutive power of the people.227 
Schmitt believed, nonetheless, that constitutional orders were pragmatic and 
necessarily limited forms of stability.  For him, “[e]very constitution of a real state must 
adapt itself to political circumstances, just as the abstract outline of a building must adapt to 
its foundation and to other substantive facts.”228  Schmitt recognized that the inherent 
tension between Rechtsstaat and politically sovereign elements of modern democratic 
constitutions — the former intended to channel power through rule of law, and the latter 
marking the discretionary power of the sovereign elements of the state to act without legal 
limits — would lead eventually to political instability; in particular in liberal parliamentary 
democracies, Schmitt anticipated that stability would be short-lived as pluralist elements, 
whether formal political parties or otherwise, tore the homogeneous people apart despite 
following procedural rules.  In Balakrishnan’s view, Schmitt “recognized that it is only in the 
struggle between parties vying for hegemony over ‘the people’ that the latter is mobilized as 
an agent, and becomes something more than the empty signifier of an imagined 
community.”229  I think that this understates the people’s latent role, even in Schmitt’s 
conception, but the core point is clear:  pluralist democracies on Schmitt’s view decay, as 
plural elements fight to define the content of “the people.”  As Schmitt himself put it, “[i]f 
the state becomes a pluralistic party state, the unity of the state can be maintained only as 
long as two or more parties agree to recognize common premises,” i.e. reach homogeneous 
agreement on some fundamental political or legal tenets. 230 
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And what of the people’s latent role?  Here Schmitt comes in for some significant, 
and I believe warranted, criticism for failing fully to theorize the latent role of the people in 
the context of extant democratic polities.  Schmitt believed that within an established 
democracy, 
[t]he people can only respond yes or no.  They cannot advise, deliberate, or discuss.  
They also cannot set norms, but can only sanction norms by consenting to a draft set 
of norms laid before them.  Above all, they also cannot pose a question, but can only 
answer with yes or no to a question placed before them.231 
 
It follows from this, of course, that some authoritative body must be empowered to 
formulate and place before the people proper questions to be answered by them without 
misusing such power, a set of requirements he believed were rarely met in democratic 
practice.232  Thus “the democratic will in Schmitt is a combination of the power of a man or 
minority to ask the people a question and the peoples’ [sic] right to answer.”233  The people 
have here receded substantially from their prior prominence as bearers of the pouvoir 
constituant.  Once they have established a constitution, and until they do so again, they become 
passive in Schmitt’s view, waiting to vote up or down (whether through plebiscite or through 
less formal means of acclamation) on questions properly posed by state actors given 
authority through the constitution to pose them.  In this regard, then, for Schmitt, “[p]opular 
sovereignty seemed to be becoming what it should be in a stabilized constitutional 
democracy:  an all-pervasive idiom of political life, a formless source of legitimating 
acclamation.”234 
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But this seems to leave out of the argument who will pose questions for acclamation 
(or rejection), and how such question posers relate to the people hovering above the 
founded democratic state.  This, argues George Schwab, “is a perversion of a true 
democracy, because of the dependence of the people on the question being asked.”235  “This 
idea of acclamation as a type of direct rule,” Kalyvas claims, “is unsustainable, even 
laughable.”236  In adopting a narrow view of the popular democratic role during normal 
times as limited to acclamation, 
Schmitt ignored forms of radical contestation that do not target the constitution 
directly but rather endeavor to challenge peripheral constellations of everyday power 
relations, local forms of domination, and more hidden practices that escape from the 
pincers of the legal system and thus from the constituent power.237 
 
I agree in general with these criticisms.  Schmitt’s theorizing of the Vishnu moment of 
constitutional democracy leaves the people largely out of the picture, except for its potential 
to act in the face of dire need, tantamount to entering the Shiva moment.  Schmitt theorizes 
the day-to-day inadequately.  Indeed, a core aim of this dissertation is to show how 
microsovereign popular action in the context of jury nullification (which not coincidentally 
amounts to juries engaging in acclamation or rejection of questions put to them by state 
actors — prosecutors and judges — in the context of criminal trials) can serve to bring the 
people back in to quotidian exercises of sovereignty under law. 
Nonetheless, Schmitt’s focus was never on the norm, but rather on the exception.238  
Thus it should come as no surprise that even when examining examples of specific 
constitutions, he did so with an eye toward their making or their undoing.  For example, 
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Schmitt wrote approvingly of John Adams’s constitution for the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts, citing specifically its insistence (in parallel to the Declaration of 
Independence) that the people of the commonwealth could change their government even 
outside the constitution’s amendment procedures when its purpose was no longer fulfilled, 
and claiming that under such provisions political unity resulted from a pact of the entirety of 
the people with each citizen to guarantee that “[t]he entire body of citizens is presupposed as 
the political unity,” and thus as the bearer of the pouvoir constituant.239  Schmitt clearly was 
more focused on the first and third moments of constitutional democracy, in which the 
people would end existing constitutional orders in a process that would culminate in their 
founding new ones.  It is to the third, Shiva moment that I now turn. 
 
Resisting the State:  The People Reawakened 
Yet another debate in Schmitt scholarship asks whether Schmitt believed that a 
democratic people had the right to resist or revolt against its government. According to 
David Dyzenhaus, Schmitt believed that Immanuel Kant was right that the state’s position as 
supreme judge “excludes any individual right of resistance against the state.”240  Dyzenhaus is 
either wrong about this, or Schmitt is inconsistent on this point.  Schmitt does note that 
“Kant rejected the right of resistance outright because it contradicted the idea of the unity of 
the state,” but in this context Schmitt is reviewing, not endorsing, Kant’s ethic of state, 
which he in any event associates with the ethic of liberal individualism, which we have seen 
he clearly disfavors.241  “Do the people have a right to revolt?”  George Schwab claims that 
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“Schmitt makes no specific statement on this question.”242  Yet Schmitt does claim in that 
work at least that individuals have a right to resist in order to secure their basic rights.  The 
individual’s right to resist his government serves as the utmost means of protecting his and 
his fellow citizens’ basic rights.  It is inalienable, but also unorganizable, and an essential 
component of a democratic Rechtsstaat.243 
Some purchase on Schmitt’s thoughts on the right to resist or revolt can be found in 
his analysis of Thomas Hobbes’s Leviathan and associated theory of the state.  According to 
Schmitt, before Hobbes, in the era of the medieval state, “the feudal . . . ‘right to resist’ an 
unlawful ruler [was] self-understood. . . . The endeavor to resist the leviathan,” however, was 
made by Hobbes’s theory “practically impossible.”244  There is ordinarily no right to resist 
the leviathan, who as sovereign determines the law.245  In part, apparently, this is because the 
leviathan state is “[a] closed legal system [that] establishes the claim to obedience and 
justifies the elimination of every right to resistance.”246  Yet the modern Hobbesian leviathan 
state also generates “the assumption of total political responsibility regarding danger and, in 
this sense, responsibility for protecting subjects of the state.  If protection ceases, the state 
too ceases, and every obligation to obey ceases.  The individual then wins back his ‘natural’ 
freedom.”247   
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I believe that the best way to make sense of these claims, which seem to be in 
tension, is to recall that Schmitt’s theory of the state comprehends both normal legal order, 
which Schmitt sees as attempting always to assert its hegemony but also as fragile, and 
extraordinary circumstances, in which the political breaks through the norm.  After all, a 
central paradox to Schmitt’s political thinking is that the state aims to achieve order and 
stability, and yet is founded beyond order-maintaining law.248  “Schmitt is valuable because 
he stresses that all legal orders have an ‘outside.’”249  In the Hobbesian state, the normal legal 
order inheres in the capability of the leviathan to protect the people in return for their 
obedience.  When protection fails, the right of the people to revolt and disobey reasserts 
itself, outside the prior legally constituted order.250  On this read, it is erroneous to think that 
Schmitt sides with Kant and against rights to resist. 
Here I follow a line of argument developed by Andreas Kalyvas.  Recall that, as I 
have argued above, a constitutional founding (or refounding) is a legal break from the 
preceding constitutional norms.  Sovereign dictatorship — whether popularly instituted or 
exercised by a single dictator — is thus a “form of constituting politics.”251  Schmitt, however, 
in the context of defining and describing sovereign dictatorship, conflates the extraordinary 
with the exception.  Suspending the constitutional order is a form of dictatorship that flows 
from the exception.  Establishing a new constitutional order is an exercise of sovereignty 
identified with the new category Kalyvas introduces — the extraordinary.252  Because 
Schmitt saw dictatorship, even sovereign dictatorship, as a mandate on behalf of the 
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sovereign people rather than as exercise of sovereignty in its own right, his failure to keep 
the categories of the exceptional and the extraordinary distinct has led to difficulty in 
distinguishing between an extralegal, unauthorized democratic founding (such as the 
adoption of the US Constitution), democratic sovereign dictatorship, and the rule of a 
sovereign but democratically unaccountable dictator.253 
Once, however, it becomes clear that Schmitt not only anticipated but favored some 
latent right of the people to resist, revolt, and refound, it becomes easier to make sense of 
certain other of his claims.  Recall that Schmitt expressed concern about the modern total 
legal state and its attempt to subordinate everything to law — a concern closely linked to his 
deep discomfort with both legal positivism and the liberal Rechtsstaat.  This concern is 
typically mobilized against Schmitt to demonstrate his illiberal political commitments and 
even opposition to individual rights.  Yet lurking within Schmitt’s theory is an alternative 
conception, according to which he presciently identified a totalizing nature in law and the 
Rechtsstaat.  For as the liberal state proliferates law in an attempt to eliminate exceptional 
circumstances and thus decisions by human actors, it simultaneously subjects more and more 
of its citizens to increasingly complex legal restrictions.  Schmitt associated the turn toward 
the total state in modernity as primarily implicating a move toward proliferation of the 
administrative state form — one in which bureaucratic functionaries govern either according 
to the exercise of their own unchecked decisions, or in which they claimed to do otherwise, 
pointing always toward law as the source of all otherwise political decisions.254  Thus a state 
that did not give credence to or derive its foundations from a right to resist would have been, 
in Schmitt’s thought, a state that refused to deal with the concrete political realities of 
                                                
253 Ibid. 97. 
254 See Schmitt, Legality and Legitimacy, 6. 
 66 
administrative actors who either brazenly rule contrary to the popular will, or under the guise 
of following law accomplish the same results. 
In fact, Schmitt formulated consent of the people as bearers of the pouvoir constituant 
to be governed in a democracy not positively, but negatively in terms of a right to resist.  
“Legitimacy depends not on the overt compliance of those over whom authority is exercised 
but rather on their choice not to resist such authority.”255  That is, acclamation’s flip side is 
exercise of the right to resist, which is how the people reclaim their pouvoir constituant in the 
face of a failed government that does not correctly take into account the people’s 
acclamation or rejection on questions posed to it during the Vishnu moment, or perhaps 
simply fails to pose sufficient or proper questions.  Schmitt understood a political entity to 
be truly democratic only if it tolerated periodic emergencies in which the people could 
publicly and vocally show their power in such instances through, for example, mass 
demonstrations, rallies, and general strikes.256  Such public rejection of extant law or orders 
mirrors the ancient Roman “tumult” in which the plebs could, usually in some kind of crisis 
situation, demonstrate its unhappiness with current rulers.257 
Schmitt also seemed to contemplate, however, that “even under conditions of 
normal politics the people need, for reasons of democratic legitimacy, to periodically arise 
from within the constituted powers.  They do so through ‘inauthentic’ political forms and 
institutional channels, such as referenda and periodic plebiscites.”258  Schmitt holds that in 
these appearances and actions, “apocryphal acts [of popular sovereignty] inevitably reappear 
[ ] during everyday politics as [the people] strive[ ] to survive within an institutionalized 
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political system.”259  In this way, albeit without a great deal of careful consideration, Schmitt 
begrudgingly lets the people back into political action even during the more-or-less stable 
period of an established democratic order.  It thus seems at least possible that, on Schmitt’s 
understanding, the foreclosure of such apocryphal sovereign acts, of which I believe jury 
nullification to be one, by existing legal orders might lead to the people to engage in more 
tumultuous aimed at destroying the polis in order to clear the way for its refounding. 
What kinds of situations might give rise to the resurgent power of the people?  
Schmitt is less than comprehensive about this question, but does point to circumstances that 
might lead to a state’s downfall in this way.  In a corrupted state, on Schmitt’s view, the 
situation is one in which 
[l]egality and legitimacy [ ] become tactical instruments that each [side of a political 
struggle] can use for momentary advantage . . . . Even the constitution itself breaks 
up into its contradictory components and interpretive possibilities such that no 
normative fiction of a “unity” can prevent warring factions from making use of that 
part of the constitution . . . that they believe is best suited for knocking the opposing 
party to the ground in the name of the constitution.260 
 
In such a circumstance, “[t]he claim to legality renders every rebellion and countermeasure 
an injustice and a legal violation or ‘illegality.’  If legality and illegality can be arbitrarily at the 
disposal of the majority, then the majority can, above all, declare their domestic competitors 
illegal, . . . thereby excluding them from the democratic homogeneity of the people.”261   
Caution is warranted here.  Schmitt might appear to be foreclosing the possibility of 
a homogeneous democratic people whose unity is grounded in law or constitutional 
principles.  But to say that such a unity can be exploited by a majority acting in the name of 
the law is different from saying that no unity can be grounded in legal principles, including 
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agreement to adhere to some form of legal rule.  Rather, Schmitt, read as a whole, seems to 
be pointing out that while there might be good reasons to found democracy on a 
constitutionally normative unity, such democracies are unstable and fleeting, precisely 
because of the inherent tensions between democracy and the representative, party-
dominated Rechtsstaat.  This problem is only compounded by the fact that liberalism 
promotes the supremacy of statutory law, which is understood as safeguarding justice and 
freedom, but which in so doing threatens democratic sovereignty, including especially the 
right to resist, which is antithetical to the supremacy or sovereignty of existing law.262  This 
antithesis is why, as Giorgio Agamben observed, “in both the right of resistance and the 
state of exception, what is ultimately at issue is the . . . juridical significance of a sphere of 
action that is itself extrajuridical.”263  In any event, it is clear what course Schmitt would urge 
upon democratic citizens in response to a Rechtsstaat’s attempt to achieve a monopoly on 
legality, and thus on legitimacy:  “If the danger exists that democracy might be used in order 
to defeat democracy,” e.g. through the enactment and enforcement of antidemocratic 
statutes or amendments by a majority or supermajority, “then the radical democrat has to 
decide whether to remain a democrat against the majority or to give up his own position.”264 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter introduced Schmitt and his thought, with particular attention to his 
political commitments and role in attempting to save the Weimar Republic, including his role 
in its collapse, his adoption of at least certain elements of Nazi ideology, and his 
participation in the Nazi Reich.  It examined his theorizing in connection with its gradual 
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reception by theorists on the political left, as well as Schmitt’s views on legal positivism and 
liberalism.  Finally, it introduced Schmitt’s seminal understanding of sovereignty as the 
power to decide upon exceptional circumstances and what to do about them, before 
undertaking an exegesis of his problematic and sometimes inconsistent views on democracy, 
democratic homogeneity and the operation of democracy within constitutional systems.  
This work clears the ground for an application of these core principles in Schmitt’s thought 
to sovereignty in America.  In the next chapter, I discuss the American founding through 
close analysis of where America’s key founding documents appear to locate sovereignty.  I 
then in the subsequent chapter analyze the American situation according to Schmitt’s 
principles of sovereignty, in order that the remainder of the dissertation can better identify 
jury nullification’s role within the matrix of American sovereignty in accordance with 
Schmitt’s views. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
SOVEREIGNTY IN AMERICA 
 
 
Introduction 
Having detailed in the previous chapter Carl Schmitt’s theory of sovereignty as the 
exercise of ultimate decisional authority in exceptional circumstances, together with other 
relevant aspects of Schmitt’s views on democracy, liberalism, and constitutionalism, I turn 
now to applying his theories in the concrete context of the American founding.  In this 
chapter I will analyze both provisions of the US Constitution and arguments made in The 
Federalist, showing that the Framers established a republic built on radically diffuse, and as a 
result obscure, sovereignty.  In so doing, I will address authorship and rhetoric in The 
Federalist, the observable differences among the views of its authors, elements of sovereignty 
inherent in the Constitution and The Federalist as founding texts, the sovereign power to 
interpret these texts, and the fictive nature of “the people” as addressed in these texts.  With 
this foundation in place, I examine in the subsequent chapter the American situation 
through the critiques of liberal conceptions of sovereignty propounded by Carl Schmitt and 
some of the theorists who have extended his ideas. 
 
Diffuse Sovereignty in America 
Following the 2008 financial markets crisis, and throughout the Obama presidency, 
loosely affiliated grass-roots movements of citizens opposed to the Obama health care plan, 
finance and auto industry bailouts, and federal government regulation and spending in 
general have proliferated.  These groups, who self-identify with the Boston Tea Party, in 
which a group of American colonists protested British taxes through an act of civil 
disobedience, take inspiration and derive political legitimacy from principles they claim to 
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trace to the American founding, properly understood.  In particular, they advert to the US 
Constitution’s Ninth and Tenth Amendments, which respectively reserve rights not 
expressly identified in the Bill of Rights to the people, and powers not delegated to the 
federal government to the states or the people.1   
While these tea partiers’ messages are not unified — these groups and their members 
prize independence, including from one another — they appear to agree in general on a 
theory of the American founding and of constitutional jurisprudence that invests “the 
people” (and to a secondary degree the states acting through popular militias) with the 
ongoing right to resist, even by violent means, federal encroachments on the prerogatives of 
states and the rights of citizens.  For them, the most central crisis posed by recent political 
events is their further tilting of the original balance between the rights and powers of citizens 
and states on one hand, and the powers of the federal government on the other, in favor of 
the latter at the expense of the former.  They organize classes and book club readings, 
intending to inform themselves about the Constitution, the American Founding, and 
founding principles.  They largely conclude, in part on the basis of these investigations, that 
contemporary political actors including the Supreme Court have ceded too much power to 
the federal government through overly broad interpretations of Congress’s Article I powers 
(including those granted by the Welfare, Commerce, and Necessary and Proper Clauses).  
Betraying a preference for the Framers’ original intent over later democratic reforms, some 
even object to the Seventeenth Amendment’s provision for popular election of US Senators 
as upending an important state power originally designed to check the federal government.2  
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Many mobilize the Gadsden flag with its coiled snake emblem and “Don’t Tread on Me” 
motif, as well as Thomas Jefferson’s call to nourish the tree of liberty periodically with the 
blood of patriots and tyrants, as symbols of their willingness to take up arms to protect their 
originalist vision of the American republic.  In short, they reach for the words and images of 
the founding generation as evidence for the general claim that in America, power is and must 
remain fundamentally an attribute of the people (apparently even when mediated in ways 
designed to check popular sovereignty, as in the case of state legislatures’ role in electing US 
Senators prior to the Seventeenth Amendment). 
In so doing, I argue, they profoundly misread the Constitution and the Founders’ 
intent in drafting it and securing its ratification.  While the tea partiers’ views cohere with a 
set of important founding myths, and while they correctly point to a popular sovereignty 
deficit in contemporary America, close analysis of the Framers’ intent as memorialized in 
particular in the US Constitution and in The Federalist demonstrates that the nascent 
American republic did not fundamentally rest on popular sovereignty as that term is 
ordinarily understood.  Indeed, Schmitt at times is critical of American democracy on 
precisely this basis, arguing that its liberal Rechtsstaat elements hold popular democratic 
sovereignty at a distance from the core of American power.  Rather, the constitutional 
system was meant to channel popular constituent power through a diffuse series of 
mechanisms and actors, which make it more difficult to determine where power lies and 
who exercises it.  The Framers were self-consciously engaged in a key founding act:  the 
construction of functional myths, which overrode memory of the prior order, and 
established new ontological values; at the same time, they were both divided amongst 
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themselves and individually ambivalent with respect to the workings of power in the new 
republic.3 
 
American Sovereignty Conventionally Understood 
In contrast to tea party rhetoric, diffuse sovereignty is currently quite popular in 
America — in the sense of being embraced by most citizens.  A 2010 Penn Schoen Berland 
poll prepared for the Aspen Institute shows that “[b]y 64 to 19 [percent Americans] endorse 
the system of checks and balances as necessary to prevent one branch from dominating the 
Government.”  However, some of the mechanisms of diffuse sovereignty in America do not 
fare so well:  69 percent favor mandatory retirement for Supreme Court Justices, 66 percent 
favor term limits for Justices, and 51 percent want Justices to be subject to popular election, 
while 74 percent favor abolishing the electoral college.4  In a sense, this demonstrates that 
the Constitution has accomplished what the conventional view of American constitutional 
theory claims it has:  once the Constitution was established, the initial constituent power of 
the people was channeled through its new institutions, and restricted in its ability to amend 
the Constitution through its own textual procedures.5  This also, however, shows that in the 
contexts of the Constitution’s textual sovereignty as subjected to judicial interpretation, and 
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of the method of electing presidents, most Americans would like to see greater popular 
control, though they do not yet appear willing to oppose en masse judges appointed to 
lifetime positions or the electoral college. 
The founding ideal becomes, on this analysis, one that crystallized the values of the 
Revolution — setting up a political system that incorporates popular sovereignty in at least a 
rhetorical way, but that simultaneously constrains change, consistent with Schmitt’s analysis 
of the role of the people in an established constitutional order.  The Framers set up a 
political system that while not abandoning entirely the principles of the Declaration of 
Independence, “nonetheless . . . would demand obedience to its laws from a majority of 
adults — women, non-whites, and some white males — who were excluded from active 
participation in making those laws, whether directly or through their elected 
representatives.”6  Moreover, “the framers deliberately created a framework of government 
that was carefully designed to impede and even prevent the operation of majority rule.”7  In 
the conventional view, then, American sovereignty lies in the Constitution, subject to 
amendment, as implemented by governmental institutions, subject to popular election.  
 
Allocated Sovereignty in the Constitution and Declaration 
As the governing document of the United States, the Constitution is an appropriate 
first place to look for signs of sovereignty in the American polity.  American schoolchildren 
are taught that ours is a system of separation of powers, marked by checks and balances 
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exercised by various governmental entities against, and sometimes in conjunction with, 
others.  In short, American sovereignty is diffuse.  Its attributes are divided.8 
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establish inferior federal courts (Ibid. Art. I, Sec. 8, Cl. 9; Art. III, Sec. 1).  Congress can declare war, raise and 
support armies, provide for and maintain a navy, regulate both, call forth state militias, and organize these and 
the armed forces (Ibid. Art. I, Sec. 8, Cl. 11-16).  Congress must consent to states’ imposts or duties except 
pursuant to inspection laws, all of which are subject to congressional revision (Ibid. Art. I, Sec. 10, Cl. 2).  
States require congressional consent to exercise foreign relations powers (Ibid. Art. I, Sec. 10, Cl. 3).  The 
House and Senate originally selected the President and Vice President respectively when no candidate received 
a majority of electoral votes (Ibid. Art. II, Sec. 1, Cl. 3).  Congress sets the time and date of presidential 
elections (Ibid. Art. II, Sec. 1, Cl. 4).  Congress originally provided exclusively for presidential succession 
beyond the Vice President (Ibid. Art. II, Sec. 1, Cl. 6).  The Senate must approve treaties by a two-thirds vote, 
and has consent power over presidential nominees to the executive and judiciary (Ibid. Art. II, Sec. 2, Cl. 2).   
The President is required to report to Congress on the state of the union (Ibid. Art. II, Sec. 3).  
Congress may provide for the manner by which the validity public acts to which the states must give full faith 
and credit shall be proven (Ibid. Art. IV, Sec. 1).  Congress must consent to the admission of new states (Ibid. 
Art. IV, Sec. 3, Cl. 1).  Congress may propose new amendments to the Constitution, subject to state ratification 
(Ibid. Art. V).  The Vice President sits as presiding officer of the Senate and casts tie-breaking votes there (Ibid. 
Art. I, Sec. 3, Cl. 4).  Members of Congress may not serve in the executive while serving as legislators, nor take 
any office in the executive created during or for which the pay is increased during their legislative terms (Ibid. 
Art. I, Sec. 3, Cl. 4).  All legislative acts requiring both houses of Congress to concur must be approved by the 
President, subject to his veto (Ibid. Art. I, Sec. 7, Cl. 2-3).  The President’s pay may not be altered by Congress 
during his term (Ibid. Art. II, Sec. 1, Cl. 7).  The President commands the army, navy, and militia (Ibid. Art. II, 
Sec. 2, Cl. 1).  Subject to senatorial approval, the President makes treaties and appoints federal judges and 
executive officers (Ibid. Art. II, Sec. 2, Cl. 2).  He may appoint officers during congressional recess for the 
remainder of the congressional term without senatorial approval (Ibid. Art. II, Sec. 2, Cl. 3).  He may convene 
Congress and may adjourn it when its houses cannot agree upon adjournment (Ibid. Art. II, Sec. 3).  
The judiciary is empowered over other branches in that the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court 
presides at impeachment trials of the President (Ibid. Art. I, Sec. 3, Cl. 6).  Members of Congress cannot serve 
in judicial positions created or for which the pay has been raised during their terms (Ibid. Art. I, Sec. 6, Cl. 2).  
Federal judges at all levels serve lifetime appointments provided they are on “good behavior” and Congress 
may not diminish their pay during their tenures (Ibid. Art. III, Sec. 1).   
The states too are invested with powers:  State legislatures determine the times, places and manner of 
federal legislative elections subject to congressional override as to time and manner only (Ibid. Art. I, Sec. 4, Cl. 
1).  States appoint presidential electors (Ibid. Art. II, Sec. 1, Cl. 2).  States are required to give full faith and 
credit to each other’s public acts, records, and judicial proceedings (Ibid. Art. IV, Sec. 1).  They may not deny 
to each other’s citizens the privileges and immunities of state citizenship (Ibid. Art. IV, Sec. 2, Cl. 1).  They 
must extradite criminals within their borders to the states where they are wanted (Ibid. Art. IV, Sec. 2, Cl. 2).  
They could not originally, by harboring escaped slaves, emancipate them (Ibid. Art. IV, Sec. 2, Cl. 3).  New 
states formed out of existing states’ territories must be approved by those existing states (Ibid. Art. IV, Sec. 3, 
Cl. 1).  States are guaranteed a republican form of government and protection from foreign invasion and 
domestic violence by the federal government (Ibid. Art. IV, Sec. 4).  And they may by calling conventions 
propose amendments, and have, through their legislatures or through state conventions the power to ratify 
amendments (or not), provided that no such amendment may deprive any state of equal representation in the 
Senate without its consent (Ibid. Art. V).  Nine states were originally empowered to ratify the Constitution 
itself, through state conventions, as binding among themselves (Ibid. Art. VII).   
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From this express constitutional division of powers, we can glean a picture of 
sovereignty spread unevenly and in often contradictory ways among political actors.  
Sovereignty is not just divided, but tangled and diffuse.  Just when it seems to be in one 
place, some other entity’s sovereignty impinges.  This was perhaps less true at the founding 
than now.  For instance, during the Founders’ generation, states were understood as 
“sovereign” even after the Constitution’s ratification, where “‘sovereignty’ implied 
supremacy.”9  Under this view, any significant overlap of powers between states and the 
federal government, a common feature of American government now, would have been 
conceptually impossible, because it would have meant that states were not really sovereign.10  
Likewise, coordination of powers across federal governmental branches in forms common 
now (such as independent agencies established by Congress whose members are appointed 
by the President) was clearly not contemplated by the Founders.11  Yet despite the somewhat 
cleaner lines of divided sovereignty at the founding, the original constitutional system still 
yields complex and conflicting results when one asks who, under particular circumstances, is 
                                                                                                                                            
The Constitution’s ratification by only nine states is claimed to have been proper, despite that the 
then-effective Articles of Confederation insisted on their amendment only through unanimity of the states, 
because of the necessity of self-preservation of the federation.  It could also be argued that breaches by various 
states of the Articles rendered them nugatory as against all other states, as would have been the case in a treaty 
among sovereign nations.  See James Madison, Federalist 43, in Alexander Hamilton, James Madison and John 
Jay, The Federalist Papers, ed. Clinton Rossiter.  (New York:  Mentor, 1961), 279-80. 
Apart from its particular branches, the federal government is also given some attributes of 
sovereignty.  It is charged with guaranteeing to states a republican form of government and protection from 
foreign invasion, as well as upon state legislatures’ application, from domestic violence (U.S. Const., Art. IV, 
Sec. 4).  And federal law, together with treaties and the Constitution, is supreme over state laws and binds state 
judges (Ibid. Art. VI, Cl. 2).  The federal Constitution itself bears marks of sovereignty:  It is the supreme law 
of the land (Ibid.).  And federal and state officers are expressly required to be bound by oath or affirmation to 
follow it (Ibid. Art. VI, Sec. 3). 
9 Richard H. Fallon Jr., The Dynamic Constitution:  An Introduction to American Constitutional Law.  (Cambridge, UK:  
Cambridge University Press, 2004) 160. 
10 Ibid. 161. 
11 See James Madison, Federalist 48, in Alexander Hamilton, James Madison and John Jay, The Federalist Papers, 
ed. Clinton Rossiter.  (New York:  Mentor, 1961), 308:  “It is agreed on all sides that the powers properly 
belonging to one of the departments ought not to be directly and completely administered by either of the 
other departments.  It is equally evident that none of them ought to possess, directly or indirectly, and 
overruling influence over the others in the administration of their respective powers.” 
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sovereign in the Schmittian sense — that is, who ultimately decides that a decision is 
necessary, and what the content of that decision will be — a decision whose content, 
because it takes place in exceptional circumstances, is by definition unknowable in advance. 
Theorist of the human mind Douglas R. Hofstadter aptly uses the American 
constitutional framework to illustrate the concept of tangled hierarchies or strange loops as a 
feature of intelligence, artificial or otherwise.  Take, for instance, a case in the US court 
system (as that system is presently constructed by congressional legislation, duly signed into 
law by the President).  Ordinarily, it will involve two disputants and a court that decides the 
outcome of the dispute.  Should two trial courts disagree over a legal issue implicated by 
such suits, a yet higher appellate court decides it.  Finally some highest court outside the 
others renders an ultimate and binding decision — if the case reaches the Supreme Court, 
that court’s decision is final.  But since there is no court higher than the Supreme Court, 
when it becomes involved in a dispute with co-equal branches of government (say over 
whether Congress may validly issue laws that appear to violate the Constitution as in Marbury 
v. Madison,12 or in Hofstadter’s example, whether President Nixon was required to obey 
Court rulings as in United States v. Nixon13), such disputes are insoluble by reference to any 
higher authority.  As Hofstadter puts it, “once you hit your head against the ceiling like this, 
where you are prevented from jumping out of the system to a yet higher authority, the only 
recourse is to forces which seem less well defined by rules, but which are the only source of 
higher-level rules anyway:  the lower-level rules, which in this case means the general 
reaction of society,” i.e., whatever sovereignty remains in the people in a residual, reactive 
sense, deployed when the complex system of diffuse sovereignty cannot by itself generate an 
                                                
12 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
13 418 U.S. 683 (1974). 
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authoritative answer.14  Hofstadter has unwittingly described the role of popular sovereignty 
precisely consistent with Schmitt’s own conception of democratic power beyond the 
Constitution and beyond any written law or positivist norm that remains latent until a crisis 
provokes it to break through and decide. 
And what of the people in the constitutional text?  As was then the case with many 
state constitutions, the federal Constitution’s Preamble began by asserting “the People” as 
the source of its own authority and legitimacy.15  This reference to the people as the 
constitutive source of the Constitution’s sovereignty is of dubious validity in the sense that 
its authors were those members of the 1787 Constitutional Convention who signed their 
own names to that document before presenting it to the states for ratification.  Their 
authority even to undertake the drafting of a new governing document for the states was 
questionable and called into question, even at the time of the Convention (which had been 
called to amend, not replace the existing Articles of Confederation, which by their own 
terms required a unanimous vote of all thirteen states to be altered).16 
Nonetheless, the Constitution’s key Federalist advocates argued strenuously for the 
legitimacy of that gathering and its results.  James Madison writing in Federalist 40 found 
authority for the convention that drafted the Constitution in the first instance in 
recommendations by the Annapolis convention of September 1786 and the Congress in 
February 1787.  The former had authorized appointment of commissioners to devise further 
provisions to the then-constitution (the Articles of Confederation) to meet exigencies of the 
union.  The latter had noted that several states had called for remedies to defects in the 
                                                
14 Douglas R. Hofstadter, Gödel, Escher, Bach:  An Eternal Golden Braid.  (1979; repr. New York:  Vintage Books, 
1989), 692-93. 
15 U.S. Const., Preamble.  Edmund S. Morgan, Inventing the People:  The Rise of Popular Sovereignty in England and 
America.  (New York:  W.W. Norton, 1988), 281-82. 
16 Arts. of Conf., Art. XIII. 
 
 
79 
Articles and appointed delegates to a convention in Philadelphia for the purpose of revising 
them and reporting to Congress on recommended revisions.17  The provisions calling for 
revision, however, were implicitly inconsistent with and subordinate to those calling for an 
effective government, and therefore could reasonably be read out of the delegates’ 
commissions; thus Madison argued that the delegates could not have been understood to 
have been sent to revise the Articles without also remedying the Union’s fundamental 
deficiencies.  Moreover, he claimed, revising the Articles did not require retaining the 
original document itself in any degree.18  In his view the Constitution merely expanded upon 
powers already delegated to the national government under the Articles.  And while the 
Constitution by its own terms could be ratified by fewer than all thirteen states, this was in 
Madison’s view necessary for the practical reason that a single dissenting state, such as tiny 
Rhode Island, could otherwise hold the other states hostage to unreasonable demands.19 
Madison further argued that even assuming the convention was itself illegal or insufficiently 
empowered to adopt a new draft constitution, its resulting draft document still amounted to 
good advice, and should thus be adopted (albeit according to its own terms, not the 
Articles’).20 
Most importantly for a Schmittian analysis, however, Madison bolstered all these 
claims by reference to language in the Declaration of Independence proclaiming a right in 
the people to abolish or alter governments to effectuate their own safety and happiness, such 
that they could not be bound by the states or by law to adhere indefinitely to a bad set of 
                                                
17 James Madison, Federalist 40, in Alexander Hamilton, James Madison and John Jay, The Federalist Papers, ed. 
Clinton Rossiter.  (New York:  Mentor, 1961), 247-48. 
18 Ibid. 249. 
19 Ibid. 251. 
20 Ibid. 254. 
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Articles.21  This argument points directly to a latent constitutive power in the people that 
remains outside the legal norms of a constitution but is always ready legitimately to override 
it in favor of a new constitutional text.  As will be shown below, Schmitt wrote approvingly 
of the Declaration’s perpetual reservation of such constitutive power to the American 
people, and the degree to which that document demonstrates a truly democratic core to the 
American polity, its liberal Rechtsstaat elements notwithstanding.22  
Setting aside the legality and legitimacy of the Constitution in light of the prior 
Articles, and notwithstanding Madison’s justification of the Constitution on the ground of 
latent popular sovereignty, the people had only a severely mediated role in adopting the 
Constitution; according to its own terms, it was to be ratified not by popular vote, but rather 
by representative conventions in the several states.23  This practice was not unusual in the 
context of state constitutions in the post-colonial system.  Early American drafters of state 
constitutions, recognizing the special legal status of these founding documents, endeavored 
to cast the people, usually in preambular language, as the source of their authority as drafters 
to set forth the states’ fundamental governing rules.  At the same time, the drafters 
characterized those rules as expressing the authoritative will of the people, exercised by the 
drafters and ratifiers at the people’s behest. 
Despite objections that merely claiming that these proxy exercises of popular 
sovereignty expressed the will of the people would not make it so, these claims generally 
                                                
21 Ibid. 253.  See Declaration of Independence, ¶ 2:  “That whenever any Form of Government becomes 
destructive of [Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness], it is the Right of the People to alter or abolish it, 
and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such 
form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.” 
22 See Chapter 4, text accompanying notes 30 to 41 for discussion of Schmitt’s analysis of the Declaration and 
the sovereign constitutive power of the people. 
23 U.S. Const., Art. VII, specifying no requirements for the means by which delegates such conventions were to 
be selected. 
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prevailed in the early years of the Revolution.24  By 1779, however, Massachusetts voters 
rejected a constitution drawn up by preexisting popular representatives, choosing instead to 
elect a convention of delegates to draft a constitution that would subsequently require a two-
thirds popular-vote ratification.  Despite irregularities in the convention’s interpretation of 
town votes, that state constitution “could be said, with more plausibility than any other, to 
be an act of the sovereign people,”25 understood here, as in Schmitt’s thought, as a majority 
of those empowered to vote.  Thus, a true enactment by “the people” of the federal 
Constitution was at least conceptually possible by 1787. 
Apart from their rhetorical appearance in the Preamble, one that implicitly refers 
back to the Declaration of Independence, “the people” are referred to only seven further 
times in today’s Constitution.  In the original text of the document, however, they are named 
only as electors of members of the House of Representatives.26  All other constitutional 
references to “the people” came after the original ratification, appearing in Amendment I 
(right to peaceably assemble), Amendment II (right to bear arms), Amendment IV (right to 
security in persons, houses, papers, and effects), Amendment IX (not having other rights 
denied through enumeration of some), Amendment X (retaining residual power not given to 
the federal government or retained by states), and Amendment XVII (as electing Senators 
directly).  Both rhetorically and functionally, then, the people remained largely outside the 
constitutional framework from its inception, though their latent constitutive power 
remained, pursuant to the Declaration. 
 
 
                                                
24 Morgan, Inventing the People, 256-57. 
25 Ibid. 258. 
26 U.S. Const., Art. I, Sec. 2, Cl. 1 
 
 
82 
Textual Sovereignty:  The Federal i s t  and the Constitution 
Before I proceed to analyze The Federalist and the views expressed therein on popular 
sovereignty under the Constitution, it is necessary to address a linguistic ambiguity.  In 
analyzing that text, Joshua Miller asserts that while its authors rhetorically expressed support 
for democracy, they substantively demonstrated a preference for what the Constitution truly 
enshrined, namely “popular sovereignty.”27  Miller defines that term, however, in a way that 
would be unrecognizable to most users of ordinary language, including today’s tea partiers, 
though not to Carl Schmitt.  For Miller, popular sovereignty places power in a strong central 
government but legitimizes it by claiming that it is rooted in the popular will.28  For him, 
then, popular sovereignty is both consistent with a very powerful federal government and 
also does not require ongoing or active participation by the people.29  According to Miller, 
and consistent with a strain of Schmittian analysis, while the Federalists, the Publius authors 
included, employed a rhetoric of “the people,” they did so in an effort to modulate 
democratic culture by juxtaposing it against a powerful national government.30 
On the face of it, the Federalists appear to be contradicting themselves.  In some 
places, they seem to heartily support popular power; in other places, far more 
numerous, they seem to be designing a government in which representation, checks 
and balances, protection of private property, and expanding national boundaries will 
all serve to check the aims of the people and to prevent democracy.31 
 
Substitute “popular sovereignty” as used in ordinary contemporary discourse for “popular 
power” and “democracy” in Miller’s lexicon, and his analysis substantially agrees with what 
follows. 
                                                
27 Joshua Miller, “The Ghostly Body Politic:  The Federalist Papers and Popular Sovereignty,” Political Theory 16 
no. 1 (February 1988):  99. 
28 Ibid. 103. 
29 Ibid. 99. 
30 Ibid. 100. 
31 Ibid. 102. 
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The central dilemma of sovereignty — whether it would inhere in the people, in 
institutions representing them, or in some mixed medium — was not unknown to the 
founding generation.  By the 1760s, John J. Otis, Jr. was advancing a then-current concept of 
sovereignty as supreme legislative and executive power, lodged entirely either in some body 
at the people’s behest, or if not, remaining residually in the “whole body of the people.”32  
But as Otis and others attempted to draw boundaries between British parliamentary power 
over America and America’s own self-sovereignty, they began to undermine this monistic 
view of sovereignty and develop a new metaphysics of divided sovereignty.33  The 
parameters of this division remained deeply contested, especially in the context of the newly 
proposed federal Constitution. 
The authors of The Federalist, writing to persuade New Yorkers to support delegates 
to that state’s ratifying convention who would vote to adopt the Constitution, and to urge 
delegates’ support thereof, agreed in general terms that the federal government operative 
under the Articles of Confederation had to be substantially strengthened.  Having finished 
an extensive survey of historical confederations, Madison had already concluded in 1785 that 
they shared a common vice with the US under the Articles, namely that they suffered from 
weak central national authority.34  In an illustrative passage, Hamilton in The Federalist opined 
that “[t]he entire separation of the States into thirteen unconnected sovereignties is a project 
too extravagant and too replete with danger to have many advocates.”35  Yet the overall 
content of The Federalist gives a more leavened perspective on the matter.  Madison’s essays 
                                                
32 Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution, enlarged ed.  (Cambridge, MA:  Belknap Press, 
1992), 205, citing Otis’s Rights of the British Colonies. 
33 Ibid. 208-12. 
34 Michael I. Myerson, Liberty’s Blueprint:  How Madison and Hamilton Wrote the Federalist Papers, Defined the 
Constitution, and Made Democracy Safe for the World.  (New York:  BasicBooks, 2008), 52-53. 
35 Alexander Hamilton, Federalist 13, in Alexander Hamilton, James Madison and John Jay, The Federalist Papers, 
ed. Clinton Rossiter.  (New York:  Mentor, 1961), 97. 
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for the Federalist outlined a complex intermingling of federal and state powers under the new 
Constitution.36  In Federalist 37, Madison admitted that in delineating state versus federal 
power, the Constitution is necessarily ambiguous.37  And Hamilton argued that coordinate 
authority in general (i.e. divided sovereignty) in government could exist in fact and reality, 
citing the Roman republic’s legislative authority’s having been divided between independent 
patrician and plebeian legislatures.38 
The issue of federal versus state power serves as a specific example of ambivalence 
within The Federalist.  According to Michael Myerson, the thrust of Publius’ view on 
federalism (taking The Federalist authors, as they represented themselves, as a single entity) 
was that federal power should be limited in order to maintain at least some sovereignty in 
the states.39  This balancing act reflects in part the divided view expressed in The Federalist as 
a whole:  some of its essays prefer an almost unlimited federal government, and others 
advocate limiting federal powers in favor of primary governmental authority remaining with 
the states.40  Ultimately, Myerson concludes that The Federalist intended that “the division of 
powers between the federal and state governments . . . be fluid.”41  In fact, and again 
complicating matters, both Hamilton and Madison separately argued that the federal 
government’s authority would ultimately be determined by the people, thus making them in 
                                                
36 Myerson, Liberty’s Blueprint, 93. 
37 James Madison, Federalist 37, in Alexander Hamilton, James Madison and John Jay, The Federalist Papers, ed. 
Clinton Rossiter.  (New York:  Mentor, 1961), 229. 
38 Alexander Hamilton, Federalist 34, in Alexander Hamilton, James Madison and John Jay, The Federalist Papers, 
ed. Clinton Rossiter.  (New York:  Mentor, 1961), 206.  In an interbranch example of divided sovereignty, 
Hamilton elsewhere opined that because treaty-making is a practice of making sovereign-to-sovereign 
agreements, that power is properly placed exclusively neither in the executive nor the legislative branch.  
Alexander Hamilton, Federalist 75, in Alexander Hamilton, James Madison and John Jay, The Federalist Papers, ed. 
Clinton Rossiter.  (New York:  Mentor, 1961), 451. 
39 Myerson, Liberty’s Blueprint, 196. 
40 Ibid. 197. 
41 Ibid. 198. 
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this respect decisionally sovereign,42 and both claimed that state militias would ultimately 
guarantee that the pendulum would not swing too far in favor of the federal government as 
against the people or the states, though they expected that most checks on federal power 
would come from the ballot box rather than at gunpoint.43 
Federalists distinguished between the federal government exercising supremacy over 
states directly through law, which they claimed would not occur and would not be good for 
the republic, and federal supremacy operating against the individuals who make up states and 
collectively the union, and from whom the federal government’s sovereignty ultimately 
derived.44  As in the case of federal-state relations, The Federalist makes conflicting claims 
regarding the role of the people.  Richard Hofstadter noted that both Madison and Hamilton 
saw representation — the exercise of mediated popular sovereignty by the US House — at 
least at points in The Federalist as not so much responsive to popular will as capable of 
shaping and educating it.  Madison, in Federalist 10, hoped that representative government 
would “refine and enlarge the public views by passing them through the medium of a 
chosen body of citizens” . . . . wiser and more deliberate than the people themselves 
in mass assemblage[, while] Hamilton frankly anticipated a kind of syndical 
paternalism in which the wealthy and dominant members of every trade or industry 
would represent the others in politics.45   
 
As but one example of The Federalist’s equivocation on this head, compare Federalists 39 and 
45, both by Madison, which in near parallel emphasize in the former the people’s and in the 
                                                
42 Ibid. 202. 
43 Ibid. 203. 
44 Bailyn, Ideological Origins, 359. 
45 Richard Hofstadter, “The Founding Fathers:  The Age of Realism,” in The Moral Foundations of the American 
Republic, ed. Robert H. Horwitz, 2nd ed.  (Charlottesville, VA:  University Press of Virginia, 1979), 78-79, 
quoting Federalist 10. 
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latter the states’ primacy as the source of federal and constitutional sovereignty.46  It is clear 
even on the surface of The Federalist that, as Bernard Bailyn put it, “Federalism[’s] . . . essence 
was not automatic harmony but an uncertain tension which statecraft alone could 
maintain.”47 
It would be possible at this point to engage in an extensive qualitative analysis of 
particular instances of diffuse sovereignty in The Federalist, but that work has been done, 
including by the authors referenced herein.  Instead, I offer a tally of references (overt or 
otherwise) to sovereign power in The Federalist, categorizing them according to where 
sovereignty is claimed to lie.  This too is necessarily a qualitative exercise, and my specific 
categorizations are admittedly contestable.  What I have attempted here is to catalog each 
distinct claim throughout The Federalist regarding sovereignty — as ultimate, legally 
sanctioned decisional power — under the proposed Constitution.  This necessarily involves 
some judgment because the term itself is used only twenty-two times in this context.48   
My research revealed at least 317 total references in The Federalist to conceptual 
sovereignty under the Constitution.  Of these, fifty-nine placed some form of sovereign 
power in the hands of the states, fifty-eight in the federal government, forty-four in the 
people, and twenty-seven in the Constitution.  The President, Congress, and the judiciary 
                                                
46 James Madison, Federalist 39, in Alexander Hamilton, James Madison and John Jay, The Federalist Papers, ed. 
Clinton Rossiter.  (New York:  Mentor, 1961), 242-44; James Madison, Federalist 45, in Alexander Hamilton, 
James Madison and John Jay, The Federalist Papers, ed. Clinton Rossiter.  (New York:  Mentor, 1961), 290-93. 
47 Bailyn, Ideological Origins, 378. 
48 Of the twenty-two overt references to sovereignty under the Constitution, six involve the external 
sovereignty of the US or the states, and three involve constitutive sovereignty.  The data presented here are 
selected results of my own research.  They are available in full upon request, subject to a Creative Commons 
license.  My method, roughly speaking, was to record each distinct reference to sovereign power in The 
Federalist, where such power involved formal legal (or informal external) ultimate control, as exercised under the 
proposed constitution.  I noted in each case whether a cognate term of sovereign was used, whether or not 
either constitutive or external sovereignty was involved, and who was presented as sovereign.  I did not record 
any references to sovereignty, overt or otherwise, that did not refer to the concept in the context of the 
proposed constitution’s provisions. 
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followed with twenty-three, twenty-one, and nineteen references respectively.  Negative 
references  — to entities not having sovereignty — then appear in the list, with sixteen 
references to negation of state power.  The House and Senate each get fifteen references to 
their being sovereign, and the frequency of references for other loci of sovereignty (or the 
lack of it) declines steeply thereafter.  These numbers demonstrate that The Federalist indeed 
mirrored the Constitution in assigning sovereign power to diffuse entities.  They also show 
that state versus federal power was a primary concern of The Federalist’s authors, as was the 
role of the people.  Moreover, they clearly intended the Constitution to partake of some 
degree of sovereignty in its own right. 
In aggregating these counts, I take seriously those authors’ claim to be one author, 
Publius.  The Federalist’s authors sought both anonymity and to appear united in thought, and 
their identities in general were not widely known until after the Constitution’s ratification.49  
The Federalist authors’ use of the pseudonym Publius allowed them, among other things, to 
speak with the double voice of, first, a popular politician, and second, a paternal founder of 
the new republic.50  The specific authorship of individual essays was first, if inaccurately, 
revealed when Hamilton left a list in a book in an old friend’s law office, but not corrected 
and fully confirmed until a 2003 stylometric study.51  The very fact of fractured and falsified 
authorship itself calls into question the edifice of consistency that The Federalist seeks to 
erect.  In the very first essay of the series, Hamilton positions Publius as being candid and 
transparent with his readers about the Constitution, its mechanisms, and its benefits.52  This 
                                                
49 Myerson, Liberty’s Blueprint, 2-3. 
50 James Jasinksi, “Heteroglossia, Polyphony, and The Federalist Papers,” Rhetoric Society Quarterly 27, no. 1 (Winter 
1997):  34.  It is the second, paternal founder’s voice, that predominates, and Hamilton even warns in Federalist 
35 against other authors’ use of the popular politician voice. 
51 Myerson, Liberty’s Blueprint, 4-7. 
52 Ibid. 80. 
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self-consciously crafted image is as much at odds with the Federalist as a whole, which 
presents an often inconsistent and fractured understanding of functional sovereignty and 
where it would lie in the proposed republic, as it is with the fact that Publius is in fact no “I.” 
Astute observers of early American politics would soon witness some of the cracks 
in Publius’ visage.  In opposing assumption by the federal government of state war debts, 
and speaking contrary to Hamilton’s views, Madison argued that if the goal of assumption 
was to strengthen the federal government, then this aim should be accomplished if at all 
through explicit grants of power in the Constitution.53  Madison likewise objected to the 
establishment of a national bank on the grounds that the constitutional text did not grant the 
power to Congress to create such an institution.54  Hamilton, meanwhile, defended the bank 
and the federal government’s power to establish one, based on a broader reading of the 
Constitution, in particular the Necessary and Proper Clause, together with a theory that 
implied powers of all externally sovereign states gave the federal government sufficient 
authority to create a national bank.55 
These arguments illustrate the divide between post-Federalist Hamilton and Madison, 
with the latter espousing more narrow textual readings of the Constitution (i.e. its textual 
sovereignty) and accusing the former of fostering despotism rather than republican 
government by advocating for broader constitutional interpretations and thus the possibility 
that the interpreters would arrogate broader powers to the federal government.56  In this 
vein, Madison characterized the debate as one between himself, having remained consistent 
in his limited interpretation of the constitutional text, and Hamilton, who had “deserted” 
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Madison and the originalist principle.57  In later disagreements over the appropriate 
allocation of powers concerning war, peace, and foreign relations, Hamilton would 
characterize strong executive power in this area as necessary and unexceptional, while 
Madison sought to check that power legislatively.58  The authors even occasionally accused 
each other of departing from their own views as expressed in particular Federalist essays.  In 
defending the Jay Treaty as Camillus, Hamilton mustered arguments from Madison’s own 
Federalist 42 to illustrate that Madison’s views had strayed from his original claims that the 
constitutional convention had intended the President’s treaty power to include all kinds of 
international agreements, and that Congress — specifically the House — did not have a 
power to review international treaties merely because they had commercial effects.59  In so 
doing, Hamilton began to use The Federalist itself as a kind of sovereign text. 
In addition to these examples, my research shows that when the authorship of the 
various Federalist papers is taken into account, important differences between Hamilton and 
Madison emerge.  While the papers as a whole give roughly equal weight to the sovereignty 
of the states and the federal government, and Hamilton’s papers do as well, Madison cites 
state sovereignty thirty-two times, but federal sovereignty only twenty-three.  Weighted as a 
percentage of papers written by author, Hamilton makes states sovereign in a number of 
instances equivalent to 51 percent of the papers he wrote, and makes the federal government 
sovereign in 53 percent.  Weighted likewise, Madison makes states sovereign in instances 
equivalent to 110 percent of his papers, and the federal government only 79 percent.  
Though Hamilton points to popular sovereignty twenty-one times, and Madison nineteen, 
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when weighted by number of papers written, Hamilton refers to popular sovereignty in 
instances equivalent to 41 percent of his papers, and Madison in 65 percent.60 
The greater quantitative attention by Madison to state and popular sovereignty as 
against federal sovereignty tracks his articulated views in a number of ways.  As noted above, 
Madison was much more skeptical than Hamilton in his later career of expansions of federal 
power, including through the Necessary and Proper Clause.61  Madison likewise expressly 
disfavored federal action pursuant to the Welfare Clause in Federalist 41, explaining that its 
content was limited to the powers enumerated in the remainder of Article I, Section 8, and 
that it did not form an independent source of congressional authority to act.62  Indeed, 
Madison, isolated from his fellow Publius authors, appears to favor generally a more robust 
conception of popular sovereignty — one closer to the views now expressed by many tea 
partiers.  Madison in Federalist 46 predicts that if the federal government encroaches too 
much on state power, the people as a whole will become alarmed, and will work through the 
states to oppose it, as they did during the American Revolution against Britain.63  This 
instance among all the Federalist Papers presents the strongest case for the tea parties’ popular 
sovereignty views being consistent with those of the American Founders.   
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Madison’s willingness to embrace popular sovereignty, including a right in the people 
to oppose an overweening federal government using violence if necessary, is strikingly at 
odds with Hamilton’s views.  Though the latter did not expressly oppose popular revolutions 
as a general matter in his Federalist essays, he repeatedly referred explicitly and with disfavor 
to Shays’ Rebellion, which had taken place just a few months before, in which Massachusetts 
citizens followed the pattern of the American revolution in opposing violently what they 
viewed as illegitimate state action in the form of taxation and imprisonment of debtors.  
Madison’s essays, on the other hand, make no specific references to that rebellion.64  While 
Clinton Rossiter is correct that “Publius’ “dislike of instability and downright fear of anarchy 
are writ large and often in these essays,”65 that Publius is mostly Hamilton. 
By presenting themselves as a single author, The Federalist’s authors not only masked 
their identities, but also covered over their nascent political differences, crafting a text that at 
least appeared to present a unified view with respect to sovereignty, though close analysis 
reveals its internal contradictions.  This, in turn, allowed Madison — without exposing his 
differences with Hamilton on this score — to appeal over the heads of state representatives 
opposed to the Constitution to sovereign popular authority as a way of lending legitimacy to 
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the Constitution and its mode of adoption, and to promote its ratification, in short, 
“inventing a sovereign American people to overcome the sovereign states.”66  I will return to 
the Founders’ invention of a people, and that tactic’s relevance to popular sovereignty, 
below.67  I turn now to the Constitution and The Federalist as sources of sovereignty in their 
own right. 
As evidenced by the oft-expressed view that the United States is “a government of 
laws, and not of men,”68 “the Constitution transcended ordinary legislation.”69  Indeed, as 
will be discussed below in the context of Carl Schmitt’s political theory, constitutional 
democracy is based on the idea of an ultimately authoritative constitutive higher law.70  As 
noted above, The Federalist itself refers twenty-seven times to sovereignty conceptually resting 
in the text of the Constitution, seventeen times in Hamilton essays, nine in Madison essays, 
and once in a Jay essay.  Yet textual sovereignty is problematic because texts require human 
interpretation, pushing sovereignty from the seemingly safe terrain of stable words on a page 
to highly contested decisional ground.71  Justice Antonin Scalia has famously argued for a 
kind of textual sovereignty of the Constitution that looks not to the intent of the drafters, 
but to the original meaning of the text they drafted.72  Under this reading, interpretation is 
not an exercise of power so much as a task of reading and understanding according to fixed, 
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69 Myerson, Liberty’s Blueprint, 101. 
70 See Chapter 4, text accompanying notes 32 to 41. 
71 For examples of how contested interpretive power is, one need only refer to any of the US Senate hearings 
on nominees to the Supreme Court over the past quarter century. 
72 Myerson, Liberty’s Blueprint, 149. 
 
 
93 
crystallized scripts or algorithms.73  Consult the text itself, and then consult some texts that 
define the terms given in the original text, and you have an accurate interpretation.  What 
this prescription omits is that at every turn the interpreter must make choices:  Which 
defining texts apply?  How should they be interpreted when they disagree on some point (as 
do various of the Federalist Papers)?  Scalia’s originalism rests on a political judgment that the 
views of a sovereign people, demonstrated through state conventions’ ratification of the 
specific words of the Constitution, are the sole legitimate source of sovereign power in the 
United States.74  That is, the Constitution should be understood according to the original 
meanings of its words, because this best enacts the will of the nascent republic’s founding 
citizens as represented then by ratifying convention delegates.  That those delegates, were 
they exercising sovereign decisional power now, would agree with originalism as an exclusive 
interpretive framework is simply assumed. 
Madison too concluded that because the state ratifying conventions had before them 
a delimited text, the words of that text itself should serve as the sole authoritative guide to its 
meaning — a position that explains, for instance, the originalism-advocating Federalist 
Society’s current use of Madison’s silhouette as its logo.75  The text is understood as 
sovereign because it freezes in time the only known combined will of the people who 
adopted it.  Yet neither Madison nor Hamilton was able to present a consistent and clear 
theory of how the Constitution should be interpreted, not only with respect to whether its 
words should be read broadly or narrowly, but also in regard to what amounted to a narrow, 
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faithful, reading of the text itself.76  This in turn points back to the inherent difficulty in 
making any text sovereign:  it cannot guide with respect to the meaning of all of its own 
provisions.  A constitution, by virtue of being superior to ordinary law, necessitates some 
form of legal constitutional review, whether or not strictly located in a judiciary.77  Some 
human act of interpretation is required, and interpretation implies power — in Schmittian 
terms, sovereign decisional power — as even Chief Justice Marshall recognized in opining 
that it was the role of the Court to state authoritatively what the Constitution means.78  
Hamilton hinted at his own views on constitutional interpretation in this intriguing passage 
from Federalist 34: 
[W]e must bear in mind that we are not to confine our view to the present period, 
but to look forward to remote futurity.  Constitutions of civil government are not to 
be framed upon a calculation of existing exigencies, but upon a combination of these 
with the probable exigencies of ages, according to the natural and tried course of 
human affairs.  Nothing, therefore, can be more fallacious than to infer the extent of 
any power proper to be lodged in the national government from an estimate of its 
immediate necessities.  There ought to be a CAPACITY to provide for future 
contingencies as they may happen; and as these are illimitable in their nature, so it is 
impossible safely to limit that capacity.79   
 
Except for the foregoing passage and to a limited extent in Hamilton’s Federalist 78, 
the Publius authors do not address who interprets the Constitution and how.  Yet The 
Federalist has become a source of textual sovereignty in its own right, having been used 
repeatedly to bolster arguments about the content, meaning, and intent of the Constitution.  
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Since the 1798 case Calder v. Bull,80 the Supreme Court has repeatedly turned to The Federalist 
to shed light on constitutional questions, in over three hundred separate cases and at a 
growing rate in the last fifty years.  Clinton Rossiter, the editor whose 1961 edition of The 
Federalist contributed to a modern revival in its popularity, described The Federalist as both 
the most important native work of political science to come out of the US, and “rightly 
counted among the classics of political theory.”81  In Rossiter’s view “The Federalist stands 
third only to the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution itself among all the 
sacred writings of American political history.”82  It is, as a text, legitimate, authoritative, and 
authentic, and thus is referred to in order to understand what Jefferson called the “genuine 
meaning” of the Constitution.83  Having been only “one of several hundred salvos in the 
loud war of words that accompanied the protracted struggle over ratification of the 
Constitution,” it apparently acquired textual authority because its arguments won the day, at 
least in the sense that New York’s state convention — the essays’ intended audience — 
ultimately ratified the Constitution, as all thirteen states eventually did.84  “[R]elied on mostly 
as a means of persuasion,”85 The Federalist can be seen as both providing “logical” interpretive 
arguments regarding the Constitution’s content and creating an ongoing dialog with its 
readers.86  This, in turn, implies that its authors’ views might derive a degree of interpretive, 
even sovereign authority from the fact that their ideas became part of the bargain, so to 
speak, with the original ratifiers of the Constitution, and those citizens who elected them to 
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ratifying conventions, directly or indirectly.  This authority accrued slowly, however.87  Chief 
Justice Marshall — a Federalist aligned with Hamilton’s political views more than those of 
Madison’s Republican party — first helped popularize The Federalist as an authoritative aid to 
interpreting the Constitution and as a bulwark against those who would undo its intent 
through allegedly spurious interpretations.88  Only in contemporary times has his suggestion 
really taken off, though:  Supreme Court citations to The Federalist have increased 
substantially in the last thirty years as compared with the previous century or so.89   
 But the Court’s use of The Federalist has been inconsistent.  It sometimes cites 
passages out of context, ignores others though they would support opposing views, and has 
even rejected its use where its advice would be inconsistent with the outcome in particular 
cases.90  “[M]any respected scholars contend The Federalist is of either little or no use in 
interpreting the Constitution.”91  By way of illustration, consider Printz v. United States,92 a 
case concerning whether the federal government could require state executives to enforce 
federal laws, which featured an extensive discussion by both Justice Scalia writing for the 
majority and Justice Souter in dissent of portions of The Federalist as bearing on the question, 
presenting a kind of conflicting legislative history of the Constitution and its framers’ 
intent.93  Citations to the Framers’ views in general and The Federalist in particular thus 
become “the secular equivalent to citing the Bible.  It is an appeal to a higher and more 
                                                
87 Rossiter, introduction to The Federalist Papers, ix. 
88 Myerson, Liberty’s Blueprint, 142. 
89 Melvyn Durchslag, “The Supreme Court and the Federalist Papers:  Is There Less Here than Meets the 
Eye?”  William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal 14, no. 1 (October 2005):  247, citing Ira Lupu’s quantitative 
research. 
90 Wilson, “Most Sacred Text,” 99. 
91 Myerson, Liberty’s Blueprint, 135. 
92 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
93 Durchslag, “Supreme Court,” 243-44. 
 
 
97 
revered authority.  It not only establishes an ethos of objectivity but the perception of 
infallibility.”94  Yet like citations to the Bible, citations to The Federalist can be used equally 
well on both sides of a debate.  Moreover, The Federalist is open to multiple, even conflicting, 
interpretations not only for the general reasons applicable to texts generally, but all the more 
so given its multiple authorship, and its sometimes internally contradictory claims.95 
One important reason not to rely on The Federalist exclusively or excessively to 
interpret the Constitution is that its “authors themselves never treated the work with such 
reverence.”96  Madison himself claimed that while it was the best explanation of the 
constitutional text as it was understood by its drafters and ratifiers, it nonetheless could not 
have anticipated all future interpretations, nor predicted or prevented inaccurate ones.97  
Even Chief Justice Marshall, while speaking highly of The Federalist’s use as an interpretive 
aid, nonetheless claimed that the right to judge the correctness of this or any other text 
remained with the judiciary, which was in his conception thus the ultimate sovereign on such 
matters.98  Myerson gives an example of the Court’s capacity to misuse The Federalist in the 
context of the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the key tenet of which is that states are 
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immune from lawsuits brought by their own citizens.  This doctrine was blessed by the 
Court in reliance largely on Hamilton’s views in Federalist 81.  But the Court has, according to 
Myerson, extended it to apply to suits by noncitizens contrary to Hamilton’s clear advice in 
Federalist 80.99  In the end, Myerson views the Court’s use of The Federalist in this way as 
improper, noting that “[d]espite the Supreme Court’s assertions, The Federalist cannot provide 
significant support for the Court’s sovereign immunity opinions,” demonstrating that while 
it “is a superb source of constitutional insight, [ ] the modern reader must always strive to 
understand the context in which it was written.”100  That is, in Myerson’s view the text of The 
Federalist itself is not, and should not be considered, independently sovereign. 
In sum, like the Constitution, The Federalist cannot be completely sovereign because it 
is a text, and texts both require interpretations and submit to conflicting but equally plausible 
interpretations.  As James Wilson has noted, the Court has used The Federalist in ways that 
uncritically assume both its relevance and importance, and likewise that its authors would 
have “agreed with the Court’s interpretation and application” of them.101  Myerson advocates 
a theory for using The Federalist to interpret the Constitution that would give it much more 
credence with respect to questions of practical or effective sovereignty — which branches of 
government prevail under what circumstances, as well as the distribution of power between 
states or the federal government — while giving it substantially less weight regarding 
questions of political liberty and equality.102  This still, however, amounts to making the text 
at least partially sovereign with respect to sovereignty itself.  Melvyn Durchslag, on the other 
hand, cites favorably David McGowan’s thesis that the Court uses The Federalist less as an 
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authoritative guide than to establish an “ethos” of its own institutional legitimacy by tying its 
decisions to The Federalist’s guides to the Framers’ intent and thus seeming to eschew 
interpretation in contentious cases.103 
Finally, although the Constitution cannot embody complete textual sovereignty, even 
with the assistance of the potentially sovereign Federalist Papers, sovereignty is not completely 
in the hands of the Supreme Court either.  Alan Keenan, theorizing democracy as an 
ongoing process of questioning, relates Hannah Arendt’s understanding of the American 
founding in On Revolution thus:  Instead of placing ultimate authority in, for instance, the will 
of the people, “Americans placed authority in an entirely separate, and more reliable, sphere:  
it was located in a text — the Constitution — and in an institution designed to interpret that 
text — the Supreme Court.”104  Although that power of interpretation leads at points to 
contestable results, “even the most radical reinterpretation would always be in the terms of 
the original document, and thus confined.”105  In this sense, the authority that manifests as 
foundation is wedded inseparably to the authority that manifests as Arendtian freedom:  
change can only occur within constitutional confines, but within this boundary change is 
endlessly possible.106  We have here again Hofstadter’s strange loop:  the judiciary interprets 
the Constitution, but subject to implicit constitutional constraints on such interpretation, 
which the Court in turn also interprets.107  That the judiciary enforces constitutional 
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principles does not mean that they are externally enforced, because the judiciary acts from 
within the constitutional system, and according to constitutional rules.108 
So when, if ever, can the Constitution be overridden, short of amendment according 
to its own terms?  One line of thought on this is that in times of deep crisis necessitating 
deprivation of individual rights and suspension of the constitutional order in favor of greater 
governmental power to address the crisis, the Constitution may be suspended.  Clinton 
Rossiter, citing Carl Schmitt and Abraham Lincoln among others, makes this argument in 
detail in his Constitutional Dictatorship.  Rossiter insists that any such suspension in the 
American context should have the sole goal of overcoming the crisis at hand and supporting 
over the long term the constitutional order’s original purposes (including individual liberty).  
Thus, a proper constitutional dictatorship, in his view, must be temporary and instituted only 
in order to restore the status quo ante bellum.109  While Rossiter is clear that traditional 
American constitutional theory provides for no such suspension of the Constitution in war 
or emergency, he points to the congressional power to declare war, call forth the militia, and 
suspend habeas corpus, together with the presidential power to act as commander in chief and 
to convene Congress, and the joint or several duty of the legislature and executive to 
guarantee to states a republican form of government and protect them from invasion as 
collective bases for extrapolating a kind of constitutional (or commissarial, in Schmitt’s 
terms) dictatorship from the text.110  Despite that these specific powers are shared under the 
Constitution, Rossiter, consistent with Schmitt’s theories, sees emergency power under 
constitutional dictatorship as falling primarily to the President, who would thus be sovereign, 
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but subject to the sovereignty of the Constitution in the sense that at crisis’ end he would be 
compelled to relinquish dictatorial power.111 
Another important strain of argument locates power to undo the Constitution in the 
people.  We have seen this argument before in the context of Madison’s Federalist 40:  if the 
people, as claimed in the Declaration of Independence, have a fundamental right to reorder 
their government, then this right must obtain despite any current constitutional order.112  Yet 
apart from this claim, and some hints in Federalist 46 that the people might retain a right to 
act through states or state militias against a federal government that oversteps the boundaries 
of its sovereignty,113 the Constitution, as understood by The Federalist, submits the 
constitutive power of the political man acting via revolution to the static, sovereign 
constitutional text.114  I return to the question of the nature of the people’s sovereignty 
below.  We must first examine more closely just who “the people” might be. 
 
Constructing the People 
In Federalist 78, by way of justifying judicial review of statutory law, Hamilton argues 
that “the Constitution ought to be preferred to the statute, the intention of the people to the 
intention of their agents.”115  In addition to ignoring temporality — the later-enacted statute 
might be due some preference over the earlier enacted will of the people — Hamilton’s 
argument implies that the Constitution (then and forever) reflects the will of “the people.”  
Which people?  John Jay in Federalist 3 attempts to construct a coherent people out of the 
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former colonists, engaging in a kind of mythmaking in the process.116  But the construction 
of a people is hardly limited to that text. 
Edmund Morgan has written extensively on “the people” as a constructed entity, 
identifying the concept of a people as necessary to found a government.  It is, in his view, a 
fiction that “the people have a voice or make believe that the representatives of the people are 
the people[, or that] . . . . governors are the servants of the people.”117  When using the term 
“fiction,” Morgan does not intend to be pejorative.  Indeed, he acknowledges that political 
fictions are precisely those necessarily central and unquestionable determinants of the nature 
and stability of political societies.118  The issue goes back to Rousseau’s founding paradox:  
the people need norms to define themselves as a people and yet must define themselves as a 
people in order to promulgate legitimately constitutive norms.119  Rousseau solves this 
problem by reference to a hypothetical founding lawgiver or deity.  The US Constitution 
solves this problem by assuming the people and simultaneously empowering it as a fictive 
group, and empowering its governmental actors as legitimate agents of that group.  “We the 
People” form a more perfect union, ostensibly through, first, the delegates to the 1787 
Convention, and then through state ratifying conventions. 
The fiction of popular sovereignty provides both stability and the possibility of 
political change within that stable framework.120  Of course not all theorists privilege 
stability.  In Keenan’s view, “[r]ather than beginning from the assumption that a unified — 
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or ideally unifiable — version of the people exists to be adhered to, a preferable mode of 
democratic theory and practice would accept that democratic politics is stuck permanently in 
a state of transition, or formation.”121  Yet stability may forestall violence, provided the 
fiction of a people is not stretched too far.  When it is, revolution may result as when the 
American colonies moved toward revolution and colonial thinkers increasingly decried the 
notion of “virtual” representation, whereby colonists were represented by members of 
parliament elected from within England (but never from among the colonists themselves).  
The colonists argued strenuously that the only valid representation in terms of creating 
binding law was by those who truly represented — that is, were elected by — those whom 
law would bind.122  Notably, however, “the people” never includes all the people, and thus 
some people are always governed by representatives they have no hand in selecting.  Schmitt 
understood this, arguing that in democracies, not only voters in the minority but even 
nonvoting registered voters as well as citizens not registered to vote or not permitted to vote 
must nonetheless be considered — fictively — to have registered their will in any vote that 
takes place.123 
Tea partiers do not now argue that children should vote or participate in sovereign 
decision making.  And while voters in the mid-eighteenth century American colonies were a 
proportionately greater segment of the national population than they were in England, they 
still were at most a majority of nonenslaved adult males.124  Indeed, 
popular sovereignty, in the colonies, as in England, became the prevailing fiction in a 
society where government was traditionally the province of a relatively small elite.  
Although the new fiction slowly widened popular participation in the governing 
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process, those who made use of it generally belonged to that elite and employed it in 
contests with other members.125 
 
“The people” were thus from the outset of the American republic never all, nor even most 
of the people.  Yet on a Schmittian analysis, and apparently consistent with American 
founding premises, none of these facts detracts from America’s democratic nature. 
Not surprisingly, a key debate in the popular press during ratification and at ratifying 
conventions for the new Constitution centered on the degree to which the (relatively small) 
House of Representatives could be truly said to represent effectively the diverse interests of 
the (very large) American population.  The Federalists’ ultimately victorious response was 
that just as the (fictively popularly ratified) Constitution would be superior to the 
representatives, so too were the people — whose specific identification was postponed — 
superior to the Constitution.  In other words, representation didn’t matter much because the 
people (although really only an elite) retained sovereignty.  In part, the success of this 
argument turned on the Antifederalists’ inability to settle on a single ground of objection to 
the Constitution:  to the extent that they sought to shore up states’ power as against the 
federal government, they undermined their own advocacy of greater popular sovereignty 
(through, for instance, a larger House), playing into their opponents’ contention that 
representatives (as opposed to state-representing senators) were parochial and unreflective of 
the will of “the American people” as a whole, such that having more of them would further 
undermine popular sovereignty.126 
Given that “the people” is a fictive and imprecisely knowable entity, what, if any 
power do they have under the American constitutional system?  As Morgan notes, 
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The ambiguities of popular sovereignty, its paradoxes and contradictions, especially 
as embodied in the mystery of representation, could be manipulated to shape fact in 
more ways than one.  Americans, like their English ancestors, invoked the doctrine 
both to justify resistance to government and to support it.127 
 
Indeed, the Founders were not of one mind regarding the role of the people even with 
respect to the Constitution’s ratification.  In correspondence with Madison during the 1787 
Convention, Jefferson argued for popular ratification of the Constitution and representation 
in the new Congress solely on a basis proportionate to state populations.128  Madison, on the 
other hand, whom we have already seen was willing to concede more power to the people 
than was Hamilton, considered the legislature, because closest to the people, to be the 
strongest and thus most dangerous branch of government, implying that too a great degree 
of popular sovereignty entailed significant danger itself.129 
Popular sovereignty can “pose threats to the very values it [is] ostensibly designed to 
protect.”130  In part, this is because, as Schmitt argues, “[i]n addition to other meanings   . . . 
‘people’ has the special sense that it includes a contrast to every state official . . . . People are 
those who do not govern, do not represent, do not exercise organized functions with an 
official character.”131  Giving “the people” power is a way of empowering “the people,” 
however understood, to exercise sovereignty over other people, potentially by way of closing 
off opportunities for people to exercise their own formal or (re)constitutive authority against 
“the people.”  In part, this is because “if the ‘people’ is the subject of constitu[tive] power, it 
can be so only insofar as it first undergoes an organizational process capable of expressing its 
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essence.”132  That is, some people must become “the people” before achieving any exercise 
of sovereign power, because in enacting sovereign power, “the people” continually defines 
its membership going forward, as well as the degree of sovereignty, if any, remaining in the 
hands excluded from “the people.” 
American constitutional practice is illustrative of this problem.  In America, 
representatives are proxies for geographically determined communities of people but 
collectively make laws that bind their entire societies.133  “The people” elect representatives 
who authoritatively pass laws governing all the people.  True, at the moment at which 
representatives are elected, the fiction of popular sovereignty is in some way made fact.134  
But even here, “the people” becomes a stand-in for anything from all who are entitled to 
vote, to a plurality of those who do actually vote.  The victorious portion of any electorate is 
almost never close to all of the people, or even all of the people permitted to cast votes.  
Popular sovereignty comes to embody the ever-present contradiction between 
representatives who are both agents and (subject to removal at the ballot box, but only if 
they wish to stand for office again and are available at the time to do so) “wielders of the 
supreme power that the people mysteriously conveyed to them.”135  The representative 
system strenuously advocated in The Federalist was intended both to give the people a 
modicum of sovereignty while insulating the republic from its dangers, removing 
governmental institutions from popular control by degrees, depending on the institution.  
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“Popular sovereignty would give the new government the support of the people, and, at the 
same time, insulate the national government from the activity of the people.”136 
Schmitt’s own views on popular sovereignty recognize this conflicting tendency as 
inherent in the democratic liberal Rechtsstaat.  “The people as bearer of the constitution 
making power are not,” he noted, “a stable, organized organ.”137  Because not organized, the 
constitutive people cannot be dissolved, but at the same time their will is difficult to establish 
or interpret.  This led Schmitt to the belief that in any democracy the people can only 
express their will through acclamation:  the collective vocalization through some means of a 
“yes” or “no” to questions posed by their representatives in government, at least once they 
have established a constitution through their constitutive power.138  Fundamentally, Schmitt, 
like Morgan, sees “the people” as an unformed, unorganized entity defined primarily 
through election procedures as a system of validations, and indeed as a fiction-making 
exercise that constructs a popular will.139 
What practices remain in the US, short of revolution (itself not clearly meant to be 
an act of the people, as opposed to “the people”), for the exercise of popular sovereignty?  
In some colonies, as even today in Massachusetts, a majority of voters, figured as “the 
people” could instruct or advise legislators by ballot with regard to specific statewide issues, 
thus somewhat short-circuiting the representative process.140  Legislators did (and do) not 
always consent to follow these instructions, however.141  Petitions were also popular in the 
colonies and the nascent United States, and were used effectively by James Madison and his 
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party against the Federalists.142  But nothing binds lawmakers to follow these either — only 
the threat of popular sovereignty exercised through balloting stands behind them.  Apart 
from the threat of militant activity previewed in Madison’s Federalist 46, the chief residual 
attribute of popular sovereignty appears to be the capability, somehow, to alter the 
constitutional order.  Hamilton, for instance, allowed for the possibility that the people 
might radically alter their government through “‘some solemn and authoritative act.’”  But as 
Joshua Miller argues, “[b]y attributing sovereignty to a fictitious people, the Federalists 
reduced the [altering] acts of that people to one:  the ratification of the Constitution, 
symbolically interpreted as an act of the people.  After that act, the people could only act 
again ‘when a general disruption in the federal system or some far-reaching constitutional 
change was contemplated,’” i.e. in, at a minimum, a state of exception.143  This could, of 
course, also amount to revolution, a right to which was not only implicit in the Declaration, 
but also a component of some express constitutional provisions at the founding.144 
 
Conclusion 
Sovereignty is diffuse in the American system — it is both everywhere, and on closer 
inspection, seemingly nowhere.  The Constitution divides it in the name of the people.  The 
people are themselves unidentifiable, and only active through momentary elections, or 
through revolution and reconstitution.  The Constitution itself may be sovereign, but not 
solely, because texts require interpretation.  The Federalist is offered up as a potentially 
sovereign interpretive tool, but which Publius do we follow?  Tea partiers, like any other 
advocates of popular sovereignty, have at best a few verses of the American bible at their 
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disposal, and those who view law, Congress, the President, the Supreme Court, history, the 
federal government, or states as ultimately sovereign have just as many arguments available 
to them.  Can we speak of an American sovereignty at all?  If so, what does it look like and 
where does it lie?  In the following chapter, I apply Carl Schmitt’s theories, as he presented 
them and as interpreted by Schmitt scholars, to sovereignty in America.  In doing so, I 
prepare the ground for the following chapters’ discussion of Schmitt’s friend-enemy 
distinction, the application of that centrally political concept to the criminal as enemy in 
American legal and political practice, and the possibility of limited popular exercise of 
microsovereignty through jury nullification.  
 110 
CHAPTER 4 
 
A SCHMITTIAN ANALYSIS OF AMERICAN SOVEREIGNTY 
 
 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I described diffuse sovereignty in America by reference to 
its founding documents and their allocation of ultimate decisional power to varying actors, 
and connected it to conventional and contemporary tea party views regarding sovereignty 
and founding principles.  I then discussed differences in founding views as to the intended 
role of popular sovereignty vis-à-vis the nation in American democracy, and limitations on 
both.  In this chapter, I apply Carl Schmitt’s theories of sovereignty, outlined in Chapter 2, 
to diffuse sovereignty in America, analyzing American sovereignty both according to his 
views and the views of scholars who have responded to the challenges of his work.   
 
American Sovereignty in Schmittian Analysis 
As we have seen, for Schmitt, sovereignty inheres in the power to decide about the 
existence of and the appropriate response to unanticipated or emergency situations, 
understood as “the exception.”1  In making this claim, Schmitt in part is arguing against his 
contemporary Hans Kelsen’s theory of pure law, according to which law, once in place, 
binds all citizens and eliminates sovereignty except under the law — a theory that is mirrored 
in conventional analyses of constitutionally-based sovereignty in the American constitutional 
system.  Schmitt claims that Kelsen simply negates the problem of sovereignty through a 
kind of methodological conjuring.2  In Schmitt’s view, law, in terms of a constitutional text, 
is neither central nor sovereign.  Instead, “[w]hat matters for the reality of legal life is who 
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decides.”3  Sovereignty on this conception is always a matter of ultimate human decision, 
which is invoked whenever the law fails fully to govern the circumstances at hand. 
What did Schmitt make of the concept of sovereignty in America?  In Political 
Theology, Schmitt argues that since the French Revolution, modern states have conceived of 
sovereignty deistically, making the sovereign the absent external engineer of the machinery 
of state, who remains outside it while the machine runs by itself.  “The decisionistic and 
personalistic element in the concept of sovereignty was thus lost.”4  Writing probably about 
his own German state, but with an eye as well toward other states, such as the US, that 
operate on bourgeois Rechtstaat principles, Schmitt states that “to an observer who takes the 
trouble to look at the total picture of contemporary jurisprudence, there appears a huge 
cloak-and-dagger drama, in which the state acts in many disguises but always as the same 
invisible person.”5  Thus, state power, in the guise of powers exercised mechanically by 
particular organs of government, is in fact always nonetheless the same state power — 
monistic and unified, but disguised as power contested and coordinated by at least 
potentially coequal and disagreeing actors.  Whether Schmitt had America in mind or not, 
his mechanical and cloak-and-dagger metaphors appear to apply equally well to our 
constitutional regime.  As the above examination of American constitutional sovereignty 
demonstrates, sovereignty in America is conventionally understood to involve a relatively 
mechanical — in the sense that those who apply the rules are merely following a 
                                                
3 Ibid. 34. 
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constitutional script rather than making discretionary sovereign decisions — application of 
complex textual rules (located primarily in the Constitution) by authorized actors who share 
amongst themselves certain sovereign attributes, but of whom none can be said to be clearly 
sovereign over the others. 
The significance of Schmitt’s “cloak-and-dagger play” metaphor becomes clearer in 
the light of Walter Benjamin’s study of German tragic drama.  Tracing that genre’s 
genealogy, Benjamin distinguishes it from but links it to “the intrigues of the comedia de capa y 
espada [cloak and dagger play].”6  In their Spanish form, the cloak and dagger plays 
emphasize honor, plot, and intrigue (as the term cloak-and-dagger implies in modern English 
usage).7  These comedies “present[ ] noble characters in a sophisticated plot that revolves 
around honour, chance and disguise.”8  The cloak and dagger drama both entertains (and 
thus distracts) observers, and simultaneously fools its audience using disguise.  From a 
Schmittian perspective, liberal constitutionalism, like Kelsen’s pure theory of law, distracts 
and disguises.  Under it, what is truly important — who decides in extremis — is cloaked.  
Meanwhile, a distracting set-piece tells us that one entity, then some text, then some other 
decider, then another text, is truly sovereign.9  The problem with this is that when sovereign 
decisionism is hidden (whether by being intentionally disclaimed or otherwise), it becomes 
easy for government actors to make sovereign decisions that the people do not see as such, 
and that gradually over time both sap popular sovereignty, thus making a democracy ever 
                                                
6 Walter Benjamin, Origin of German Tragic Drama, trans. John Osborne.  (London:  NLB, 1977), 86. 
7 Andrés Franco, “Vega Carpio, Lope de,” in McGraw Hill Encyclopedia of World Drama:  An International Reference 
Work in 5 Volumes, vol. 5.  (Bonn:  Verlag für die Deutsche Wirtschaft AG, 1984), 88. 
8 Patrice Pavis, “Cape and Sword Play,” in Dictionary of the Theatre:  Terms, Concepts, and Analysis, trans. Christine 
Shantz.  (Toronto:  University of Toronto Press, 1998), 43. 
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113 
more undemocratic, and extend potentially tyrannical power over the people without raising 
popular alarm.  This process has its ultimate end either in the enslavement of the people or 
their revolution, both ends that the American Founders sought to avoid, or at least forestall. 
So in Schmitt’s view, the cloak-and-dagger drama distracts the people from the true 
operation of sovereignty by the state, which itself must reduce to some, and ultimately one, 
human.10  Schmitt accepts this reductionism as a reality to be embraced.  Contrary to the 
trend in the eighteenth through twentieth centuries toward “fragmentation” of political 
power as a “central tenet of constitutional liberalism,” Schmitt insisted on making 
sovereignty indivisible once more.11  As Tracy Strong has restated it, “if life can never be 
reduced [to] or adequately understood by a set of rules, no matter how complex, then in the 
end, rule is of men and not of law — or rather [ ] the rule of men must always existentially 
underlie the rule of law.”12  Schmitt “despised liberalism and regarded its vision of the rule of 
law as an ideological subterfuge, an attempt to hide the domination of liberal values under an 
allegedly neutral rule of law.”13  In this light, Schmitt views separation of powers as in the 
American system as “merely an overly mechanical construction that inevitably paralyzes a 
state in the face of an exception because it obscures who is sovereign, who must decide and 
act at that moment.”14  He cites Chief Justice Marshall’s famous dictum that the government 
of America is one of laws and not of men as an example of a concept of law that serves as a 
                                                
10 As discussed above, Schmitt sees sovereignty in an established democracy as ultimately, but latently, residing 
in the people.  In the context of day-to-day operations of the polity, either some institution and ultimately 
probably one person within that institution acts as sovereign in the decisional sense, or the people retake their 
sovereignty to end a failed democracy and reestablish a new one.  See Chapter 2, text accompanying notes 221 
to 239. 
11 Schwab, introduction to Political Theology, xlii. 
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“cornerstone . . . of constitutional and absolutist thought” that dangerously obscures the fact 
that some sovereign must decide “what constitutes an exception,” and thus allows state 
actors to accumulate sovereign power at the expense of the people without their noticing 
that this is being done.15  Elsewhere Schmitt alludes to the same claim without citation, 
arguing that it is the normativist (i.e. positivist, liberal-Rechtsstaat) demand for the rule of law 
that appears centrally in the American Constitution’s establishment of a government of law 
and not men.16 
Ultimately Schmitt’s description of the rule-of-law Rechtsstaat as engaged in cloak-
and-dagger politics is of a piece with his strident critique of legal positivism.  The bourgeois 
Rechtsstaat, and in particular the form that separates power in a mixed government, “intends 
to evade the ultimate political decision.”  The covered over political component in the 
Rechtsstaat is omnipresent and threatens through potential rupture the balance created by 
separation of powers.17  Liberal constitutional states “attempt[ ] to repress the question of 
sovereignty by a division and mutual control of competences.”18  The rhetoric describing 
diffuse sovereignty in a Rechtsstaat as fundamentally deceptive also pervades the secondary 
literature on Schmitt’s theorizing.  Leo Strauss in his notes on Schmitt’s Concept of the Political 
claims that for Schmitt, liberalism does not destroy the political but rather hides it.19  Robert 
Howse notes that “liberal jurisprudence or ideology [ ] hides or obscures the decisionist 
character of all rule” for Schmitt.20  Heinrich Meier associates Schmitt’s concern with 
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“unmasking . . . the deceitfulness of conducting politics under moral pretexts” with his 
critique of such political strategies’ “flight from responsibility.”21  And Paul Hirst opines that 
Schmitt’s concept of sovereignty forces us to consider carefully how law amounts to a 
“conjuring trick.”22  Even Hannah Arendt picks up on this theme, characterizing the key 
American innovation in politics as “the consistent abolition of sovereignty within the body 
politic of the republic,” by which I understand her to mean not that sovereignty really goes 
away, but that it is consistently (and on Schmitt’s view falsely) disclaimed as an aspect of 
republican government.23 
In a less polemic vein, Schmitt turned specific attention to describing the American 
constitutional system in his 1928 treatise Constitutional Theory.24  This work carefully 
conceptualizes constitutional practice, and provides examples from among various 
contemporary constitutional systems to illustrate Schmitt’s views.  In it, Schmitt critiques the 
American Constitution as “lack[ing] a genuine constitutional theory,” citing specifically The 
Federalist as mostly a document addressing technical questions regarding the organization of 
the new government.25  Schmitt argues that the US Constitution conflates the specific 
constitutional covenant between the people and their government with any freely 
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constitutive act of the people and the states regarding the particular existential form of the 
polity.26  That is, it apparently fails to address sufficiently and distinctly the requirement in 
Schmitt’s theory of constitutions that “[t]he democratic principle of the people’s 
constitution-making power means the constitution is established through an act of the 
people capable of acting politically.  The people must be present and presupposed as 
political unity, if it is to be the subject of a constitution-making power.”27  Yet, precisely as 
we have seen above, the Constitution resolves Rousseau’s constitutive paradox, which 
Schmitt is here restating, only by sweeping it under the rug.  The people create the 
Constitution and are created by it.28  And yet popular sovereignty, while claimed as a source 
of constitutional legitimacy, played barely a role in the Constitution’s adoption.  Schmitt 
notes that the US Constitution was accepted through state ratifying conventions (not 
popular votes) and that the majorities of these conventions that ratified were “often very 
slight [and] accidental.”29  The Preamble’s wave toward a people is, for Schmitt, an 
unsatisfactory resolution to the paradox of constitutional government, and a failure of the 
American constitutional system to acknowledge constituent power as a source of 
sovereignty. 
Indeed, rather than the Constitution itself, the Declaration of Independence seems 
to come closer to meeting Schmitt’s terms for appropriately democratic constitutional texts.  
Schmitt notes that although not all states decide consciously their form of political existence 
                                                
26 Ibid. 127. 
27 Ibid. 112. 
28 See William E. Scheuerman, “Revolutions and Constitutions:  Hannah Arendt’s Challenge to Carl Schmitt,” 
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through a decision regarding the concrete type the state adopts, the US did this through its 
Declaration of Independence, by declaring a right in the people to undo and remake their 
governmental forms when these do not suit their needs or rights.30 
The avoidance in the Constitution of a decision on the nature of the people itself 
does not, for Schmitt, invalidate the Constitution outright as replacement for the Articles.  
Recall Schmitt’s insistence on a homogeneous, unified demos capable of exercising the pouvoir 
constituant to found a constitution and then remaining latent within the constituted system 
until it becomes necessary for it to reconstitute a new order.  Something much like this 
occurred in the transition from the Articles of Confederation to the Constitution.  For 
Schmitt, this transition was politically valid because of the people’s inherent right to revolt, 
even though the people in this instance did not need to exercise that right violently or 
tumultuously.   
In other words, the unmaking of the Articles outside their own amendment 
requirement was legitimate for Schmitt, if not legal, as outlined in Madison’s argument from 
the principles of the Declaration.31  For Schmitt, “[t]he constitution-making will of the 
people is an unmediated will . . . prior to and above every constitutional procedure.  No 
constitutional law, not even a constitution, can confer a constitution-making power and 
prescribe the form of its initiation.”32  Thus, in Schmitt’s view, the Articles could not require 
that the people amend them according to their own terms rather than refounding the state 
through the Constitution.  “The legitimacy of a constitution does not mean that a 
constitution originated according to previously valid constitutional laws.”33  Further, “it is 
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incorrect to designate the authority, empowered and regulated on the basis of a 
constitutional law, to change constitutional provisions, to revise them in other words, as the 
constitution-making power or pouvoir constituant.”34  That is, amendment procedures 
internal to a constitutional text differ qualitatively from refoundings, and only the latter are 
secured by the popular use (in democracies) of the pouvoir constituant.  As Andreas Kalyvas 
puts it, “the sovereign constituent people may initiate a change in the law in violation of the 
instituted law.”35  
Schmitt does cite approvingly a 1920 Harvard Law Review essay by William L. 
Marbury — “The Limitation upon the Amending Power” — as “rightly claim[ing] that the 
authority to alter and extend the constitution cannot be boundless and has not been 
conferred, in order to eliminate the constitution itself.”  That is, within the bounds of a 
constitutional order, a constitution cannot be amended according to its own rules for the 
purpose of undoing its core principles.36  An unresolved question, according to Schmitt, in 
American constitutional law is whether basic rights can be eliminated from the Constitution 
by constitutional amendment, or whether such elimination amounts to a destruction or 
elimination of the Constitution itself and thus would require a refounding.37  In other words, 
it was unclear to Schmitt from his understanding of American constitutional law whether 
basic rights are core principles under the US Constitution or are ancillary.  Constitutions in a 
typical modern liberal democratic bourgeois Rechtsstaat such as the United States are 
presented as outlining the sole means for alteration of the constitutional order, as though 
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they themselves, and not “the people” (neither the people who founded the constitutional 
order, nor the people presently living under it) were sovereign.  But Schmitt’s approbation of 
Marbury’s commentary is analytic, not polemic:  existing constitutional powers cannot 
properly be used to dissolve the constitutions that grant them because only the people (in a 
democracy), as subjects of the constitution-making power, can dissolve constitutions and 
establish new orders.38 
In sum, on the question whether the Constitution could legitimately supplant the 
Articles without the unanimous consent of the states united in the preceding Confederation, 
as required by the Articles, Schmitt clearly agreed with the position expressed by Madison in 
Federalist 40:  because and to the extent that the Constitution was established through the 
popular pouvoir constituant announced in the (itself constitutive) Declaration, the fact that the 
founders did not act according to the law of the Articles in establishing it is of no moment.  
In this sense, Schmitt’s thought aligns with the views of both Hannah Arendt and Andreas 
Kalyvas.  Arendt argued that one mistake of the American founding was seeking “to 
immortalize the constitutional document and to sacralize its legal foundations.  By doing so, 
they inevitably limited the freedom of their successors to initiate in their turn new 
beginnings.”39  Thus the founders, on Arendt’s view, failed to recognize that the 
Constitution might, precisely because it was better suited to the nascent American polity 
than the Articles, actually come to be seen as supplying the exclusive means for its own 
modification or replacement, not just in terms of legality, but of legitimacy as well.  In this 
sense, the founders, presumably unwittingly subsumed the pouvoir constituant that the people 
                                                
38 Schmitt, Constitutional Theory, 153. 
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exercise in extraordinary political moments “under the[ ] founders’ prohibitive shadow.”40  
Thus while “[t]he main threat for the first [Brahma] moment [of popular sovereignty] is a 
permanent revolution . . . for the second one [Vishnu, it] is stagnation and juridification.”41 
Another point of Schmittian analysis of American constitutionalism arises from 
Schmitt’s discussion of the mediating mechanisms by which the people indirectly establish a 
constitution.  He characterizes these assemblies as either constitution-amending or 
constitution-making.  The latter “convene after a revolution (more specifically, after an 
annihilation or elimination of a constitution) [as] the bearer of a sovereign dictatorship.”42  
Given Schmitt’s distaste in general for representation of the people — recall that he holds 
both that the people are never truly represented, and that a key failure of parliamentary 
government is that representatives inevitably shift to partisan interest politics and away from 
their fictive but nonetheless nobler role as advocates for the interests of the people as a 
whole — he somewhat surprisingly approves of the exercise of the people’s pouvoir constituant 
through a body of delegates.  Schmitt wrote approvingly of constitutional ratifying 
conventions, including in the US context, so long as they amounted to instances of delegated 
popular sovereignty, subject to delimited powers and instructions, as opposed to a more 
discretionary representation of the sovereign people.43  Sovereignty has to be, for Schmitt, 
exercised by the people in a democracy, because of their ultimate authority, or can be 
delegated.  It cannot properly, however, be represented.44  The central distinction here is that a 
                                                
40 Ibid. 261.  Consider in light of this the spectacle of an aide to Senator Tom Coburn tearing up during one of 
Coburn’s paeans to the founders’ constitutional intent during the confirmation hearings for Justice Sonia 
Sotomayor.  Reverence for the founders’ constitutional choices among conservative politicians is in deep 
tension with the emphasis by tea partiers among others on the people’s ongoing rights to resist and revolt. 
41 Ibid. 262. 
42 Schmitt, Constitutional Theory, 148. 
43 Ibid. 205. 
44 Kalyvas, Politics of the Extraordinary, 117, 128, 147. 
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representative is elected to make decisions about the content of law according to his own 
views, although for Schmitt in a well-functioning democracy this will involve deciding 
according to the interest of the people as a whole, whereas a delegate to a constitutional 
convention has little or no discretion because she is given clear instructions by the people 
who are exercising their sovereignty through the pouvoir constituant.  Put differently, for 
Schmitt, “the people cannot allow itself to be transformed into an official body without 
ceasing to be the people.”45  So while a representative body claims to be — in the sense of 
representing — the people in official form, a convention of delegates merely carries out the 
people’s will, without pretending to be an embodiment, or stand-in for the people. 
Of course as we have seen above in connection with Edmund Morgan’s arguments, 
the people is at best an amorphous and fictive concept, and at worst a deception that can be 
mobilized by any politician claiming to speak for the people but actually presenting his own 
views.  And despite his insistence that the people not be represented, Schmitt’s own theory is 
open to the same critique.  Schmitt has, for instance, been accused of appealing to a fictional 
and unidentifiable “people” as a pretext for establishing executive dictatorship.46  At the 
same time, however, Schmitt at least tacitly acknowledged this indeterminate and fictive 
nature of the people in his analysis of voting, by arguing that one cannot really say that a 
majority decides a question in a vote, because really only the small part that gives the 
winning side the edge has “decided.”47 
In any case this is arguably not so much a problem with Schmitt’s theory (or with the 
American founding) as with the idea of democracy itself, which must be grounded on some 
understanding of “the people,” where any such understanding will necessarily be fictive.  
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Thus Chantal Mouffe, building on Schmitt’s relatively unquestioning assumption of a 
democratic people, refines his understanding, arguing that “democracy requires . . . putting 
into question any idea of ‘the people’ as already given with a substantive identity.”48  Because, 
for Mouffe, the people are articulated through a temporary hegemonic process that is 
contingent, and reducing “the people” to only one of its many possible forms reifies the 
people’s identity, it is thus important to recognize that “the people” is only ever a shifting 
stand-in for the demos.49  This necessary understanding does not undermine democracy, but 
rather enriches it by calling attention to the eternal lack of fit between “the people” and the 
people. 
Having noted important puzzles with respect to Schmitt’s conception of the people, 
I now turn to a discussion broadly speaking of how Schmitt’s understanding of sovereignty 
and the mechanisms states employ to obscure it operate in the American context.  
Addressing the US constitutional system directly, Schmitt’s core observation is that the US 
Constitution “is indeed consciously built on the opposition between the Rechtsstaat that 
divides power and democracy, but [the United States’] political ideology previously only 
spoke so unproblematically and optimistically of ‘democracy’ because it did not need to be 
conscious in a practical sense of the fundamental opposition [between democracy and 
Rechtsstaat].”50  That is, at the founding, the inherent contradictions between democracy and 
Rechtsstaat were not terribly significant for America, though they appear to be now.  Schmitt 
disfavored division of power as an elimination of political absolutism designed to further 
liberal Rechtsstaat principles, but not democracy or its political unity.  “[A]ll separations, 
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divisions, limitations, and means of controlling state power operate only inside the 
framework of political unity.”51   
As we have seen, this results directly from Schmitt’s decisionism:  division of power 
obscures its exercise by particular, identifiable actors.  Thus “the question is not whether 
unconstitutional laws are invalid.  That is self-evident.  The question, rather, is who resolves 
the doubts about the constitutionality or unconstitutionality of a law.  Who, therefore, is 
competent to make this distinctive decision[?]”52  At one point, Schmitt opines that judicial 
review in the American system may locate ultimate sovereignty in the Supreme Court in a 
way that belies the Rechtsstaat concept of separation of powers.  The US Constitution not 
only includes “reciprocal checks and controls” but also effects separations of powers as 
among the branches of government.53  Yet at the same time, “judicial review of the 
constitutionality of laws, as the highest court of the United States of America exercises it, 
runs against the logically instituted schema of a separation of powers.”  That is, it amounts 
to power of one branch over against another, in the form of a check or control that runs 
counter to the grain of separation.54 
Schmitt’s analysis of the inherent contradictions in the American system between 
Rechtsstaat elements and democratic sovereignty mirrors his critique of the outcome of 
France’s 1830 revolution:  “The advocates of the liberal Rechtsstaat sought to evade the 
alternative, either sovereignty and the king’s constitution-making power or sovereignty and 
the people’s constitution-making power, and they spoke of a ‘sovereignty of the 
                                                
51 Ibid. 102. 
52 Ibid. 231. 
53 Ibid. 222. 
54 Ibid. 223. Ellen Kennedy, on the other hand, points to the US Supreme Court’s political question doctrine, 
according to which it generally stays out of disputes between its coequal branches of government, as an 
illustration of the Court’s self-denial of sovereignty in Schmitt’s sense.  Kennedy, “Hostis Not Inimicus,” 97. 
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constitution,’” which nonetheless did not answer, but “only sidestepped and veiled behind 
the somewhat occult-like image of the constitution-making power of the constitution” the 
ultimate question of sovereignty.55  As demonstrated in Chapter 2, Schmitt was not 
antidemocratic; rather he argued that whether the people or some other entity would be the 
possessor of ultimate sovereignty, it must be some actual living actor capable of deciding and 
not a text that would be sovereign.  Thus to the extent that the US Constitution, 
Declaration, Federalist, or other texts were meant to be sovereign, on Schmitt’s view, the 
American experiment was doomed to ultimate failure.  On the other hand, attempts to meet 
Schmitt’s critique by identifying an ultimate sovereign actor within the American 
constitutional structure tend to lead to investing sovereignty in the executive.  As we have 
seen, Clinton Rossiter identifies the president as the bearer of constitutional dictatorship in 
the American system.56   Moreover, as John McCormick outlines,  
The U.S. Constitution seemingly identifies the document itself, and thereby the 
sovereign popular will manifested within it, with the institution of the president.  In a 
way that it does not for any other representative of any other governmental branch, 
the constitution dictates the inaugural oath for the president and concludes it with 
the declaration that he or she will “preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of 
the United States.”57 
 
One could also advance the argument that though sovereignty is nowhere fixed in particular 
actors in the American constitutional system, it is granted to particular actors in the context 
of particular situations.  While this claim certainly applies Schmitt’s decisionism, it does so in 
a way that fundamentally opposes the core of his theoretical commitments:  for Schmitt, 
sovereignty is located somewhere as an ultimate matter.  If in varying situational contexts 
                                                
55 Schmitt, Constitutional Theory, 104. 
56 See Chapter 3, text accompanying notes 109 to 111. 
57 McCormick, “Dilemmas of Dictatorship,” 249, n. 38, quoting U.S. Const., Art. II, Sec. 1, Cl. 8.  McCormick 
immediately casts doubt on this analysis, however, claiming that the presidential oath “is certainly an attempt at 
an added precaution against the branch that is the most likely institutional threat to the constitution rather than 
any substantively existential equating of the document to the office itself.”  Ibid. 249-50, n. 38. 
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sovereignty appears to be exercised by varying actors, this is again simply a ruse that 
disguises the fact that sovereignty is the attribute in the end of some identifiable but 
concealed actor in any political system.58 
Notably, on Schmitt’s view, the American federal system did not impinge upon 
sovereignty through division of power in a Rechtsstaat form by dividing powers between the 
nation and its component states.  While the system of checks and balances that seems to 
locate sovereignty in various branches of government in various contexts amounts for 
Schmitt to an exercise in obscuring the actual source and operation of sovereign power, 
federations need not amount to a division of sovereignty, so long as homogeneity in the 
populace prevents the emergence of conflict between the federation itself and member 
states.  On the other hand, “[w]here the substantial homogeneity is absent, the agreement on 
a ‘federation’ is an insubstantial and misleading sham enterprise.”59  In the specific case of 
American federalism, Schmitt sees the US Constitution as a special form because of its 
federal-state component, which requires submission for ratification to the people of the 
states, rather than to the people as a whole, thus complicating somewhat the question of 
popular exercise of the pouvoir constituant.60  Schmitt does note that even before the Civil War, 
the contradictions inherent in the federal components of the US system had been discussed 
in the writings of John Calhoun, whose “theoretical significance for the concepts of a 
constitutional theory of the federation is even today still great and in no way settled by the 
fact that in the war of secession the Southern states were defeated.”61  Yet despite seeing 
                                                
58 As will become apparent in Chapter 8, I too part ways with Schmitt here, by dint of applying his sovereign 
decisionism in microcosm to juries.  Obviously juries are not ultimate sovereign actors, though I do associate 
them with the sovereignty of the people in a democracy in Schmitt’s sense. 
59 Schmitt, Constitutional Theory, 395. 
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these conceptual issues as unresolved, Schmitt argued that the “solution” to the question 
whether federal or state power ultimately prevailed was achieved through the Union’s victory 
in the Civil War, and meant that the constitution of the United States changed its character, 
and “no longer involve[s] the question of the independent political existence of the states.”62  
In part, this is because the question of slavery in the dispute between North and South, 
which had endangered homogeneity in the US, was through the outcome of that war fully 
resolved.63 
Schmitt urges in Constitutional Theory that Rechtsstaat constitutionalism hides the actual 
operation of sovereignty.  For instance, in the modern Rechtsstaat statutory ruptures, in which 
the legislature attempts to exercise power by going beyond the bounds of the constitutional 
order, are 
the criterion of sovereignty.  The difficulty lies in the fact that the bourgeois 
Rechtsstaat takes its point of departure from the idea of being able to comprehend 
and to limit the entire exercise of all state power without exception in written laws.  
In this way, political action of any given subject . . . is no longer possible.  Instead, a 
diverse range of fictions must be set up, such as that there is no longer any 
sovereignty at all, or, what is the same thing, that the “constitution,” more precisely, 
constitutional norms, are sovereign . . . . In reality, however, it is precisely the 
essential political decisions, which elude normative definition.  The fiction of the 
absolute normative quality then has no consequence other than that such a 
fundamental question like the one regarding sovereignty is left unclear.  For the 
inevitable sovereign actions, a method for apocryphal acts of sovereignty develops.64 
 
These essential political decisions are, for Schmitt, hidden behind legality in the Rechtsstaat.  
And they are the hallmarks of sovereignty itself.  Thus, a 
logically consistent and complete Rechtsstaat aspires to suppress the political 
concept of law, in order to set a “sovereignty of the law” in the place of a concrete 
existing sovereignty.  In other words, it aspires, in fact, to not answer the question of 
sovereignty and to leave open the question of which political will makes the 
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64 Ibid. 154-55.  I explore in Chapter 8 whether jury nullification can be seen as one such apocryphal act of 
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appropriate norm into a positively valid command.  As noted [ ], this must lead to 
concealments and fictions, with every instance of conflict posing anew the problem 
of sovereignty.65 
 
According to Schmitt, normativism, in the mode of legal positivism, according to 
which law and not men govern, finds its concrete expression in “the decision of the fathers 
of the American constitution who provided for a government of law and not of men.  Thus 
what is generally understood to be a Rechtsstaat [law-as-right state], Schmitt concluded, is 
nothing else than a Gesetzsstaat [positive law state].  For the normativist, the norm produces 
the right.”66  As Schmitt himself put it: 
The American constitutions [sic] of the eighteenth century lacked a genuine 
constitutional theory.  The most important historical source for the theoretical 
foundations of this constitution, The Federalist, offers insight mostly only into 
practical organizational questions.  The people provides itself a constitution without 
distinguishing the general “covenant,” . . . from every other act of constituting a new 
political unity and from the act of the free political decision on the particular form of 
existence,67  
 
that is, whether the American state will be a democracy, monarchy, or other sovereign form.  
In short, Schmitt argues that the US constitutional system was founded as a mechanism for 
division and obfuscation of sovereign power, and as a would-be sovereign legal text in line 
with legal positivism, without giving adequate attention to the retention of fundamental 
sovereignty in the people.  Put differently, one might safely conclude that while Schmitt 
admired the gestures in the direction of democratic sovereignty in the Declaration and in the 
Preamble’s reference to “We the People,” he nonetheless derided the US Constitution’s 
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failure to enshrine something like a right retained by the people to revolt against and remake 
the constitutional order.68 
This can be seen more clearly by connecting Schmitt’s views on the US federal 
system with his insistence that a democracy involve a homogeneous and unified people.  For 
Schmitt, the US Constitution’s guarantee of a republican form of government in the states69 
is a means of ensuring democratic homogeneity in the US.70  As we have seen, democracy 
and federation both require homogeneity for Schmitt, and the two naturally converge, 
effectively eliminating the substantive component of federalism as power sharing, and 
replacing it with a complete unity in which the independence of federal states is largely 
dissolved.  Schmitt opines as noted above that this occurred in the US as a result of the Civil 
War, and cites the Preamble’s reference to “We the People of the United States” as an early 
indicator of this necessary convergence.71  Schmitt further notes that the intent of the 
founding with respect to the states vis-à-vis the union was to create a Rechtsstaat system 
                                                
68 Importantly this should not be understood to indicate that Schmitt did not believe that American is truly a 
democracy, although to the extent that the answer to “Quis judicabit?” is the President, the Supreme Court, 
Congress or some other institutional actor, he would not have so believed.  In a sense, the only way to detect 
sovereignty is after the fact of an ultimate decision on the exception.  Thus the US might be a regime of 
popular sovereignty if its people actually do mobilize to revolt against and remake a governmental system in 
crisis.  Until such time, whomever exercises sovereign decisionism is evidently sovereign. “Under some 
circumstances, the revolutionary elimination of a constitution can even be designated somewhat rightly as mere 
constitutional change, but naturally only when one presupposes th[e] permanence of the subject of the 
constitution-making power.”  Schmitt, Constitutional Theory, 141.   
Schmitt did elsewhere argue that English-based common law thinking was not as susceptible to 
normativism (effectively positivism) as civil law in continental Europe because case-based precedent is both 
limited to the facts of specific cases, and involves decisionism by judges interpreting new facts in light of extant 
law.  Schmitt, Three Types of Juristic Thought, 85-86.  In the context of the US Supreme Court, however, Justices 
are not bound by precedent, though they generally seek to abide, or to appear to abide by its normative terms.  
The high court thus operates on a profoundly more decisionist plane than lower courts, which must, if acting 
faithfully to their charges, apply the norms embodied in statutes as well as prior authoritative precedent. 
 
69 U.S. Const., Art. IV, Sec. 4. 
70 Schmitt, Constitutional Theory, 393. 
71 Ibid. 404.  See text accompanying notes 60 to 63. 
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involving complicated separations of powers in part in order to put off the decision about 
substantive political unity, citing in this context Madison’s Federalist 49.72 
Schmitt was cognizant of the implications for political stability inherent in his 
critique of mechanical legal means for curbing popular sovereignty or constituent power.  He 
“was fully aware of the politically revolutionary implications of his doctrine of constituent 
power.  He also knew that political revolutions risk dual power and civil war, not to mention 
dictatorship, which he understood as the other side of the constituent moment itself.”73  In 
the US context, separation of power is meant to tame power itself, which must in a 
democracy mean the power of the people.74  And at least Madison among the Federalist 
authors too grasped that there lay at the core of constitutionalism the germ of violent 
revolution, opining that “[i]t is in vain to oppose constitutional barriers to the impulse of 
self-preservation.”75  Madison’s insight here, as in Federalist 46, foregrounds the looming 
potential of popular rebellion and thus the omnipresence of popular sovereignty.  This in 
turn highlights the contrast between Madison’s constitutionalism and Hamilton’s, which 
more closely tracks the Rechtsstaat strategy Schmitt illuminates.  Hamilton seeks to channel 
popular sovereignty through constitutionalism.  Schmitt shows us the ultimate impossibility 
of this task.  But in American politics and jurisprudence, Hamilton’s Rechtsstaat view has 
triumphed, thanks in no small part to the contributions of his sometime allies, Chief Justice 
Marshall and President John Adams.76  Madison’s limited references to popular sovereignty 
in The Federalist are ultimately overshadowed both by his own, and Hamilton’s and Jay’s, 
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references to constitutional sovereignty, and as well by historical practice.77  Schmitt’s 
critique of sovereignty in America supports my thesis.  Though in his view no democratic 
state can avoid the operation of popular sovereignty, the Rechtsstaat, including America as its 
example par excellence, denies its validity.78 
Schmitt notes that The Federalist’s authors argued for a “mixture and tempering that 
directs itself especially against pure democracy.”79  This contrasts, as noted in Chapter 2, with 
Hans Kelsen’s view that separation of powers should be considered a sharing of power 
rather than a division of power against itself.80  William Scheuerman, taking up this line of 
reasoning, claims that even 
[t]he Federalist Papers offers little more than meager details “about practical 
organizational questions,” and American thought collapses the foundation of the 
social order and of a new constitutional order into one act.  In contrast to the 
French, Schmitt thereby suggests, the Americans downplay the truth that 
constitution-making presupposes the existence of a unified homogeneous Volk with 
a real capacity for willful action.81  
 
Jeffrey Seitzer confirms this interpretation of Schmitt’s views, noting that “[t]he Americans 
had to ‘constitute’ their identity through the act of constitutionmaking itself, whereas the 
                                                
77 Madison, for example, opposed an easily amended Constitution on the ground that it would lead citizens 
both to believe the original document was seriously flawed, and to demonstrate their disrespect for it by 
changing it frequently, depriving the new government of the advantages of veneration over time.  Myerson, 
Liberty’s Blueprint, 222-23. 
78 John McCormick seeks to demonstrate that Schmitt’s views on the whole align more with those of 
Hamilton’s Publius than those of Madison’s.  McCormick, “Dilemmas,” 249 n. 36, citing Schmitt, Crisis, 40, 45.  
Unfortunately, McCormick’s overly simplistic conclusion here is not supported by the texts.  Schmitt does 
indeed cite Hamilton’s Federalist 70 favorably, summarizing at length its arguments for a strong executive.  Ibid. 
45, 102 n. 40.  But McCormick’s only citation for the proposition that Schmitt criticizes Madison’s Federalist is 
to page 40 of Crisis, where Schmitt merely lists The Federalist tout court as among many “names” demonstrating a 
liberal bias toward balancing mechanisms in government.  Neither here nor in the accompanying footnote does 
Schmitt refer to any specific Federalist papers, nor to Madison himself.  Read most charitably, McCormick’s 
conclusion here might be that only in Madisonian papers are there references to checks and balances, such that 
Schmitt’s obliquely critical reference on page 40 applies only to Madisonian papers, but my catalog of 
references to sovereignty in The Federalist does not support that conclusion.  
79 Schmitt, Constitutional Theory, 238. 
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French were able to ‘presuppose’ this identity.  The Americans, in other words, were stuck at 
some sort of preparatory stage, unable to grasp the great opportunity offered by their own 
Revolution.”82  Scheuerman goes on, incorrectly I believe, to argue that in Schmitt’s view 
America failed to recognize that all constitutions are established through “an exercise of 
arbitrary power illegitimate from the perspective of the constitutional order which [they] 
intend[ ] to generate.”83  As discussed above, however, the founders recognized that the 
Constitution was in some sense illegitimate from the point of view of the Articles, since its 
establishment came outside the prescribed amendment mechanism for those and had to be 
defended by reference to other principles, such as those found in the Declaration.84  Thus 
they recognized precisely this need for an arbitrary and illegitimate founding power.  
Likewise, its establishment, while in conformity with its own internal ratification rules, was 
accomplished through means it now forecloses for its own amendment.85  In Schmittian 
terms, America’s founders, and specifically Hamilton and Madison, recognized the need to 
acknowledge and mobilize the pouvoir constituant, understanding as Bruce Ackerman has put it 
that “the People best express themselves through episodic and anomalous ‘conventions,’ and 
not through regular sessions of ordinary legislatures.”86  This view is at least partially 
confirmed by reference to the arguments reproduced above from Madison’s Federalist 40.87  
What remains to be seen is what role the people play, and were intended to play, in 
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American democracy after its founding moment, and during the preservation of its newly 
established constitutional order.  I address that question briefly before concluding this 
chapter. 
 
Bringing the People Back In 
I now examine the views of some theorists who have followed Schmitt’s lead in 
analyzing sovereignty in the American system, and who in varying ways have proposed 
bringing popular sovereignty back into American constitutional practice.  This discussion is 
intended to open a conceptual space for my application of Schmitt’s theory to jury 
nullification in Chapter 8.  I will ultimately show how jury nullification, somewhat in line 
with and in some ways contrary to Schmitt’s theory, can bring the sovereign people back in 
to the American Rechtsstaat, in particular in the context of the criminal justice system.  Here, 
however, I outline ways in which Schmitt’s understanding of popular sovereignty informs 
and underlies contemporary arguments about how the people in general can be actively 
sovereign in American democracy. 
Antonio Negri, a theorist of the political left who favors a resurgent popular 
sovereignty, largely agrees with Schmitt’s diagnosis of sovereignty in America:  “The 
American constitutionalists  . . . enclose the contradictions of political space within a juridical 
machine so sophisticated that it is manipulable and soon distorted.”88  What Negri describes 
as “[t]he democratic game of power” in America is, in order to avoid a dictatorship of the 
few or the many, “dispersed through a multiplicity of offices of government” such that the 
constitutional order protects political society by dividing power within it.89  But while his 
                                                
88 Negri, Insurgencies, 303-04. 
89 Ibid. 160. 
 
 
133 
diagnosis of sovereignty resembles Schmitt’s, Negri distinguishes between sovereignty, which 
is for him exercised from above by the political few, and constituent power, which he 
defines as sovereignty exercised from below by the many — the people.  “[T]he concept of 
sovereignty and that of constitutive power stand in absolute opposition” because they are 
only linked, paradoxically, by the fact that constitutive sovereignty is a continually renewed 
praxis of a constitutive act within the continuity of free praxis, rather than being subject to 
sovereign limits imposed from above.90  That is, ideally, constitutive sovereignty escapes the 
founding paradox by continually reconstituting itself.  Constitutive power thus never goes 
over into the sovereignty of the few.  “[I]n Spinozian terms, Negri’s conception of 
constituent power relies on a political ontology of pure immanence.”91  “This theory of 
constituent power [ ] cuts diagonally across the conventional divide between reform and 
revolution.”  Disguised as reform, it amounts to “absolute procedure” that constantly 
transforms social structures.92  Or, to recall my exposition of Kalyvas on Schmitt from 
Chapter 2, for Negri, rather than enter a Vishnu or preserving moment, democracy always 
remains in an ongoing Brahma-Shiva cycle of creative destruction.  For Schmitt, of course, 
this would undo the stability and security that he saw as the primary missions of the modern 
state.93 
Of course there is some debate whether Carl Schmitt himself favored any democratic 
form of constitutive power or sovereignty or remained committed to a mode of sovereignty 
lodged in a single sovereign, debate fueled by the lack of systematic consistency in Schmitt’s 
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theorizing discussed in a prior chapter.94  Hans Lindahl, for instance, holds that Schmitt’s 
Constitutional Theory  “relentlessly moves to recover the primacy of constituent power over 
constituted power and of democracy over the rule of law.”95  In this way, “Schmitt’s 
insistence on constituent power as the subject of a constitution aims to deny the possibility 
of a closed, purely normative constitutional system.”96  Damian Chalmers, on the other 
hand, disputes the degree to which Schmitt promotes constituent power, claiming that his 
writing as a whole does not contemplate such power “as an autonomous force separate from 
the State.”97  And this, I submit, is where Kalyvas’ intervention is most helpful:  by dividing 
Schmitt’s theory into successive moments of creation, preservation and destruction, and by 
assigning the demos distinct roles in these moments, Kalyvas helps remedy this perceived 
inconsistency with respect to Schmitt’s democratic thought. 
In Negri’s conception anyway, “[t]o speak of constituent power is to speak of 
democracy.”  This is apparently both because Negri wishes to associate the terms for his 
own purposes, but also because they “have often been related” as a matter of common 
understandings of the terms.  According to Negri, “[t]he desire for community is the spirit 
and soul of constituent power” which links it profoundly and closely with democracy.”98  
Constitutive power is a form of democracy that resists constitutionalization.99  Instead, it is 
itself properly the source of constitutional norms.  But it is too easily shunted into ordinary 
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mechanisms of power, such as procedural and administrative institutional forms, and in this 
sense is opposed and confined by constituted power in the Vishnu moment.100  The US 
Constitution, for example, makes constitutive power “a formal element of the government,” 
confining and channeling it.101  Because it is clear that the constitutional text cannot resolve 
all conflicts of power in America, the question arises whether recourse to the popular will 
can do so.   
Here, consistent with my analysis, Negri sees The Federalist as a whole as being 
suspicious of too much popular power, characterizing recourse to it as a “‘perverse effect’ of 
democracy.”102  “The circle of the constitutional demonstration [in The Federalist] closes with 
a paradox, since homo politicus, who is constructed by the constitution, has now become the 
sociological referent of the constitution . . . . The constitution has absorbed not only 
constituent power, but also the subject of constituent power.”103  Finally, Negri sees the 
constitutional grant of interpretive and dispute-resolving power to the United States judiciary 
as a final door slammed on constitutive power:   
[H]ere the machine appropriates the last terrain on which the homo politicus could 
produce a direct innovation.  The political innovation gives its ripe fruits:  nothing is 
left of the sociality and the universality of the political expressed by the revolutionary 
moment.  The strenuous centralization of the constitution takes up an exclusive and 
total place, from which constituent power is excluded. . . .  Judiciary power assumes 
and exalts for itself the becoming explicit of constituent power, uncontainable in the 
net of a rigid constitution.104   
 
But Negri, unlike Schmitt, does not merely see this as a basis for critique of the attempt to 
confine constituent power (for Schmitt identified with sovereignty) in constitutional practice.  
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For Negri, the diagnosis is accompanied by a prescription for its cure.  I examine now his 
suggestions for bringing constituent power, or popular sovereignty, back into the picture, 
along with those of a few other theorists. 
According to Michael Hardt, Negri’s longtime collaborator, Negri does not view 
exceptional decisionism from above, by the sovereign in Schmitt’s terms, as convergent with 
exceptional decisionism from below, by the multitude.  In Negri’s view, at least in part, 
“constituent power,” the multitude’s exercise of what Schmitt calls sovereignty, “is . . . a 
democratic process that seeks constantly to institute mechanisms of social equality, in 
contrast to the fundamentally monarchical nature of sovereignty.”105  This essentializing view 
of the demos as always “good” and always operating in favor of equality over rank is 
problematic, to say the least:  tea partiers, hardly the kind of multitude that shares Negri’s 
political values or priorities, appeal to and attempt to mobilize popular sovereignty as 
constituent power.  Nothing ensures that the multitude will not — even before it succeeds in 
exercising exceptional power — adopt or endorse exclusivist, elitist or antidemocratic goals. 
Negri argues that during and after the American Revolution, “[t]he ‘people-in-arms’ [were] 
not only a fact of military organization; they also represent[ed] a new constitutional order.”  
Colonial militias became enactors of constitutive power.106  Yet the “people-in-arms” who 
now claim lineage from colonial militias bear no resemblance to the Marx-inspired 
revolutionaries Negri anticipates.  Understood more charitably, Negri hopes to change the 
ontology of constituent power into one that is democratic or democratizing.107  Negri’s 
proposal for opening constitutional systems to popular sovereignty appears to involve a kind 
of permanent revolution that allows constituent power always to reconstitute itself without 
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ever permanently (or over a very long temporal horizon) being hardened into constituted 
power. 
Kathleen Davis takes a more concept-driven approach, urging a reframing of norms 
and meanings of sovereignty.  Davis outlines a general theory of the tendency for concepts 
of sovereignty to be associated retrospectively with starkly delimited temporal periods that 
thus coheres with Schmitt’s views, at least as understood and critiqued by Kalyvas.  She 
argues that this tendency contributes to a reification of concepts of sovereignty, when in fact 
sovereignty is fluid and contingent.  In the context of American sovereignty, her insights 
show that it need not conform to any particular intent of the Framers’ (even if such a 
singular and fixed intent is determinable), and leaves open the possibility, together with 
Schmitt and Negri, that “the people” or a at least a larger subset thereof might exercise 
sovereignty, provided that the people believe that they have such an opportunity, or can 
work through a sovereign who does.108 
Positioned as alternatives to revolutions, political or conceptual, are more 
incremental and more fundamentally legalistic (if nonetheless sometimes formally outside the 
legal system) versions of change designed to keep the American constitutional system open-
ended.  According to Andrew Arato, American proposals that near Schmitt’s thinking in 
attempting to restore an extralegal constituent power must choose “revolution based on a 
new legitimacy, or extra legality led by an existing legitimate institution.”109  Incrementalists 
look for ways to work to open the constituted order from at least within the broadest 
borders of the constitutional system, and sometimes as well within the legal order more 
strictly determined.  Robert Goldwin, for instance, cites Tocqueville’s observations on the 
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American founding by way of asserting that “[t]umult, confused clamor, a thousand voices 
— not harmony — [ ] is how America was and is constituted.  And the framers wisely chose 
. . . not to strive to change it, but rather to institutionalize it.”110  Untrammeled revolutionary 
action is good for establishing, but not for maintaining, governments, but even the Founders 
recognized the need for some form of ongoing revolution, albeit cabined within institutions.   
Whether this institutionalization can be accomplished, and how effectively, is hotly 
debated.  Benjamin Barber notes the view of historians including Louis Hartz and Arthur 
Schelsinger that America was founded around a central consensus not informed by 
substantive views, but rather by an agreement to purposelessness under defined procedures 
— that is, an agreement to keep the constitutional system as open as possible to change, so 
long as change is rooted in legality.111  But as the nation has become too large for its own 
needs and too small to successfully pursue empire, “the very institutions that once fostered 
success now catalyze failure.”112  That is, procedure without agreement to substance can 
eventually lead, and in Barber’s view has led, to a manipulation of procedural techniques and 
carefully crafted institutions to pursue competing aims according to who is capable of 
manipulating them.  Barber likens the representative system to “a benign tumor metastasized 
to become perilous to the body it once served,” in fulfillment of Rousseau’s warning against 
people allowing themselves to be represented.113 
                                                
110 Robert A. Goldwin, “Of Men and Angels:  A Search for Morality in the Constitution,” in The Moral 
Foundations of the American Republic, ed. Robert H. Horwitz, 2nd ed.  (Charlottesville, VA:  University Press of 
Virginia, 1979), 11. 
111 Benjamin R. Barber, “The Compromised Republic:  Public Purposelessness in America,” in The Moral 
Foundations of the American Republic, ed. Robert H. Horwitz, 2nd ed.  (Charlottesville, VA:  University Press of 
Virginia, 1979), 30.  This notion resonates with the Kelsenian view. 
112 Ibid. 31. 
113 Ibid. 32. 
 
 
139 
Barber’s point is well illustrated by recent developments in the US Senate.  Stymied 
by repeated Republican filibusters in that body, some Democrats have lately pursued the 
possibility of a “constitutional option” that would allow the Senate to redefine its own rules, 
in accordance with Article I, Section 5 of the Constitution, at the beginning of a new term, 
to alter or abolish the practice on a majority vote, which itself would in theory not be subject 
to filibuster.114  The Senate Rules Committee recently held hearings on alternatives to the 
filibuster and proposed modifications to the informal practice of senatorial “holds” on 
nominations or bills.115  Both practices, and the proposals for overcoming them, offer direct 
insight into the extraordinarily complex rules — stated and unstated — that govern behavior 
in the Senate, all of which are, per the Constitution, determined by the Senate itself.  This 
current contretemps recalls as well the much bemoaned decline in bipartisan cooperation in 
general in American government, and the Clarence Thomas confirmation hearings and 
Clinton impeachment, among other events.  As political pressure increases from all sides, 
attempts at incremental reform become increasingly overwhelmed by political actors who 
learn the revised complex rules well and exploit them.  Further tweaking of the rules, on this 
read, merely postpones — and not for long, the inevitable exercise of sovereignty by elites 
who cloak themselves in legalisms. 
Apart from revolution and incremental reform according to the established 
constitutional order, are there any intermediate ways to foster the people’s ongoing 
participation in determining the nature of American democracy and law?  Alan Keenan, like 
Schmitt and Negri, diagnoses the problem with particular attention to the situation in the 
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United States today, noting that despite formal democratic principles of citizen participation 
“the people themselves are increasingly locked out of their own political system” through 
both procedural and substantive barriers.116  Keenan’s mission is to mine and reveal the 
centrally democratic “concept and practice of openness.”117  Openness in democracy has, for 
Keenan, two key qualities:  participatory openness to all members of a community in making 
laws and decisions that will affect them, and openness to change, in the sense of freedom 
from static patterns or dead-hand control.118  That is, in Schmittian terms, he favors popular 
sovereignty or the exercise of constituent power over rigid adherence to constituted forms 
of power.  The tensions between these and the practical needs for stability and clarity lead 
Keenan to a third form of democratic openness:  incompletion and imperfection — i.e., the 
idea that democracy is always in question.119  Respect for the essential openness of the 
definition of the democratic “we” is Keenan’s fourth form of openness.120   
Evidently from this synopsis, Keenan is not looking to radical or violent solutions.  
Keenan calls for restraint of left and radical impulses to resist entrenched power tout court, 
favoring instead the deployment of “second-order civic virtues . . . of compassion, 
forgiveness, self-critique, and self-limitation.”121  Keenan’s strategy reflects his 
acknowledgment that the central paradox of democratic freedom is that openness cannot be 
achieved without forms of closure, such that “democracy is better defined as a set of questions 
than as an answer or guide to action.”122  In this sense, so long as democratic questions are 
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being asked and answered, we live in a democratic context.123  This seems to elide the issue, 
however, of who asks and answers the questions.  If only ever a set of institutions — 
Congress, prosecutors, and courts, for instance — then is it not possible that stability, 
tantamount to institutional ossification, will trump openness across the run of instances? 
Other third-way advocates who seek to retain both popular sovereignty and 
openness in the context of established constitutional orders both acknowledge and work 
through — without resolving — the constitutive paradox.  According to David Dyzenhaus, 
Schmitt’s analysis of constitutional authority holds that those who wield constituent power 
are always “able to use constitutional form against itself and so constitutionalism sows the 
seeds of its own destruction.”  Dyzenhaus nonetheless defends the liberal view of the rule of 
law against Schmitt’s critique, arguing that constituent power neither disappears in a 
constitutional context, nor is entirely contained by constitutional forms.124  Damian 
Chalmers adopts a reformist stance, positing three aspects of constituent power:  that it 
makes individual and collective subjects mutually constitutive while foregrounding political 
order; that it is always related to particular constitutional settlements that it informs and 
conditions; and that these in turn occur against broader means of generating meaning and 
legitimacy.  He then argues that intolerance and authoritarianism that occur through the 
operation of constituent power do so when one or more of these aspects is missing from 
some exercise of such power (as in the case of fascism overemphasizing the collective over 
the individual in violation of the first aspect), so that making constituent power viable in a 
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constitutional context involves ensuring that his three conditions are met, rather than that 
constituent power be constitutionally channeled, or not.125 
A final possibility that both works through and subverts the constitutional order, is a 
mandatory sunset or revision period for laws, up to and including constitutive or 
constitutional law, an idea proposed by Thomas Jefferson in a letter to Madison.126  
Maryland, like thirteen other states, has a constitutional provision that requires a vote 
roughly each generation on whether to hold a constitutional convention to completely revise 
its constitution.127  In Schmittian terms, this appears to be a kind of legally required, or 
institutionally led exercise of constituent power, in the mode of acclamation or rejection of 
the question “shall we retain these laws,” perhaps in line with Arato’s second option.128  It 
could thus too be subordinated to raw sovereign power — say a dictatorial edict that no laws 
or provisions will be revisited or will expire until the sovereign decider so decrees.  The 
problem of providing for substantive, ongoing constituent power, and for allowing change 
through popular sovereignty to the very order that channels it, seems to be intractable in the 
Rechtsstaat, no matter how approached, unless one is willing to accept threats either to 
democracy and liberty, or to the order itself.  It is this insight that Schmitt introduced to 
German legal theory, that “the rebellious and insurgent force of the constituent power” 
discovered during the English civil war and American and French revolutionary experiences 
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is dangerous to political stability while at the same time constructive of democracy, that is 
perhaps also most valuable for a Schmittian analysis of sovereignty in the United States.129 
 
Conclusion 
Intractable though it may seem, the problem of how to retain constitutive power in 
the people without at the same time inviting perpetual violent revolution of the kind Schmitt 
abhors begs some solution, and some solution or solutions will inevitably obtain from time 
to time.  Along Giorgio Agamben’s lines, Chalmers asserts that “even within liberal 
constitutional settlements, there must be some recognition of means through which extra-
constitutional change can take place.”130  James Tully’s proposal that a truly democratic 
constitutionalism (as distinguished from imperial constitutionalism) would preserve “the 
basic idea of democratic freedom,” namely that “the laws must always be open to the 
criticism, negotiation, and modification of those who are the subjects of them as they follow 
them,” may be a good starting point, even if he is not terribly specific as to how such 
negotiation and modification will occur.131   
Or Tully may simply be making the same claim as Anne Applebaum in a recent 
Washington Post column critiquing the Occupy movement, that such protest activity “isn’t 
what democracy looks like.  This is what freedom of speech looks like.  Democracy looks a 
lot more boring.  Democracy requires institutions, elections, political parties, rules, laws, a 
judiciary and many unglamorous, time-consuming activities.”132  Schmitt would disagree 
vehemently:  what Applebaum describes are liberal Rechtsstaat institutions, designed precisely 
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to channel and cabin democracy.  Democracy is exercise of the pouvoir constituant, whether 
through acclamation, tumult or other means such as revolution.  One way or another, 
popular sovereignty will express itself in America, whose Brahma moment of founding is far 
behind it.  Whether popular sovereignty will reappear through violence in a Shiva moment 
(such as some tea partiers have advocated) or whether more incremental means can succeed 
in enacting or supplanting Schmitt’s reliance on acclamation as the sole form of popular 
participation in a stable, established democracy remains to be seen. 
As we learned in the prior chapter, Schmitt views the people in a well-functioning 
democracy as always latently next to the constituted Rechtsstaat, waiting to resist, revolt, and 
refound as and if necessary, but potentially only either through violence or by withholding 
acclamation (which may amount to the same thing in the extreme case).133  One possible 
solution, though one Schmitt himself would possibly have dismissed as smoke and mirrors, 
is to foster a democratic homogeneity based on shared commitments to a legal-constitutional 
framework.134  In the next chapter, I examine Schmitt’s theory that the political is 
fundamentally based on an irresolvable distinction between friends and mortal enemies.  
This will not only allow for a discussion of criminal law in the United States in terms of 
Schmitt’s understanding of the political, but will also help connect Schmitt’s views on 
democratic homogeneity to a closer examination of the possibility that friendship and enmity 
in the American experience are grounded on something like law. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
SCHMITT’S FRIEND-ENEMY DISTINCTION 
 
 
Introduction 
In the preceding chapters I have presented Schmitt’s biography and association with 
the Weimar and Nazi governments, and his theoretical approaches to sovereignty, 
democracy, and liberalism, and have applied these to an analysis of the American 
constitutional system with particular focus on the nature of sovereignty on Schmitt’s terms 
in the United States.  In this chapter, I continue my discussion of Schmitt’s core theories, 
emphasizing his concept of the political as hinging centrally on a distinction between friend 
and enemy that both defines the modern state and enables it to engage in its primary 
function of protecting its citizens in return for their obedience.  This discussion of Schmitt’s 
friend-enemy distinction will pave the way for its application to the United States criminal 
justice system in Chapter 6, in order to allow for a full discussion of jury nullification in 
terms of Schmitt’s theory in Chapters 7 and 8.  In this chapter, I define Schmitt’s friend-
enemy distinction as the central political axis, briefly discuss critiques of his theory that argue 
that he shortchanges the friendship component of the political, distinguish the concepts of 
enemy and criminal in Schmitt’s thought with reference to, among other things, Schmitt’s 
theory of the partisan and contemporary international and domestic terrorism, and briefly 
detail Schmitt’s views on criminality in general. 
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Schmitt’s Concept of the Political as Friend-Enemy Distinction 
Of Carl Schmitt’s works, the two most influential and widely studied are Political 
Theology, in which Schmitt lays out his theory of sovereignty as decision on the exception,1 
and his 1927 work The Concept of the Political.  In the latter Schmitt holds that “[t]he specific 
political distinction to which political actions and motives can be reduced is that between 
friend and enemy.”2  In this context, the enemy is “the other, the stranger,” and “is, in a 
specially intense way, existentially something different and alien, so that in the extreme case 
conflicts with him are possible.”3  Such an enemy is no mere nuisance.  “[T]o the enemy 
concept belongs the ever present possibility of combat.”4  Indeed, “[t]he political is the most 
intense and extreme antagonism, and every concrete antagonism becomes that much more 
political the closer it approaches the most extreme point, that of the friend-enemy 
grouping.”5  War, or at least death through human combat, must be realistically possible in 
order for a friend-enemy grouping to exist.6 
Nonetheless, for Schmitt “[e]very religious, moral, economic, ethical, or other 
antithesis transforms into a political one if it is sufficiently strong to group human beings 
effectively according to friend and enemy.”7  And consistent with Schmitt’s understanding of 
sovereignty, some decision is necessary to identify an enemy.  According to him, “[i]n its 
entirety the state as an organized political entity decides for itself the friend-enemy 
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distinction.”8  Thus Schmitt claims “that the moment of political decision is at one and the 
same time a moment in which the distinction between friend and enemy is made.”9  And this 
decision on the friend-enemy distinction is both a core function of the state and constitutive 
of the state’s identity.  Schmitt’s primary meaning in deploying the concept is to make a 
homogeneous group of friends more or less coterminous with the well-functioning state.10 
The friend-enemy grouping constructs the political entity, whose sovereign in turn decides 
on critical, exceptional, situations.11  And a state must make friend-enemy distinctions in 
order to be a state.12  Schmitt “endowed the state with [ ] superiority solely because of its 
political nature. . . . No other organization or association within the confines of the national 
sovereign state can make a similar claim.”13  For Schmitt, when a people ceases to be able to 
distinguish friend from enemy, it ceases to be a people in the political sense.14  Moreover, 
true justice has to be guided by the friend-enemy distinction, including with respect to 
determining whether individuals within the polity may be considered undesirable such that 
they are not properly part of the polity after all.15 
Yet as we have already seen, the state and its laws cannot act mechanically by 
themselves, absent human mediation.  While it is ultimately the role of the state to identify 
friend and enemy, Schmitt asserts that “[o]nly the actual participants [in conflict] can 
correctly recognize, understand, and judge the concrete situation and settle the extreme case 
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of conflict,” i.e. by deciding whether one’s adversary is an existential enemy.16  This 
interestingly implies that some quantum of sovereign decision making resides in combatants 
acting on behalf of the state.  Importantly, however, the enemy is not properly identified as 
the result of “a psychological expression of private emotions and tendencies. . . . He is  [ ] 
not the private adversary whom one hates,” but “solely the public enemy.”17  And this 
distinction is important in part because the state disposes of the lives of enemies in time of 
war against them.18  “[T]he distinction of friend and enemy in the age of revolution is 
primary, and . . . determines war as well as politics.”19  Thus the enemy should not be, for 
Schmitt, merely one’s own personal opponent in a feud.  Political friends and enemies in 
Schmitt’s thought are “not private adversaries, but political communities whose very 
existence posed a potential threat to other political communities.”20  Further, the political 
friend-enemy grouping is prior to law.  And though they must act through particular human 
intermediaries, states are, for Schmitt, the “means of continuing, organizing and channeling 
political [i.e., friend-enemy] struggle.”21 
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Nonetheless, and of central significance to this dissertation’s hypothesis that 
Americans adjudicated to be criminals can count as political enemies, Schmitt clearly did 
anticipate the possibility of internal enemies, albeit in particular in the context of civil war.  
On his view it was possible for intensifying internal antagonisms to become friend-enemy 
groupings internal to the state, and in such cases weaken the state and lead to civil war.22  
Moreover, the mere possibility of civil war apparently suffices in Schmitt’s theory to compel 
the state to declare internal enemies from time to time, perhaps even short of actual civil 
war.  “As long as the state is a political entity [the] requirement for internal peace compels it 
in critical situations to decide also upon the domestic enemy.  Every state provides, 
therefore, some kind of formula for the declaration of an internal enemy.”23  These formulae 
include ostracism, expulsion, proscription, and outlawry.24  Depending on the attitude and 
reaction of the declared enemies, use of these techniques may signal civil war.   
As I will explicate more fully below, Schmitt’s insistence on the need for a decision 
on the internal enemy derives in part from his requirement that democratic states clear the 
way for the development of a homogeneous population capable of democratic politics.25  It 
is in this light that George Schwab’s claim that “Schmitt insisted on the depoliticization of 
society; that is, the state must prohibit politically centrifugal forces from operating within its 
domain”26 is best interpreted.  That is, it is doubtful that Schmitt thought that society could 
be thoroughly depoliticized, but it is nonetheless clear that he argued that to the extent a 
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state was not homogenous, it would inevitably fly apart.27  Thus for Schmitt, at least during 
Weimar, defense of that republic’s constitution required clear identification of the 
constitution’s and thus the republic’s friends and enemies.28  David Dyzenhaus urges that  
if the political distinction between friend and enemy is properly made, the values that 
happen to bind together any particular community of friends are, by definition, 
ethical.  The fundamental decision which any political order takes will be one which 
establishes a normal situation out of a state of exception or political conflict, and the 
glue of that situation is its ethic.29 
 
This requires some explanation, though, since Schmitt expressly denies in Concept of the 
Political that the political is equivalent to the moral.30  It is unclear what Dyzenhaus means by 
ethic if not a reference to morality, though in Schmitt’s terms, perhaps Dyzenhaus’ “ethic” 
amounts to something more like “myth,” or some other form of social glue. 
One of the state’s tools for defining and policing the difference between internal (or 
external) friend and enemy is indeed the power of myth-making.  Schmitt saw the modern 
political world as one in which the unity of political communities could only be conceived 
through myth.31  What remains to be seen is whether the “rule of law” could serve this 
mythic function, demarcating friend (adherent to law) from enemy (opponent of law).  In 
later editions of The Concept of the Political, Schmitt “argue[d] that any conflict can become 
political if it reaches the point of intensity at which individuals are grouped into friends and 
enemies.”32  Thus criminals could constitute political enemies in contrast to law-abiding 
                                                
27 Indeed, Schwab seems to acknowledge as much elsewhere:  while traditionally the state defined friend and 
enemy in the context of international relations, “with the politicization of society, the state . . . could at any 
time be forced to do likewise in [its] domain as well.” Schwab, Challenge of the Exception, viii.  Accord ibid. 75. 
28 Müller, Dangerous Mind, 67. 
29 Dyzenhaus, “State Back in Credit,” 81. 
30 Schmitt, Concept of the Political, 26. 
31 Balakrishnan, The Enemy, 80. 
32 Ibid. 106. 
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friends provided the law-abiding citizens, or their state, see criminals as enemies with 
sufficient intensity.  The possibility of disputes becoming political always exists because 
“[e]xperiences of life-and-death struggles, even when they are vicarious and imagined, crystallize 
into stereotyped, opposed and distinct ‘ways of life,’ generating zones of contention which 
cease to be explicable in terms of a simple conflict of interests.”33  Recall, however, that 
although formally speaking, the friend-enemy distinction in Schmitt does not disqualify 
domestic conflicts as sources of the political, when domestic oppositions amount to 
especially strong existential friend-enemy groupings, civil war is at hand.34  “If any internal 
polarization reached sufficient intensity to turn political, the state had a civil war on its hands 
— and effectively ceased to exist.”35 
One aporia in Schmitt’s theory is the question who determines friend from enemy.  
As seen above, even in The Concept of the Political Schmitt seems to vacillate between reserving 
this determination for the state, and requiring that it be made by actual participants in an 
existential conflict, which would apparently mean specific actors on behalf of the state (or of 
nonstate actors).  Because only a threat to one’s own existence confers the right to end the 
lives of one’s enemies, and because enmity for Schmitt involves the “real possibility of a 
violent struggle to the death,” what counts as existential danger can only accurately be 
judged by conflict participants, in concrete situations.36  Yet Schmitt demonstrates 
ambivalence about this premise, arguing elsewhere that friend and enemy must be 
                                                
33 Ibid. 107 (emphasis added). 
34 Ibid. 110. 
35 Müller, Dangerous Mind, 33. 
36 Balakrishnan, The Enemy, 108. 
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determined by some unspecified third figure not directly party to the conflict itself.37  Thus 
George Schwab’s claim that “[b]y virtue of its possession of a monopoly on politics, the state 
is the only entity able to distinguish friend from enemy and thereby demand of its citizens 
the readiness to die,”38 while grounded in Schmitt’s own arguments, does not properly 
capture the subtlety and even vacillation Schmitt’s writings demonstrate on this point when 
taken as a whole. 
Importantly, Schmitt leaves open the possibility of any number of divisions or 
disagreements becoming or constructing a friend-enemy grouping.  Schmitt’s concept of the 
political does not distinguish between high and low politics; rather all friend-enemy 
groupings sit on a continuum of potential intensity.39  So, for instance, when what had been 
an economic concept of class conflict becomes sufficiently intense it generates a political 
friend-enemy grouping along class lines.40  As Schmitt argued, “[t]he only scientifically 
arguable criterion [of the political] today is the degree of intensity of an association and 
dissociation; that is, the distinction between friend and enemy.”41  “All issues — including 
theological ones, which necessarily touched on many areas of human life — could enter the 
force field of the political, as long as the relevant relations or polarizations between different 
groups of human beings became sufficiently intense.”42  Politics can set in anywhere, and any 
                                                
37 Ibid. 113, translating and citing Carl Schmitt, Glossarium:  Aufzeichnungen der Jahre 1947-1951.  (Berlin:  
Duncker and Humblot, 1991), 220. 
38 George Schwab, introduction to Political Theology, l. 
39 Balakrishnan, The Enemy, 110. 
40 Schmitt, Constitutional Theory, 263-64. 
41 Carl Schmitt, Political Theology II:  The Myth of the Closure of Any Political Theology, trans. Michael Hoelzl and 
Graham Ward.  (Cambridge, UK:  Polity Press, 2008), 45. 
42 Müller, Dangerous Mind, 167.  Accord Meier, Lesson of Carl Schmitt, 34:  “In Schmitt’s theory the political can 
enter into life at any time and in any context; everything is potentially political, and everything is to some extent 
political.” 
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two who unite to fight one enemy amount to a political association in Schmitt’s terms.43 
“Schmitt makes room for political associations of the most diverse kinds:  for nations and 
classes, for polis, Church, and State, for bands of guerrillas, sects, etc.”44  “[T]he constellation 
of friend and enemy can apply to everything and turn up literally everywhere.”45 
Indeed, on Ellen Kennedy’s view, Schmitt’s friend-enemy distinction does not even 
define politics or its content, but rather sets forth an objective criterion for measuring 
associative or dissociative intensity.  The political, for Kennedy, has no intrinsic substance 
beyond this.46  Similarly, Chantal Mouffe posits that Schmitt’s friend-enemy distinction is not 
in fact a political construction but a recognition of already existing political realities.47  
Further, on Heinrich Meier’s view, the intense existential nature of the centrally political 
friend-enemy distinction implies the possibility of an emergency for the state.  “It is only in 
the light of the dire emergency that the exceptional position of the political becomes visible.  
Only when it comes into view as the reality which at any time can make a life-and-death 
claim upon man, does the political appear as what is authoritative.”48 
Moreover, not all conflict necessarily does rise to this level of intensity within the 
state:  to claim, for instance, that the friend-enemy distinction turns debate within the state 
into such an intense antagonistic grouping is arguably a misunderstanding of Schmitt.49  The 
political is not a predetermined arrangement but rather “a public relationship between 
                                                
43 Ibid. 68. 
44 Ibid. 69. 
45 Ibid. 75. 
46 Kennedy, “Hostis Not Inimicus,” 100. 
47 Mouffe, “Paradox of Liberal Democracy,” in Law as Politics, 171. 
48 Meier, Lesson of Carl Schmitt, 31. 
49 Böckenförde, “Concept of the Political,” 38. 
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people . . . marked by a specific degree of association or dissociation which can potentially lead 
to the distinction between friend and enemy.”50  “Facing the ever-lurking potential of an 
escalating friend-enemy grouping, [the political] is [ ] present within the state, even though it 
does not visibly manifest itself in a normal situation.”51  And in Heinrich Meier’s view, it is 
precisely “[t]he concept of the intensity of the political [that] allows Schmitt to encompass 
civil war and revolution.”52  According to Meier, it is by expanding the enemy concept to 
include civil war that Schmitt “opens up the prospect of beating liberalism on its own turf, 
domestic politics.”53  At the same time, by recognizing the possibility of internal enemy-
making, Schmitt “introduces an ancillary construction in order to provide the political within 
the state at least a limited space beyond the equating of politics and police, without the need 
for the political unity immediately to become engulfed in civil war,” presumably where the 
friend-enemy conflict is insufficiently intense to metastasize in that way.54  But without 
always having to end in civil war, every concrete opposition is political if intense enough, 
“everything is more or less — and at all events potentially — political.”55 
The friend-enemy distinction in Schmitt’s thought also has a mutually constitutive 
character.  In Ex Captivitate Salus, his collection of essays and diaries from the period of his 
post-war detention, Schmitt figures the enemy as he upon whom one is mutually dependent, 
a shift from the mere mutual positing and existential threat of the public enemy in The 
                                                
50 Ibid. (emphasis added). 
51 Ibid. 40. 
52 Meier, Hidden Dialogue, 23. 
53 Ibid. 24. 
54 Ibid. 25, referring both to certain “secondary” concepts of the political in Schmitt’s thought as well as to the 
internal enemy. 
55 Ibid. 
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Concept of the Political.56  Even in this context, however, the enemy must have a truly 
threatening characteristic.  This mutual constitution of friend and enemy appears most 
prominently in Schmitt’s post-Weimar works.  So, for instance, in Political Theology II, Schmitt 
revives in connection with the friend-enemy distinction an old, oft-forgotten second 
meaning of the Greek term “stasis” that denotes in the political context “unrest, movement, 
uproar and civil war” contrary to its primary and now-dominant meaning as stability, quiet, 
stillness.57  He does so to show that just as gnostic thinker Gregory of Nazianzus held that 
The One was always in a state of stasis-as-uproar against itself, likewise trinitarian formations 
promote stasis not as stability as one might be tempted to conclude (considering, for 
instance, the famous stability of three-legged stools), but instead as constant tension, strife, 
and movement.58  So too, one might see a state comprising friend-enemy groupings might be 
in a constant state of tension resulting from their mutually constitutive strife, that 
nonetheless does not break out into utter civil war. 
In this sense, Schmitt’s realistic view of the inevitability of conflict-driven friend-
enemy groupings comprehends the impossibility of permanent political stability.  Schmitt 
opines that attempts to overcome the friend-enemy distinction are not only doomed to fail 
but mark a cataclysmic end to the political way of life.  Schmitt feared the appearance of an 
Antichrist who convinces men that the friend-enemy distinction has been permanently 
overcome, thus bringing politics to an end.59  In his view, when the age of perfect security 
arrives, the Antichrist has established his rule, having succeeded in convincing humanity, 
                                                
56 Müller, Dangerous Mind, 55-56. 
57 Schmitt, Political Theology II, 123. 
58 Ibid. 75, 122-23.  Consider in this regard the dynamic relationship among the Brahma, Vishnu and Shiva 
moments of political development.  See Chapter 2, text accompanying notes 200 to 264. 
59 See Meier, Hidden Dialogue, 49. 
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albeit falsely, that peace and security have become reality.60  The danger Schmitt anticipates 
in this context includes the possibility that a radically deceived population believes it is safe 
and secure in a realm of lasting peace, when in fact it falls victim to the Antichrist figure, 
who can annihilate any of them at will after declaring its members enemies in an absolute 
sense.61 
 
Friendship Shortchanged? 
Because of Schmitt’s emphasis on the role of the enemy as determinative of the 
polity — as we have seen states maintain their differences from one another, as well as their 
own internal homogeneity, by identifying external and internal enemies — some critics have 
argued that he shortchanges the concept of friendship, both in that he does not make 
significant efforts to describe the nature of friendship and in that he does not identify 
precisely its role in state formation and cohesion.  According to Meier, “[t]he friend is 
ascribed no significant function in Schmitt’s conception.”62  Leo Strauss also claims that 
Schmitt underspecifies the meaning of friend, concentrating instead on the meaning of 
enemy.63  On Dyzenhaus’ read, however, Schmitt does adequately theorize friends, 
specifically as those whom the sovereign decides are to be secured in their physical integrity 
in the context of the state in return for their obedience to the sovereign.64   
Schmitt himself seems to have recognized this in the course of revising The Concept of 
the Political.  Heinrich Meier claims that in its first two editions, Schmitt says nothing about 
                                                
60 Meier, Lesson of Carl Schmitt, 25. 
61 For a detailed discussion of the absolute enemy and criminal enemy, see text accompanying notes 73 to 99. 
62 Meier, Lesson of Carl Schmitt, 52. 
63 Strauss, “Notes on The Concept of the Political,” 103. 
64 Dyzenhaus, Legality and Legitimacy, 96. 
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friends or the concept of friendship, but adds some thoughts on these in a 1937 
“Corollarium” included in later editions, in which he holds that the friend “is whoever 
affirms and confirms me.”65  In this sense, while the enemy defines himself by attacking me 
or putting me at risk of attack, the friend also determines himself by evidencing affirmation 
or confirmation of me.66  Chantal Mouffe notes, moreover, that despite criticism of the 
undertheorized nature of friendship in his works, Schmitt’s concept of friendship is visible, if 
not highlighted, in his many discussions of political homogeneity.67  And this is borne out by 
closer examination of Schmitt’s theoretical oeuvre, in particular Constitutional Theory.  In that 
work, a central topic, though again not specified clearly in the terminology of The Concept of 
the Political, is what political associations of friends are possible in the modern state.68  As 
Tracy Strong puts it, “[u]nderlying the state is a community of people . . . a ‘we’ that . . . 
presupposes and is defined by conflict.  It derives its definition from the friend/enemy 
distinction.”69  Thus friendship is at the heart of Schmitt’s conception of a unified and 
homogeneous demos.  Whatever characteristics make the population of a state homogeneous 
simultaneously define friendship, and those who do not have those characteristics are by 
contrast enemies.  Yet Strong also adds his voice to those who argue that friendship is 
underdetermined in Schmitt, claiming that “the problem with Schmitt is that he allows the 
notion of enemy to too easily define the notion of friend.”70  In Strong’s view, only by facing 
                                                
65 Meier, Lesson of Carl Schmitt, 51, translating and quoting Carl Schmitt, Der Begriff des Politischen, Corollarium 2, 
3rd ed.  (Hamburg:  Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt, 1937), 104. 
66 Meier, Lesson of Carl Schmitt, 51-52. 
67 Mouffe, “Paradox of Liberal Democracy,” in Law as Politics, 168. 
68 Ellen Kennedy, foreword to Constitutional Theory, by Carl Schmitt, trans. and ed. Jeffrey Seitzer.  (Durham, 
NC:  Duke University Press, 2008), xv. 
69 Tracy B. Strong, foreword to Political Theology, xv. 
70 Ibid. xxxi.  Accord Strong, “Dimensions of the New Debate,” xxiv. 
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up to both sides of the friend-enemy distinction will some “we” be able to identify itself and 
rationally decide what that “we” ought to do with respect to relations with the “they.”71 
In my view, Schmitt’s critics are right to note that he is less than explicit in 
connecting friendship, as opposed to enmity, to the larger corpus of his work.  The mutually 
constitutive relations of the two notwithstanding, enmity is the clear focus of Schmitt’s 
conceptual examination in particular in The Concept of the Political, the text in which he posits, 
develops, and explains the friend-enemy distinction.  Nonetheless, I agree with Mouffe and 
Kennedy that friendship, though not carefully connected to homogeneity and political unity 
in Schmitt’s writing, must be the functional equivalent to those concepts in Schmitt’s theory 
to the extent his work can be read cohesively.  I next examine the role of friendship and 
enmity in constructing a homogeneous polity before engaging in a discussion of the 
distinctions Schmitt makes over the course of his work between the enemy and the criminal.  
Both topics are significant for my argument that the criminal in the American context can be 
considered an analog (at least) of the enemy in Schmitt’s theory. 
 
Friendship and Homogeneity 
Although like Schmitt I focus in this dissertation on the enmity side of the friend-
enemy distinction, it is important that I point out as well the role that friendship plays in 
Schmitt’s concept of the political, in order to demonstrate how constructing the criminal as 
an enemy in American jurisprudence plays a key role in bolstering American democratic 
homogeneity, and how direct citizen participation in redefining the nature of criminality 
serves to alter sovereignty over the political in the American polity. 
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Recall from Chapter 2 that some left-leaning Schmitt scholars — in particular 
Andreas Kalyvas and Chantal Mouffe among others — have extended his theories of 
democratic homogeneity by claiming that such homogeneity might be forged along lines 
other than race, nationality, religion, language and the like.  In particular they argue — as do 
I — that a democratic homogeneity might be based upon a societal consensus regarding 
founding legal principles.72  That is, a version of friendship might be constructed according 
to the willingness of particular persons to accept and abide by legal provisions, albeit most 
especially fundamental provisions such as those enshrined in a constitution.  On this 
reinterpretation of Schmitt’s theories, friendship is not merely significant as a kind of weak 
obverse of enmity, but is critical in terms of defining the basis for maintaining a 
homogeneous and unified polity.  Friendship (and enmity) might be made to pivot not 
around such more or less readily identifiable characteristics as race, nationality, religion, or 
language, but instead along less obvious questions of abstract belief in and behavior 
according to formal law (or, for that matter, informal norms). 
Obviously adherence to a set of legal commitments need not exist in isolation from 
other identifying trappings.  Consider, for instance, the cohesiveness of such groups as the 
Iranian paramilitary Basij forces, American Hell’s Angels, or sub- or transnational gangs of 
all stripes.  They often accept members of various races, nationalities, religions, or languages, 
so long as these members both adhere to a code of behavior internal to the group in 
question and display that adherence through various outward signs.  Whoever might be the 
enemies of these groups, as determined by their own sovereign actors from time to time, the 
groups’ members identify themselves to each other as friends through adoption of uniforms, 
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signs, and language games, among other things, all as a way of signaling not essentialized 
characteristics, but belief in and commitment to the group and its creeds.  
 
The Enemy versus the Criminal in Schmitt’s Theory 
Schmitt’s understanding of the enemy evolves throughout his work in ways that can 
render it confusing and inconsistent.  As we have seen, when he introduces the enemy in The 
Concept of the Political, he makes it clear that for his purposes the enemy must be public, not 
private.  On George Schwab’s read, “Schmitt observed that not every antagonism, rivalry or 
antipathy necessarily constitutes enmity,” and distinguished in this regard between inimicus, 
the private enemy, and hostis, the public enemy.73  This observation, however, paraphrasing 
Schmitt in The Concept of the Political, does not yet address the concept of the absolute enemy, 
which Schmitt labels hostis in later works.  In this regard, Schwab points out that the German 
term Feind, which Schmitt uses to signify “enemy” in The Concept of the Political can be 
translated either as enemy or foe, a distinction Schmitt neither recognizes nor addresses 
clearly until The Nomos of the Earth, first published in German in 1950.74  According to 
Schwab, foe corresponds to the devil and absolute enemy, to whom no quarter is given, 
while enemy refers to the equally sovereign enemy state, for instance, which plays by the 
rules of conflict in the modern era.75  Already apparent is Schmitt’s focus in conceptualizing 
the distinction between absolute and equal enemy on interstate relations, a focus that leaves 
somewhat open the question how Schmitt would characterize criminals or other potential 
enemies internal to the state in terms of the enmity between them. 
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What Schmitt means by characterizing the enemy, specifically the public enemy, as 
“equal,” however, merits further examination.  For Schmitt, the enemy was on an equal 
plane with the friend in terms of his humanity.  According to Gopal Balakrishnan, Schmitt’s 
ethic of politics stripped the friend-enemy distinction of “self-righteous moralizing,” 
demanding that “the enemy [be] treated not as a criminal to be punished, but simply as an 
enemy to be overcome.”76  The friend-enemy distinction involves enemies “recognized as 
legitimate, and respected as [ ] enem[ies].”77  
Although this distinction between enemy and criminal, along with the concomitant 
distinction between overcoming and punishing, is not yet entirely apparent in The Concept of 
the Political, both do emerge more clearly in later works.  George Schwab for instance notes a 
shift in Schmitt’s thought, reflecting a change in empirical circumstances as he understood 
them, from characterizing the enemy as a personally hated “foe” — in Schmitt’s later works 
the absolute enemy — to seeing him as an ideologically “clean” enemy adversary, who could 
be a member of a fighting collectivity opposed to one’s own, but did not necessarily have to 
be the object of personal hatred.  Schmitt praised this shift he claimed to observe in the 
thinking of states about enemies as a progressive move.78  The endpoint of this shift is 
apparent in Schmitt’s Theory of the Partisan, in which he holds that “[t]he enemy is on the same 
level as am I.  For this reason, I must fight him to the same extent and within the same 
bounds as he fights me, in order to be consistent with the definition of the real enemy by 
which he fights me.”79 
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Even in The Concept of the Political, however, Schmitt begins exploring the distinction 
he will emphasize more clearly as his thought develops.  There, he holds that “a new and 
essentially pacifist vocabulary has been created” to further the application by the liberal state 
of technical means to bring about violent death.  Through this conceptual shift, “[w]ar is 
condemned but executions, sanctions, punitive expeditions, pacifications, protection of 
treaties, international police, and measures to assure peace remain.  The adversary is thus no 
longer called an enemy but a disturber of peace and is thereby designated to be an outlaw of 
humanity.”80  This, in tension with Schmitt’s refusal to see as the same the humanly equal 
enemy and the mere criminal who must be punished, implies at least that some modern 
states have begun to engage in existential conflict short of war, thus actually engaging in 
political enmity, but under guise of pacifism, by transmuting war against equals into 
punishments of those cast as subhuman criminals. 
Given that Schmitt applies the enemy concept to one’s fellow countrymen in the 
context of civil war or revolution, the enemy can presumably be understood as a brother or 
equal.  Nonetheless, Schmitt describes the enemy in The Concept of the Political as “plainly the 
other, the alien,” a move that might again on a merely superficial interpretation seem to push 
the enemy from the pole of equal to that of subhuman criminal foe.81  That such a reading 
embodies a misconception in turn helps unpack what Schmitt means by “equal” in the 
context of the enemy:  he refers not necessarily to equality of might, or to moral neutrality or 
equality of enmity, but rather to the idea that the true enemy is not considered to be morally 
inferior to oneself, and thus is neither worthy of contempt, nor of annihilation or utter 
disregard.  In a sense, for Schmitt, the enemy, while an existential threat to one’s own 
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81 Meier, Hidden Dialogue, 23, translating and quoting Carl Schmitt, Der Begriff des Politischen:  Text von 1932 mit 
einem Vorwort und drei Collarien.  (Berlin:  Duncker and Humblot, 1963), 38. 
 
 
163 
continued existence, is nonetheless properly understood as being on the same moral footing 
as oneself and one’s friends.  Put differently, the enemy is legitimate in a way that the 
criminal is not. 
Again, however, Schmitt’s shifting terminology confuses matters.  The non-enemy 
“outlaw” from The Concept of the Political reappears in other contexts variously as the “absolute 
enemy” or the “criminal.”  Schmitt’s categorizations in this regard even differ even across 
different editions of The Concept of the Political.  In changes made after the first edition, 
Schmitt expanded on the idea of the political friend-enemy distinction to refer more clearly 
to more intense conflict that moves into the sphere of holy war or total war, in which the 
absolute enemy is not merely to be held back, but is now to be annihilated, implying a sub- 
or nonhuman status inconsistent with the formal existential enemy who is simply one’s 
humanly equal opponent on the battlefield.82   
Heinrich Meier helpfully seeks to distinguish among various forms of enemy in 
Schmitt, differentiating from the ordinary, equal enemy the absolute enemy, who is 
characterized “as a criminal or a monster,” and who must be annihilated as enemy of 
mankind who lacks value.83  From there Meier reinterprets Schmitt’s conception of civil war 
to include an understanding that it cannot be bounded or restricted because it knows no just, 
equal enemy target.84  From 1932 on, “Schmitt leaves no doubt that the most extreme degree 
of intensity [obtains] where it is a question of the battle against an adversary whose moral 
dignity is contested, whose historical legitimacy is disputed, whose religious orthodoxy is 
negated, or the battle against an enemy who for his part attacks his opponent as the absolute 
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enemy.”85  According to Meier, “the most intensive, decisive enmity presupposes an 
asymmetrical relationship,” apparently between an upstart power and an established order at 
a peak of great politics with which it is in conflict.86  Meier understands this kind of 
intensive, decisive enmity as inherent in a battle between true and heretical faiths.  
“[E]veryday politics presents merely a pale reflection of this case.”87  On Meier’s read, then, 
the absolute enemy, who corresponds roughly to the criminal or foe as opposed to the equal 
enemy, presents a kind of insurgent and heretical threat to the state it opposes, and thus 
must be utterly opposed, and, if the state is to be successful, annihilated.   
So, for instance, were states capable of putting an end to civil war for all time (as 
opposed to winning civil wars), for Schmitt politics and foreign policy would become 
coterminous, and “[e]verything else would fall to the police.”88  That is, if civil war is not 
political, only interstate conflict can be, in which case the internal enemy who is a threat to 
the stability of the state either becomes the absolute enemy who can be annihilated, or 
becomes a kind of lesser enemy properly addressed under criminal law.  The latter reading 
seems more plausible, and implies that the domestic criminal is not a political enemy for 
Schmitt.  In a somewhat different context, Schmitt seems to support this interpretation: 
The criminal does not break the peace or order; he does not even break the general 
norm as a rule; “juristically considered,” he actually breaks nothing at all.  Only the 
concrete peace or a concrete order can be broken; only with this in mind can the 
concept of crime be salvaged.  The abstract norm and rule, in contrast, continue to 
operate unchanged . . . despite the “crime”:  it hovers above every concrete situation 
and every concrete action; it is not annulled through a so-called violation.89 
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That is to say, at least in Schmitt’s empirical observation of Germany and other European 
states, the criminal does not pose an existential threat to the legal order.  But if, as I argue 
below, the legal order is constitutive of a homogeneous political unity in Schmitt’s terms, 
then the criminal is precisely the central threat to such a polity, with whose members she 
does not share a respect for the law, and thus is neither certainly no less dangerous than the 
equal enemy or the absolute enemy. 
Tracy Strong emphasizes the importance of Schmitt’s distinction between the enemy 
and the criminal, noting that “[t]he friend-enemy definition of politics that underpins 
Schmitt’s analysis has the advantage of keeping combatants from seeing their enemy as 
criminal.”90  But in this restatement, “criminal” appears to have a specific conceptual valence 
that does not precisely resemble the ordinary criminal in the domestic sense.  The Schmittian 
criminal to which Strong appears to refer is closer to the absolute enemy, in the sense that he 
is to be annihilated in the name of humanity because he is an existential danger to humanity 
as such.  Schmitt’s typical domestic criminal, who certainly seems to partake of enmity with 
respect to law-abiding citizens, is nonetheless not to be annihilated (at least in states that do 
not espouse the rhetorical insistence that crime itself should be eliminated — a seeming 
conceptual impossibility absent the elimination of laws making particular activities criminal).  
Marked as such even after serving his punishment, the ordinary criminal in Schmitt’s 
conception, based upon civil-law European practice, remains within law and within the 
polity.  He is not, except with respect to the death penalty (and recall that even equal 
enemies suffer death at each other’s hands), to be annihilated, and thus Strong’s conflation 
runs counter to Schmitt’s categories, rightly understood.   
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The possibility of a death sentence may play a more significant role in Schmitt’s 
distinction between enemies and criminals than is made explicit in his thought, however.  
For instance, though as we have seen Schmitt admits the possibility of a real friend-enemy 
grouping on the basis of class conflict, he also claims that civil war among class enemies is an 
example of a situation in which the fighting enemies view each other not as proper enemies 
but as subhuman criminals in the absolute enemy mode properly subject to the death penalty 
merely for participation in combat.91  Yet basing the distinction between criminal and enemy 
on the possibility of a death sentence for the former would put Schmitt’s theory in tension 
with itself, given that for Schmitt the state publicly disposes of the lives of noncriminal 
enemies in the context of war, an action that comes close to that of executing ordinary 
criminals even during peacetime.92 
Schmitt himself provides substantial support for the notion that his distinction 
between the enemy and the criminal is primarily one rooted in his views on international 
relations, and may not have much purchase outside that context.  In Political Theology II he 
opines that the Hobbesian version of the state  
has achieved, to date, the greatest rational “progress” of humanity in the definition 
of war as it appears in the theory of international law:  namely the distinction 
between the enemy and the criminal, and therefore the only possible basis for the 
theory of the neutrality of states in times of war . . . .  That, for me, is part of my 
political theology and it indicates the paradigm shift in modernity.93 
 
This passage shows clearly that Schmitt’s distinction between enemy and criminal is made 
centrally in the realm of international relations, and that “criminal” in this context means 
something closer to “war criminal,” or again absolute enemy, than a violator of ordinary 
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domestic law who can be punished, at least formally, within the context of that law without 
being made hostis humanis — the enemy of all humanity.   
Illustratively, Schmitt’s distaste for the process by which states make of their 
opponents in war criminal or absolute enemies traces back to his recollection of Germany’s 
treatment following World War I.  In that case, the Versailles Treaty criminalized the 
defeated German enemy.94  As Schmitt saw it, turning the instigator of a war of aggression 
into an unjust enemy makes it into “a criminal who must be punished . . . transforming 
international law into an annexe of penal law, and war into a matter of law and order.”95  
Under the classical laws of war, enemies were distinguished from criminals such that even 
warring states respected each other as enemies rather than discriminating against each other 
as criminals.96  The partisan — Schmitt’s term for the guerrilla or similar warrior who is an 
irregular and does not wear the uniform of or operate directly for some state — when not 
recognized as a formal “troop” is also considered criminal and hors la loi.97   
This last phrase is particularly instructive, and especially in light of Schmitt’s 
comments on pirates:  to be hors la loi is akin to being in the position of a pirate or other 
international outlaw.  Unlike in the domestic criminal context, one who is outside the 
boundaries of the law is the enemy of all, and is at the mercy, quite literally, of any legitimate 
(here state) authority who can apprehend him.98  Thus the criminal enemy in Schmitt’s 
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conceptualization is neither the enemy who must be treated as an equal in accordance with 
the law (or perhaps some extralegal morally based set of norms), nor the ordinary domestic 
criminal, who is not outside the law, but is specifically its object.  Ordinarily, one may not 
apprehend and punish a criminal actor outside the applicable state legal regime.  Instead one 
mobilizes the police, and the alleged criminal is dealt with in the context of the state’s law.  If 
a state’s vessel encounters a pirate, however, it is not accountable at all for its actions:  the 
pirate is quite literally hors la loi.  Fundamentally, what Schmitt is arguing here, though the 
double use of the term “criminal” obscures this, is that international law has improperly 
imported the concept of the criminal who must be punished into international relations, 
conflating criminal and enemy in a way that creates the subhuman absolute enemy. 
“As a metaphor,” Schmitt holds, it “may be permissible” to call “any individualist 
and non-conformist . . . a partisan.”  But Schmitt does not himself intend to use that term 
outside the context of specific historical figures involved in interstate or intrastate war.99  
This indicates an important distinction between such warriors and criminals in the US 
domestic context for example, since the US criminal is never outside the law but rather is 
apprehended precisely within a legal system and even afforded rights thereunder.  Yet in 
particular in the wake of the events of September 11, 2001, a class of absolute criminal 
enemy in Schmitt’s absolute sense has arguably been identified.  Terrorists, the subject of 
much debate in the United States as to whether they should be treated in accordance with 
ordinary criminal law or the extraordinary law of war, may well fit the Schmittian definition 
of the absolute criminal, as opposed to the equal enemy.  It is to that question that I now 
turn. 
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The Terrorist as Enemy or Criminal 
In a relatively late work first published in German in 1963, Schmitt addressed the 
role of the partisan in world politics.  Schmitt’s Theory of the Partisan depicts the partisan 
fighter as a figure “precariously perched on the line between criminality and real 
legitimacy.”100  In Schmitt’s view, irregularity in the conduct of war — the core characteristic 
of the partisan fighter — is unpolitical and merely criminal (rather than equal enemy) activity 
when neither aimed against a foreign invader nor in the service a revolutionary cause.  But 
even when invasion or revolution is not at issue, as in the case of an interested third party 
whom the irregular assists as a kind of fifth columnist, a friend-enemy distinction does arise.  
The powerful third party, in such a case, is the friend of the irregular or partisan, and the 
equal enemy of the state or other power whom the partisan opposes.101   
Also in Theory of the Partisan, Schmitt describes pirates as unpolitical because they “are 
focused on private robbery and profit.”102  In this sense, pirates appear to lack important 
elements that give rise to enmity, in particular in the sense of opposing their victims not as 
sources of gain but as existential enemies.  It should be noted, however, that historically 
many pirates have had a more coherent, overtly political (and in particular existentially 
antistate) motives than Schmitt recognizes here.  Presumably because of their likewise 
pecuniary motives, thieves like pirates are not considered by Schmitt to be political in the 
sense that certain irregular fighters may be.103   
One might be tempted to think that this puts ordinary domestic criminals, such as 
thieves, firmly outside the realm of the political and the friend-enemy distinction on 
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Schmitt’s terms.  But elsewhere in Theory of the Partisan, Schmitt claims that the partisan is 
distinct from uniformed combatants in that he “is a criminal according to ordinary law, and 
should be made harmless with summary punishment and repressive measures.”104  The 
reference here to “ordinary law” appears to point again to a difference in Schmitt’s 
conceptualization between the criminal in the ordinary domestic sense and the absolute 
criminal enemy in the international sense.  If partisans, who may be considered rough 
equivalents of terrorists, are ordinary domestic criminals, then if not excluded from formal 
international law, they are at least not equal enemies in the international law sense, which 
seems to define the prototypical enemies in Schmitt’s thought.105  Schmitt himself appears to 
confirm this interpretation when he claims that irregularity in fighting forces does not by 
itself amount to more than illegality (i.e. criminal behavior) in the international law sense.106 
Jan-Werner Müller provides an example from West German history to help 
distinguish terrorist, criminal and enemy according to Schmitt’s thought.  During the West 
German government’s 1977 struggle with the German Red Army Faction (RAF) terrorist 
group, Müller recounts, the government considered declaring a state of emergency and 
treating the terrorists as subcriminal, absolute-enemy “counter-hostages” who could be shot 
without trial.  The Helmut Schmidt government resisted these calls, however, and while it 
treated members of the RAF as criminals, it did so only within the framework of legality, 
thus not ultimately rendering them absolute enemies in Schmittian terms.107   
                                                
104 Ibid. 25. 
105 As discussed above, see text accompanying notes 1 to 35, the core existential enemy in The Concept of the 
Political is an actual or potential enemy of the state, which usually means a state or state-based enemy, but can 
also amount to an internal enemy in the context of a nascent or actual civil war. 
106 Schmitt, Theory of the Partisan, 84. 
107 Müller, Dangerous Mind, 182-83. 
 
 
171 
This approach will be familiar to observers of recent American history with respect 
to terrorism.  Here, liberal politicians have tended to respond to terrorism with calls for 
stepped-up police work and strengthening of the rule of law.  Indeed, at the heart of the 
debate over how to manage accused terrorists imprisoned at Guantanamo Bay — that is, 
whether they should remain there indefinitely as imprisoned enemy combatants, should be 
tried according to military justice, or should be prosecuted in ordinary civilian courts — is a 
disagreement between American liberal politicians who generally favor the last approach, 
and conservatives who prefer one or both of the first two.  In connection with this 
disagreement, “[a] whole new political and legal language [has] blurred traditional distinctions 
such as that between criminal and prisoner of war.”108  We should, consequently, not be 
surprised that Schmitt’s conceptual categories of enemy and criminal do not easily fit 
contemporary terrorist actors, regardless how various states choose to treat them, or for that 
matter to American criminal or antiterrorist law. 
Indeed, Schmitt himself recognized the difficulties that conflicts among these 
conceptual categories, as deployed in the actual practice of law and statecraft, might raise, 
most particularly in Theory of the Partisan.  There Schmitt points to a crisis of law and thus of 
legality that the partisan (who might now be the equivalent of a terrorist) brings on.  The 
partisan’s (or terrorist’s) enemy is never determined by a state, because the partisan (or 
terrorist) is never on Schmitt’s definition a state actor.  For Schmitt, “Whoever claims the 
right to determine the enemy also claims the right to his own new legality, if he refuses to 
recognize the enemy determined by the former legal government.”109  In this sense the 
partisan (or terrorist) poses a threat not only to the formal government of the territory in 
                                                
108 Ibid. 228. 
109 Schmitt, Theory of the Partisan, 84. 
 
 
172 
which he operates (or from which he is sent), but also to the relatively clean political system 
Schmitt anticipated in The Concept of the Political, in which the state, or at least actors closely 
associated with the legitimate state government, holds the exclusive power to declare 
enemies.  The partisan may accept as friend the state opponent of the sitting government 
against whom he fights.  Or he may declare that opponent government itself to be an enemy, 
thus undermining its legitimacy.   
Finally, at the close of Theory of the Partisan, Schmitt appears to draw a clearer 
distinction between the absolute enemy and what he now calls the “real” enemy.  “The real 
enemy will not be declared to be an absolute enemy, also not the last enemy of mankind.”110  
So the real enemy is defined here negatively:  she is not one whom states will declare to be in 
some sense ultimate, and properly treated as a danger to humanity in general.  Recall in this 
connection Schmitt’s favorable paraphrase of Proudhon that “whoever invokes humanity 
wants to cheat.”111  “Only the denial of real enmity paves the way for the destructive work of 
absolute enmity.”112  Schmitt identifies this destructive work with the “cheating” in that 
“[w]hen a state fights its political enemy in the name of humanity, it is not a war for the sake 
of humanity, but a war wherein a particular state seeks to usurp a universal concept against 
its military opponent.”113  Setting aside whether we must confine ourselves to military 
matters to understand Schmitt’s argument correctly here, by connecting the characterization 
of terrorists (among others) as enemies of humanity to Schmitt’s understanding of absolute 
enmity, we can see that the degree to which US law distinguishes between the terrorist and 
the ordinary criminal closely tracks the degree to which one can validly consider the ordinary 
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criminal in the US context a political enemy in the Schmittian sense.  The closer the terrorist 
is to the criminal in America, the less America has an operative Schmittian concept of an 
ordinary criminal as opposed to an absolute criminal enemy. 
 
Schmitt on the Domestic Criminal 
All of this exegesis from Schmitt’s references to the criminal or absolute enemy is 
necessary to trace correspondences between Schmitt’s enemy concept and the criminal in the 
ordinary domestic context in part because Schmitt’s own work on criminality is as yet 
inaccessible to English readers114 and in part because such work was not a significant focus 
of his oeuvre.  For example, while Schmitt’s concept of concrete orders, which is not 
centrally applicable to this dissertation in its own right, was developed in order to have an 
impact on evolution of criminal law in the early years of the Nazi Reich, and it succeeded in 
so doing,115 after the war, these concrete order theories did not remain central to Schmitt’s 
writings.116  Nonetheless, this section briefly mines Schmitt’s translated work for clues as to 
his views on criminality. 
Schmitt’s engagement with a concept closely related to both the declaration of 
terrorists or others to be criminal enemies, and the mobilization of humanity and enmity 
against humanity as a whole as a way of “cheating,” may prove illuminating.  In the civil law 
tradition of the European continent, the legal maxim nulla poena sine lege (no punishment 
without law) — sometimes rendered nulla crimen sine lege (no crime without law) — operates 
in much the same way as the prohibition on ex post facto laws in US jurisprudence.  Both 
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prohibit punishment for acts claimed to be criminal in the absence of prior law criminalizing 
such acts.   
Tracy Strong makes much of Schmitt’s devotion to the nulla poena doctrine, which 
would seem to rhyme with Schmitt’s objection to states declaring persons absolute criminal 
enemies.117  In both cases, the target of absolute enmity is declared criminal in an essential 
way.  It matters not, absent nulla poena, whether the actor was on notice that his acts were 
prohibited by law.  They are simply awful enough to merit punishment in and of themselves.  
So too in the case of a declared enemy of humanity:  the crimes she is alleged to have 
committed are deemed by the declaring state to be so obviously wrong that they merit her 
annihilation in humanity’s name.  But Strong overlooks an important historical lapse in 
Schmitt’s adherence to nulla poena, and to this extent he overstates his case.  In the early days 
of the Nazi Reich, Marinus van der Lubbe was executed for having set the Reichstag fire, 
despite that at the time the alleged crime was committed, the death penalty was not available 
for arson.  Lubbe’s execution was made possible by the so-called “lex Lubbe,” under which 
the Nazi government retroactively applied the death penalty to treasonous arson, in direct 
conflict with the nulla poena doctrine.  Schmitt argued that the doctrine had to give way in 
this instance because the liberal legal formalism of the Rechtsstaat of which the doctrine 
formed a part had to be replaced with “substantive, goal oriented justice.”118  As previously 
discussed, however, Schmitt was often inconsistent in his views on various matters, 
particularly where the real-world politics of the Weimar and Nazi eras were involved, so his 
defection from nulla poena here is of uncertain significance. 
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In more general terms, Schmitt gives only a few clues as to how he sees criminal law 
interacting with the political itself.  In part pointing to the move undertaken by bourgeois 
liberalism toward subsuming the political in the economic, and in part indicating that he sees 
room for the friend-enemy distinction to be hijacked and distorted by economic power, 
Schmitt observes in The Concept of the Political that “[e]vidently, the possessor of economic 
power would consider every attempt to change its power position by extra-economic means 
as violence and crime and will seek methods to hinder this.”119  In other words, economic 
power, in Schmitt’s view, is likely to characterize its own existential enemies not as proper 
political enemies, but as criminal absolute enemies who must be opposed at all costs not 
because they threaten the existing economic order, but allegedly (and falsely, in Schmitt’s 
view) because they threaten humanity as such.  Here Schmitt points again to an example of 
the abuse of the friend-enemy distinction, which consistent with his opposition to 
liberalism’s cloaking of sovereign power, he would rather see mobilized openly and honestly 
for what it is, rather than recast as an all-out war against inhuman forces. 
Finally, a few more or less isolated remarks by Schmitt with regard to the role of 
criminal jurisprudence at the intersection of politics and law are worthy of attention.  In 
recounting the Hobbesian turn in the development of the modern state, Schmitt identifies 
criminal law as the typical form of “decision and command” that characterized law and the 
role of the Leviathan in the state after law’s transformation from something binding upon 
even sovereigns to something sovereigns use to bind their subjects.120  This suggests strongly 
that Schmitt viewed domestic criminal law-making as a central trapping of sovereignty, and it 
supports my claim in the following chapter that the decision on criminality is a sovereign 
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decision.  Similarly, while Schmitt notes in Constitutional Theory that decisions on criminal 
exonerations may be characterized as simple legal disputes, capable of resolution by judges, 
he also views such actions as being capable of resolution politically — as he defines that 
term in connection with the friend-enemy distinction — rather than legally, for instance in 
the case of legislative (or presumably executive) pardons.121  Clearly, for Schmitt, the 
possibility at least exists that determinations regarding the ordinary criminal in the domestic 
sense can have political implications in terms of the friend-enemy distinction. 
 
Conclusion 
In sum, Schmitt’s central political concept embraces the sovereign’s (or his officials’) 
engaging in deciding who the state’s friends are, in a way that constructs the homogeneity of 
the polity, democratic or otherwise, and more explicitly who the state’s enemies are.  In most 
of Schmitt’s work on this friend-enemy distinction, the enemy is figured as a national group 
or formal state with whom the determining sovereign engages in existential conflict.  But 
when we pierce certain confusions regarding the meaning of “enemy,” “foe,” and “criminal” 
in Schmitt’s work, we see that the distinctions he draws between the real enemy and the 
absolute enemy who is labeled criminal have significantly more bite with regard to war 
criminals and others designated “enemies of humanity,” and that it is important to avoid 
confusing his concept of the ordinary domestic criminal with its improper extension, in his 
view, to the existential international enemy, which in turn constructs the absolute subhuman 
enemy.  Deeper in his writings, we see that Schmitt apparently anticipated, but did not work 
through carefully, the possibility that ordinary domestic criminals might themselves be the 
existential internal enemies of the state and thus centrally political figures.  In one such 
                                                
121 Schmitt, Constitutional Theory, 184-85. 
 
 
177 
moment in Theory of the Partisan, Schmitt alludes to the kind of threat that the internal, 
possibly criminal enemy, presents to the state’s cohesiveness.   “A commonwealth exists as 
res publica, as a public sphere,” Schmitt argues, “and is challenged if a non-public space 
develops within it, which actually repudiates this public sphere.”122  While Schmitt almost 
certainly has something in mind here like the partisan irregular fighter in a nascent or actual 
civil war, this threat to the cohesiveness of the state by nonpublic actors who repudiate the 
public sphere is something like the threat that the criminal, especially the organized criminal, 
presents to the state.  In the next chapter, I seek to demonstrate the ways in which ordinary 
domestic criminals in the US context appear as and are treated as political enemies through 
the practical effects of contemporary criminal law, and how this phenomenon makes of such 
ordinary criminal enemies a political class that threatens the cohesiveness of the state, and 
which the state actively resists. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
THE CRIMINAL AS ENEMY IN AMERICA 
 
 
Introduction 
Having discussed Carl Schmitt’s important, if sometimes imprecise, concept of the 
enemy, I now apply that concept in the context of American criminal law and penal practice.  
In this chapter, I will show how criminals in America can be seen as functional enemies of 
the state and its citizens, and how law and practice serve to construct criminals as an enemy 
class in line with Schmitt’s definitions.  In order to do this, I will first review some passing 
comments of Schmitt’s that bear on the issue, and then examine elements of American 
rhetoric and action in general regarding criminals and their behaviors.  I then focus in 
particular on the techniques of punishment, especially those central to the US prison system, 
to provide further evidence for the proposition that the criminal is treated functionally as the 
enemy — and in some ways as the Schmittian absolute enemy — in American society.  By 
applying Schmitt in this way to the American criminal justice system, I set the stage for the 
following chapters’ discussion of jury nullification as popular sovereign decisionism on what 
for Schmitt is the centrally political distinction of friend from enemy.  If the criminal is the 
enemy, then whoever decides who is or is not a criminal is exercising a fundamental political 
power. 
 
Schmittian Sovereignty and the Criminal Enemy 
Though Schmitt distinguished the enemy from the “mere criminal,”1 this does not 
imply that criminals, if treated or regarded in particular ways, might not be cognizable as 
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enemies of their societies in a Schmittian sense.  In the American context, leading historian 
of criminal law Lawrence Friedman has observed that “[a]ll theories of crime are ultimately 
political.”2  Moreover, as noted in the prior chapter,3 Schmitt understood that the 
construction of internal enemies could be a technique by which a sovereign might strengthen 
a polity, or by which a polity’s homogeneity could be fostered and sustained.  So, for 
instance, Schmitt opined that “the inequality of those outside the association, is an especially 
firm foundation for equality inside the community.”4  That is, when outsiders — enemies — 
are treated differently from and indeed less well than insiders — friends, visible here as full 
citizens — this strengthens the friendship bonds upon which a political community is 
grounded.  If one wishes to determine in a functional sense who a polity’s enemies are, one 
should look for out-groups treated unequally by that polity.  Importantly, Schmitt is using 
“equality” in a different way here than with respect his critique of the absolute enemy 
perceived as subhuman.  The policing of the state’s homogeneity by treating outsiders 
unequally does not imply treating them as less than human, and thus as absolute enemies.  
Rather, here, Schmitt is making a point about functional inequality of treatment, such that 
outsiders who to the extent that they threaten the state existentially are also enemies, are 
treated differently, albeit potentially still as fellow humans, than insiders who are members or 
friends. 
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Schmitt further notes that a nonhomogeneous and thus in his view dysfunctional 
state can be remedied by assimilating nonconforming subpopulations, or through the more 
expedient means of violent suppression or exile of heterogeneous elements of population.5  
Attempts in America to rehabilitate and reassimilate criminals resemble the former method 
of correcting homogeneity failures, and attempts to punish and imprison them the latter.  
Schmitt compares historical methods of discipline and excommunication to modern day 
“moral terror and social boycott,” all of which techniques have analogs in the American 
penal system.6 
According to Schmitt’s theory, the determination of friend and enemy is a sovereign 
act.  For Schmitt, the sovereign “is the one who has the power and [ ] authority to take a 
concrete, total decision on the type and form of the political existence, that is, to determine 
the existence of a political unity in its entirety.”7  If the sovereign act of constructing a 
political unity relies upon the identification of a political enemy class, then that identification, 
as well as determinations regarding how enemies will be treated in order best to safeguard 
political unity and homogeneity (assimilated, exiled, punished, or even considered subhuman 
and treated accordingly in the case of the absolute enemy) must also be matters of 
sovereignty. 
Having briefly sketched the ways in which Schmitt’s theories link sovereign 
decisionism to the friend-enemy distinction, I turn now to a closer examination of both the 
criminal justice system in the United States, with an emphasis first on how the criminal in 
America resembles the enemy in Schmitt’s thought, and second on the nature of the penal 
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system in America, and how it confirms that criminals here are treated as enemies, if not 
absolute enemies, of the state. 
 
The Criminal as Enemy of the American State 
Consider, to begin with, some observations by Alexis de Tocqueville.  Even in the 
early nineteenth century, Tocqueville noted, Americans were united to a great degree by their 
attitudes toward law.  Tocqueville argued that Americans’ active role in politics flowed 
directly from their respect for the law, such that they understood their own laws as truly their 
own creations and their own way of shaping their behavior as citizens — that is, citizens and 
law are mutually constitutive in the American polity.  Americans’ law-loving nature is thus 
deeply connected to their dedication to self-government.8  For Tocqueville, social 
homogeneity of the kind Schmitt identified as requisite for a properly functioning state can 
be built upon both shared language and a shared commitment to a governmental 
philosophy, in particular commitment to individual liberty under the law.9  Tocqueville saw 
American society as so completely premised upon respect for law that is of their own 
making and execution that for Americans “the idea of a jury surfaces in playground games 
and parliamentary rituals are observed even in the organization of a banquet.”10  Flowing 
from this centrality of law to the homogeneous identity of Americans is the idea that the 
lawbreaker is the existential enemy of the American state.  Thus, Tocqueville observed, “[i]n 
Europe, the criminal is a luckless fellow, fighting to save his life from the authorities; the 
population, to some degree, watches as he struggles.  In America, he is an enemy of the 
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human race and has everyone entirely against him.”11  In this way among others, the system 
of criminal justice in America, including its prison system, which Tocqueville had come to 
America to observe, has been, as Thomas Dumm argues, precisely constitutive of American 
liberal democracy.12 
This notion of adherence to law as fundamental to American identity, and of the 
criminal as the enemy, remains robust in the rhetoric and practice of contemporary US 
politics.  Consider, for example, the claim by former Housing and Urban Development 
Secretary Henry Cisneros that membership in the citizenry of the United States is premised 
on acceptance of the rule of law.13  Or note Illinois Governor George Ryan’s recapitulation 
in a speech explaining his decision to commute the sentences of over a hundred and fifty 
death row inmates of California Governor Pat Brown’s claim that society has a duty to 
protect itself against criminals, who are its enemies.14  Indeed, one commentator on the 
American criminal justice system has noted that “criminals are the only remaining group in 
society that it is acceptable to hate.”15 
                                                
11 Ibid. 113.  Note that this distinction Tocqueville observed in the early nineteenth century between how 
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To be sure, criminal justice is “part of the official process of labeling and identifying 
who is in and who is out.”16  And sometimes this has meant that the official designations 
track ingrained societal prejudices.  Thus the criminal enemy class in the United States has 
often comprised other out-group classes, and continues to do so.  In the mid-nineteenth 
century, for instance, large proportions of those held in prisons in the United States were 
immigrants, with the percentage of immigrant prisoners rising from the 1820s through 1860s 
and eventually becoming a majority.17  In the 1980s and 1990s, a growing number of African 
Americans joined the “underclass,” a sociological group defined in part by participation in 
and victimization by violent crime, and high rates of incarceration.18  African Americans 
born in the twenty-first century have a thirty percent chance of being incarcerated at some 
point in their lives.19  In general, the top-down aspects of the American criminal justice 
system worked particular injustice on “outsiders, nonconformists, the unattached, the poor, 
the defenseless.”20 
There have, of course, been twists and turns in the historical development of the 
criminal enemy in American law and political life.  In colonial America, the process of trying 
criminals was in part aimed at attempting to offer to the accused an opportunity for 
repentance and reintegration into the community against which he had transgressed, along 
the lines of Schmitt’s assimilation model.21  Recalcitrant criminals, however, and especially 
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those who preached beliefs inconsistent with the official word of the church, were banished, 
mirroring Schmitt’s exile alternative.22  After the failure of various approaches to 
rehabilitating criminals through the penitentiary system, discussed in greater detail in the 
following section, the American criminal justice system began to view criminals increasingly 
as inimical to and not truly part of American society.  Especially beginning in the 1950s, as 
visible in the work of the US Senate’s Kefauver Commission, “criminals were portrayed as 
somehow outside of American society, not organic to it.”23 
An important part of this process of reconstituting the criminal as enemy is the 
essentialization of individuals who commit crimes not as citizens who have erred and can be 
rehabilitated and reassimilated, but as irremediable career criminals.  It is the concept of the 
career criminal, in fact, that is responsible in large part for the growth of American prisons as 
places where such irredeemably dangerous creatures (both to individuals and to the social 
order of the state) must be isolated.24  Criminals have thus been constructed as a kind of 
enemy class in the American system through the essentialization of “habitual criminals,” 
understood as those who will continue to commit crimes no matter what, unless rendered 
incapable of so doing through imprisonment as a form of internal banishment.25  This 
essentialization also points to the possibility that criminals — in particular habitual or career 
criminals, however identified — are in the American context considered less than human.  
To this extent, what should be in Schmitt’s view ordinary criminals become in the US not 
only enemies but absolute enemies, in a kind of inversion of the process of constructing 
one’s opponents in war as subhuman absolute enemies, directed instead within the state. 
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These observations, in turn, highlight the mutually constitutive relationship of 
prisons — as spaces of isolation and banishment — to the criminal enemy concept.  The US 
criminal justice system constructs criminal enemies in two senses:  First, from the standpoint 
of the state, the criminal is ab initio declared to be the enemy who must be punished, and may 
remain in some senses the presumptive enemy even beyond the prescribed punishment 
period, especially if considered an absolute enemy.  As is often observed, Americans with 
felony convictions are effectively “marked for life.”26  Second, from the standpoint of the 
convicted criminal (and to a lesser extent the practicing criminal who has not yet been 
caught), the state becomes her existential enemy.  One striking illustration of this 
phenomenon is would-be terrorist Jose Padilla who, imprisoned for ordinary crimes, became 
radicalized through contact with Muslims in prison against the American state and made 
plans to set off explosive devices in the city of Chicago following the events of 11 
September 2001.27  In this sense, prison constructs enemies of the state by serving as 
minisocieites in which “deviate social norms” are explored and transmitted.28 
Certainly in some cases convicted criminals will seek reconciliation with society, but 
in so doing they face tremendous obstacles, not the least of which involve civic death, 
discussed below,29 and socio-spatial isolation in crime-ridden ghettos, which can serve to 
exacerbate recidivism.30  The criminal justice system’s role in creating a permanent criminal 
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enemy class can be seen, for example, in the fact that increasingly large proportions of 
prisoners are parole violators, who are usually guilty only of technical violations of release 
conditions rather than commission of new crimes.31  And in many cases, even temporary 
return to ordinary society is barred:  Life without parole has become an increasingly 
prevalent sentence in the United States since the 1990s.32  As an example of the mutually 
constituted nature of the criminal enemy and the terms of his imprisonment, the 
phenomenon of the essentialized career criminal and the purported need for more life 
sentences both arose from what was seen as a key failure of the rehabilitation experiment of 
the 1960s and 1970s, namely that prison “subjected [criminals] to dangerous criminal 
associations that perpetuated criminal and delinquent careers.”33  The idea that once one was 
a criminal one would always seek to violate the law became intertwined with the idea that if 
one had been incarcerated among criminals, one was bound to become even more intent on 
violating the law again. 
Many students of the American penal system see in it a kind of war-making against 
or enslavement of certain elements of the population deemed to be criminal, and thus 
undeserving of any degree of equal citizenship.  In the words of two criminologists deeply 
critical of the current operation of prisons in America,  
[S]upport for an inhumane prison system requires that citizens embrace the 
simplistic concept that prisoners are less worthy beings who deserve their extreme 
punishment.  This belief, which is advanced by unscrupulous and self-serving 
politicians for their self-gain, rests on and then in turn, in a looping process, 
promotes invidiousness, hate, fear, and other emotions.34 
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33 Ibid. 153. 
34 Austin and Irwin, It’s about Time, 247. 
 
 
187 
This support is fed, at least in part, by the agreement among wide ranging political interest 
groups in the US on the need always to side with victims against offenders in what they view 
as a zero-sum exercise, which requires nearly perpetual increases in criminal penalties.35  This 
ongoing zero-sum conflict makes it possible to see the war on crime perpetuated against 
living citizens in the United States as a kind of microcosmic civil war, with the criminal and 
the law-abiding citizenry locked in an existential battle.36  Or, to deploy another popular 
comparison, the state of the American criminal justice system today means that “for the first 
time since the abolition of slavery, a definable group of American lives, on a more or less 
permanent basis, [are] in a state of legal nonfreedom . . . a shocking percentage of them 
descendants of those freed slaves.”37 
Having explained how the American criminal justice system in general treats convicts 
as enemies in the Schmittian sense, let me now turn to briefly address the somewhat novel, 
but increasingly common case of the terrorist as criminal enemy.  Recall that for Schmitt, the 
categories of terrorist, criminal, and enemy are to be kept distinct, but that his own writing 
on these distinctions is less than completely precise.38  It is worth noting that political 
debates over how to treat terrorists — as enemy combatants, for instance, or through the 
ordinary workings of the criminal justice system — illuminate the fact that for Americans, 
the criminal and enemy categories are often coterminous, to the extent that Schmitt would 
have seen them as dangerously muddled.   
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The Bush Administration’s “War on Terror,” for instance, can be seen as an 
extension of the war on crime.39  Indeed, the president’s power to declare persons “enemy 
combatants” is effectively a means of making him ultimately sovereign over the central 
political axis of friend versus enemy.40  Not at all coincidentally, given Schmitt’s own political 
commitments, declaring political opponents to be enemies of the people is a variant of 
governance through crime frequently deployed by fascist states.41  And for Schmitt, that 
would have been appropriate:  the sovereign’s job is to decide, including especially about 
who is friend and who is enemy.  In Schmitt scholar Daniel Williams’s view, the policy of 
declaring that particular terrorist individuals are enemy combatants — a technique widely 
deployed by the Bush Administration, but denounced by his 2004 opponent John Kerry, and 
renounced by President Obama — amounts to a sovereign decision on the friend-enemy 
distinction in Schmittian terms.42  Sovereignty thus entails the power to cast particular 
people, including criminals convicted according to ordinary law, as functionally beyond 
certain generally applicable legal protections, but not as beyond membership in the human 
race.43   
Were that the end of the story, Schmitt would doubtless approve.  But American 
policy toward terrorists viewed more broadly has evinced a tendency to blur what Schmitt 
would prefer to see as clear lines between criminal and enemy, as can be seen not only in 
political resistance to Bush’s enemy combatant decisionism, but also in the context of 
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Supreme Court rulings that even those classified as enemy combatants and detained at 
Guantanamo must be given legal protections consistent with the US criminal justice system, 
so that they are not cast outside the protections of ordinary law.44  Even American foreign 
policy has largely collapsed any distinction between criminal and enemy.45  In short, 
Americans generally are not adept at distinguishing strictly between enemy and criminal, and 
this provides further evidence that these categories are in American politics and 
jurisprudence overlap.  Having shown as a matter of theory how the criminal qualifies as the 
enemy in Schmittian terms in America, I next will illustrate this fact through closer 
examination of the American penal system, and in particular American prison practice. 
 
The American Penal System and the Criminal Enemy 
“In America, everyone is free; prison is the negation of that freedom.  Hence the 
prison experience is a negation of the conditions which allow one to define oneself as a 
person.”46  Moreover, this negation occurs here more than anywhere else on earth:  The 
United States imprisons its population at a higher rate than any other nation.47  As of 2000, 
about one in every thirty-three Americans was under some kind of correctional supervision, 
whether in prison, on probation or parole, or otherwise.48  Much of the rise in American 
imprisonment is attributable to stiff-penalty drug laws, and most of the crimes that account 
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for Americans’ imprisonment are petty.49  Public pressure on politicians to reduce crime in 
general creates a one-way ratchet system, in which penalties are increased frequently and new 
crimes defined, but rarely are penalties reduced or activities decriminalized.50  This pressure 
is often parasitic on preexisting prejudices regarding subaltern communities, such as racial 
minorities.51  The one-way ratchet operates despite the fact that when Americans are polled 
more specifically on the subject, they prefer nonprison sentences for nondangerous petty 
offenders.52  Yet when the focus is not on these specific minor crimes that account for so 
much contemporary imprisonment, “[t]he general public is not interested in rehabilitation 
[of criminals], not interested in what happens inside the prisons, not interested in reform or 
alternatives.  It wants only to get these creatures off the streets.”53  That is to say, the 
criminal in general is the enemy who needs to be removed from participation in public life, 
even though when confronted specifically not all those whom the law makes criminal are 
really enemies in the minds of most citizens. 
What Marie Gottschalk has labeled the American carceral state is largely invisible in 
the context of day-to-day political discourse.54  According to Gottschalk,  
the United States . . . has built a carceral state that is unprecedented among Western 
countries and in U.S. history.  Three features distinguish the U.S. carceral state:  the 
sheer size of its prison and jail population; its reliance on harsh, degrading 
sanctions[,] and the persistence and centrality of the death penalty.55  
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As part of the build-up of the carceral state in the past several decades, penal policy in the 
US has increasingly embraced incarceration as punishment for deterrent and retributive 
purposes, while abandoning any attempt to rehabilitate offenders.56  As rehabilitation has 
declined as a goal of the prison system, and less and less is done to prepare prisoners for 
their postrelease lives, more of them are left without hope of readapting to social 
conventions and a mainstream life outside the prison walls, and thus are effectively rendered 
permanent outsiders to American society.57   
Prison makes members of the most disadvantaged classes in the US 
disproportionately unlikely to get jobs, vote, participate in civic life, and maintain 
connections with their families and broader community support networks.58  In part, this is 
because “[r]eleased inmates confront sizeable barriers to getting even the most demeaning 
forms of employment because they are stigmatized as ex-convicts.”59  Ex-cons often have 
difficulty even getting considered for, much less being hired to fill, jobs on the outside due 
to prejudice, including the assumption that a conviction equates to conviction for a heinous 
crime.  One result of this difficulty getting hired is recidivism, which in turn contributes to 
the creation of a permanent convict-enemy class.60  While they are in custody, however, 
criminals are eminently employable:  Prison labor in the US is contracted out at 
subminimum wages, making the prison population a kind of slave labor source.61  This is 
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expressly permitted by Amendment XIII to the US Constitution, which forbids slavery 
except in the case of convicted criminals alone. 
But the isolation prisoners experience upon release is but the tip of the iceberg.  
Since the ill-fated experiments with the penitentiary system, particularly in New York and 
Pennsylvania in the early 1800s, prison in America has commonly been a place where 
convicts are housed in situations ranging from complete solitary confinement to effective 
banishment from community and society.  Early nineteenth century prison reformers in the 
US experimented extensively with forms of extreme isolation of prisoners in the penitentiary 
as means both of punishment and rehabilitation.  These techniques were by and large 
failures, utterly warping many who were subjected to them.62  So much was this the case that 
prisoners so treated were immensely grateful for being required to perform labor, as it at 
least brought some degree of interest and occupation to otherwise solitary confinement.63  
Predictably, such prisoners were denied contact with the outside world.64  Their isolation was 
so great that prisoners at the time were delighted to have visits by jailors or even insects.65 
This kind of isolating prison system “had all the impact of an external banishment.  Convicts 
were banished to the interior spaces of the prison.”66  
While this form of punishment was soon largely abandoned, it has returned in the 
form of increased reliance on solitary confinement, “administrative segregation” and other 
forms of isolation in supermax prisons.  For repeat offenders and others deemed particularly 
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dangerous, this form of internal banishment is ever more popular today.  Supermax prisons 
isolate inmates for extended periods of time, often many years, in small barren cells with 
minimal access to assistance and instructional programs, reading material, other people, 
recreation, or the outdoors.67   This often leads to complete psychological breakdowns on 
the part of prisoners so confined, fulfilling the assumption that they are subhuman absolute 
enemies by in fact making them functionally subhuman.68  Inmates in supermax facilities 
frequently exhibit signs of psychosis, including self-mutilation and suicidal behavior.69  
Startlingly, this resurrection of eighteenth century isolation techniques has occurred despite 
knowledge that these practices contributed to psychological breakdowns among inmates 
when first employed.70 
Even where supermax techniques are not used, prisons in the United States function 
largely according to a logic of banishment, by means of which convicted criminals are 
physically and relationally distanced from their homes, families, communities, and 
mainstream society itself:   
In examining [the] history of shifting rationales for imprisonment, we clearly see that 
none of them accounts for our persistent and almost exclusive reliance on prison as 
the appropriate response to serious crime.  What does explain it is the American 
people’s strong desire to banish from their midst any population of people who are 
threatening, bothersome, and repulsive.71  
 
Notably, banishment was a tool developed in ancient Greece to deal with people who were 
viewed as existential threats to the polis, and who thus were expelled from it either for a 
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temporary period or permanently.72  Because there are no longer empty spaces in the world, 
however, “America has had to construct its locations of banishment within its borders.”73 
European colonizers had used transportation of criminals in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
century as a form of banishment in which criminals were removed from their societies and 
from public view and contact.74  Colonial Americans too relied upon banishment but 
primarily only for repeat or recalcitrant offenders, and those banished from their colonies 
were unlikely to be welcomed into other colonial communities.75  In contrast, colonial jails 
were not used to punish offenders, but rather places where accused criminals were housed 
pending trial.76  They were also used to house and employ productively debtors, vagrants, 
and the like.77 
Not originally a central component of prison detention in America, the logic of 
banishment took firm hold with the institution and refinement of the penitentiary system.  
“[T]he ideal penitentiary contains a population in near-total isolation from the outside world, 
with each member in strict separation from the others.”78  This makes the penitentiary 
system a form of “institutionalized banishment from the external world.”  The warehouse 
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prison system that subsequently replaced the penitentiary largely did away with the internal 
banishment that is the hallmark of the penitentiary, which has since been revived with the 
rise of administrative segregation and supermax facilities, but extended the logic of 
banishment by virtue of locating prisons in most instances far from populated areas in order 
to “quarantine” prisoners from upstanding members of society.79  “The inmates of the 
warehouse prison are sealed in a large container and thereby barred from intercourse with, as 
well as departure to, the outer ‘free world.’”80  As Jonathan Simon sees it, Americans 
increasingly seek security for their urban areas “by sending the young men of those 
communities into ‘exile.’”81  Simon argues that the American prison system has adopted a 
“waste management” template, by which it simply removes criminals from society, 
increasingly isolating and containing the perceived toxicity of their selves and their 
behaviors.82 
This removal of convicted criminals is increasingly accomplished by locating prisons 
in remote and isolated rural areas, far from big cities and from the communities and families 
of most prisoners.83  “[P]risoner administrators and other policy makers have completely 
abandoned the goal of reducing prisoners’ isolation from outside society.84  Thus a serious 
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concern for the well-being of inmates is not only the immediate physical restriction on their 
movements, but also their isolation from family, relatives and friends, and the “deliberate, 
moral rejection of the criminal by the free community.”85  This enforced distancing from the 
outside world and a prisoner’s community support structure occurs despite recognition by 
states that inmates who maintain contact with outside society have much better chances of 
readjusting to the world when released.86  The geographical distancing of prisoners from 
their families and communities is further exacerbated by the restrictions and inconveniences 
associated with prison visitation.  Harassing treatment of visitors by guards, invasive searches 
of visitors, and visitation in large communal rooms, combined with the need for many 
visitors to travel often for many hours to be near the prison and to find lodging in remote 
locations, all substantially impede contact between prisoners and their families and friends 
on the outside, rendering them cut off.87  
Nor does the isolation of convicted criminals end with their sentences.  The 
imprisoned criminal suffers “civic death,” in that he loses rights to vote, hold office, bring 
certain lawsuits, etc., and this status as a permanently contaminated former citizen threatens 
his own self-conception.88  In some states, ex-felons are not permitted to acquire 
occupational licenses, including those required for such mundane occupations as 
hairdressing.  Many are rendered ineligible for such key governmental support as public 
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housing assistance, student loans, and welfare.89  Prisoners in most states are denied the right 
to vote, not only during their sentences, but often permanently.  Only Vermont and Maine 
permit prisoners to vote while incarcerated.90   
Florida alone had under its disenfranchisement law prior to Governor Charlie Crist’s 
actions to reverse it banned some six hundred thousand ex-felons from voting for the rest of 
their lives, a ban which deprived a disproportionate twenty-five percent of African American 
men of the franchise.91  Perhaps unsurprisingly, then, Florida Republicans moved quickly 
after the 2010 elections to reinstate restrictions on voting by ex-felons.92  Under new rules in 
place, even nonviolent offenders will have to wait five years before applying to have their 
voting rights restored.93   
And in the case of sex offenders, most states and the federal government impose 
additional post-imprisonment requirements.  State laws in many jurisdictions limit strictly 
where convicted sex offenders may live, causing them to live on the streets or in tent cities.  
In some cases, these laws effectively exclude convicted sex offenders from particular cities, 
towns or areas entirely.   For instance in San Francisco, geography, including the location of 
schools and small parks, makes the whole city an effective exclusion zone for these 
offenders.94  Thus even after their terms of physical banishment end, criminals who have 
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served their sentences remain distanced psychologically and in terms of full citizenship from 
their neighbors. 
 
Conclusion 
The foregoing description of the American prison and penal systems demonstrates 
that in practice, as well as in concept, the criminal is treated as an enemy of the state — if 
not always as the existentially threatening but equally human enemy central to Schmitt’s early 
thought, then worse still, as the subhuman absolute enemy.95  In particular, criminals are 
treated according to a logic of banishment, which not coincidentally is precisely the penalty 
historically applied to a state’s enemies, beginning in ancient times and continuing at least as 
long as there were still places on earth understood to be uncolonized or otherwise empty of 
“civilized” populations.  Even in American colonial times, banishment was not applied to 
ordinary criminals, but only to those deemed existential threats to the community.  Today, 
however, all criminals are categorized in this way, both in popular imagination and in 
practice, despite that when presented with particular facts of alleged criminal acts — 
especially nonviolent criminal acts — many citizens appear to favor greater leniency than the 
law provides. 
In this chapter, I have sought to show how American criminal and penal law 
construct criminals as enemies, both in terms of the way law and society treat them, and 
                                                
95 By way of comparison, consider how states with which America has gone to war have been treated once the 
war is over.  Typically, they are forgiven and become allies, though only so long as they renounce participation 
with absolute enemy (e.g. Nazi or more recently Baathist) affiliations.  But once a convict completes her 
sentence, she still remains tainted by her conviction, suffers civil death, and is likely to return to prison for a 
variety of reasons associated with the lasting stigma of being labeled a criminal and intensified restrictions on 
parolees and other ex-cons.  In this sense, the criminal enemy is even more an enemy of the state in the 
American context than the wartime enemy.  Notably, the creation of internal enemies has long been recognized 
as a foundation of imperialism.  See, for example, Niccolò Machiavelli, Discourses on the First Decade of Titus 
Livius, trans. Allan Gilbert, in Machiavelli:  The Chief Works and Others.  (Durham, NC:  Duke University Press, 
1989), vol. I, 379:  “A polity desiring to expand, if it cannot identify enemies abroad, creates them at home.” 
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because of how they are treated — as a members of a dangerous subaltern class who are 
punished according to a logic of banishment both during and after their imprisonment.96  
The substantial overlap between the categories of the criminal in America and the enemy in 
Schmitt’s thought means that when a person is adjudicated guilty of a crime, he becomes in a 
functional sense the enemy of the American state.  That in turn makes the decision whether 
or not to convict an accused criminal a decision on the friend-enemy distinction, and thus a 
fundamentally political decision under Schmitt’s theories.  In the next chapter, I will discuss 
the mechanics and history of the jury’s role in making that political decision, and in the 
subsequent chapter argue that its power to refuse to decide that the defendant before it is an 
enemy is an important exercise of sovereignty in the Schmittian sense, worth preserving in a 
democracy. 
                                                
96 The idea that criminals constitute a subaltern class arrayed against the dominance of the state specifically 
arises as well in the thought of Antonio Gramsci.  Critics of Gramsci in turn would argue that attempts to 
guard against creating such classes work to destroy equality before the law.  See John Fonte, “Why There Is a 
Culture War:  Gramsci and Tocqueville in America,” reprinted at OrthodoxyToday.org, available via 
http://www.orthodoxytoday.org/ articles/FonteCultureWar.shtml (last accessed 19 February 2010).  The 
criticism that jury nullification operates likewise contrary to equality before the law is discussed in below; see 
Chapter 7, text accompanying notes 258 to 265, 280 to 283. 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
JURY NULLIFICATION IN AMERICA 
 
 
Introduction 
Let us take a moment to review the bidding.  Having first provided historical 
background on Carl Schmitt and his theories, I subsequently showed how sovereignty in 
terms of ultimate decisional authority is diffuse in the American political system, and in turn 
that this poses special problems for that system that Schmitt’s theories of sovereignty and 
democracy highlight, in particular a tension between the oft-lauded rule of law and the 
necessity for some political actor or actors to decide what the law is and how it is to be 
applied.  I then outlined Schmitt’s theory of the friend-enemy distinction as the core element 
of the political, addressing as well the somewhat incompletely theorized idea of the enemy in 
Schmitt’s thought.  Finally, in the immediately preceding chapter, I detailed the features of 
the American criminal justice system that construct the criminal as the enemy of the 
American state — she who most fully challenges the homogeneity built upon respect for the 
rule of law, and who thus existentially threatens the stability of the otherwise plural and 
therefore potentially unstable American polity.  In this chapter, I outline the mechanics and 
history of the jury and its nullification power in the context of American criminal law, and 
provide examples of its use.   
 
The Jury in American Criminal Trials 
The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees Americans the 
right to trial by a jury of their peers in federal criminal cases involving penalties of six 
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months’ imprisonment or more,1 and subsequent to the ratification of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, this guarantee has been extended to cover state criminal cases.2  Article III of 
the Constitution is also understood to ensure this right.3  The right to a jury trial is thus the 
only right that appears both in the body of the original Constitution itself and in the Bill of 
Rights.4  Federal jury verdicts must be unanimous, but the Supreme Court has held that state 
juries may vote for guilt by as low a margin as 9-3 in noncapital cases in state courts.5  While 
juries ordinarily consist of twelve members, juries in state courts may have as few as six 
members, but these must return unanimous verdicts.6  In practice, “[t]he jury returns its 
unanimous verdict and does not explain how the result was reached.”7 
The Supreme Court has recognized that the purpose of juries in criminal trials is to 
protect against government oppression, not necessarily to produce uniform outcomes.8  
Juries are in addition meant to enshrine “community participation” in the process of 
determining criminal liability.9  Because juries are drawn more or less at random from the 
local community where a criminal trial is held, they provide an opportunity for minority 
viewpoints to be heard in that context.10  While defendants have the right to trial by jury, 
                                                
1 U.S. Const., Amend. VI. 
2 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968). 
3 Conrad, Jury Nullification, 4. 
4 Arie M. Rubenstein, “Verdicts of Conscience:  Nullification and the Modern Jury Trial,” Columbia Law Review 
106, no. 5 (May 2006), 959. 
5 Ibid. 180. 
6 Ibid. 181. 
7 Ibid. 203. 
8 Duncan, 391 U.S. 145 at 156. 
9  Ibid. 
10 Conrad, Jury Nullification, 202. 
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they may, however, waive this right, electing instead to be tried by a judge in what is 
commonly known as a “bench trial.” 
In their groundbreaking study of the criminal jury in practice, Harry Kalven and 
Hans Zeisel found that in a world of plea bargains and bench trials, those cases that are 
taken to a jury are more likely to be controversial cases, and more likely to involve situations 
in which facts existed that might incline a jury to sympathize with the defendants.11  In 
general, Kalven and Zeisel found that juries are empirically more likely to acquit defendants 
than judges, though this result varies when one examines statistics for particular crimes in 
particular temporal contexts.12  More recent evidence, however, suggests that juries may no 
longer be more lenient than judges in criminal cases.13  Given that the bench trial upon 
defendant’s consent is a relatively new innovation, emerging in the US in the 1920s, and 
approved by the Supreme Court provided in 1930, it may well be that not enough time had 
passed for Kalven and Zeisel’s data to reflect enough such trials’ effects on differences in 
attitude between judges and lay juries.14  Plea bargaining, and the tendency for risk averse 
defendants to plead guilty even where they might achieve acquittal, though, pose an even 
greater threat to the trial by jury than increasing frequency of bench trials.15   
Structurally, however, in the context of sovereignty in America, the effect of jury 
trials on particular defendants may be less important than the broader effects of jury trials on 
the dynamics of power in the polity.  In constitutional scholar Akhil Reed Amar’s integrated 
view of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, the jury was understood by the Founders to 
                                                
11 Harry Kalven Jr. and Hans Zeisel, The American Jury.  (Chicago:  The University of Chicago Press, 1966), 31. 
12 Kalven Jr. and Zeisel, The American Jury, 59. 
13 Abramson, We, the Jury, 254. 
14 Friedman, Crime and Punishment, 388-89. 
15 Ibid. 390. 
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have a role under the Fourth Amendment in determining the reasonableness of searches and 
seizures conducted without warrants, as part of its duty to act as a popular check on 
government intrusion.16  For Amar,  
the key role of the jury was to protect ordinary individuals against governmental 
overreaching.  Jurors would be drawn from the community; like the militia they were 
ordinary Citizens, not permanent government officials on the government payroll.  
Just as the militia could check a paid professional standing army, so too the jury 
could thwart overreaching by powerful and ambitious government officials.17 
 
Citing Tocqueville, Amar argues that criminal juries were understood under the Sixth 
Amendment to have a right of “jury review,” which allowed them effectively to nullify by 
refusing to convict in cases where the law in question was, in the jury’s view, 
unconstitutional.18  This power was indeed, as the Supreme Court has affirmed, meant in 
part to enshrine local community standards in the application of criminal law through trials.19  
Amar supports his view of the jury’s role by collecting a range of opinions from Founding 
thinkers, including Thomas Jefferson, the “Federal Farmer,” the “Maryland Farmer,” and 
John Taylor of Caroline, who noted the centrality of the jury to the execution of laws as a 
means of keeping such execution at least partly in popular hands.20   
As Amar and others have pointed out, although many argue that jury nullification is 
problematic because it produces verdicts at odds with the facts, criminal trials, as the 
Supreme Court has held, are not about getting the facts right, but rather about applying a 
community-based judgment as to how to apply the law in particular factual circumstances — 
                                                
16 Akhil Reed Amar, “The Bill of Rights as a Constitution,” Yale Law Journal 100, no. 5 (March 1991):  1179-80. 
17 Ibid. 1183. 
18 Ibid. 1185. 
19 Ibid. 1186. 
20 Ibid. 1188-89. 
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i.e., about making fundamentally sovereign political decisions.21  Indeed, not only Duncan but 
several additional Supreme Court cases have said as much — that the purpose of a criminal 
jury is not to find the truth, but to ensure democratic sovereignty.22  This purpose will be of 
significance for my argument below, but first a close look at the phenomenon of jury 
nullification is in order. 
 
Jury Nullification Defined and Explained 
So what is this thing called jury nullification?  Thomas Andrew Green defines it as 
“the exercise of jury discretion in favor of a [criminal] defendant whom the jury nonetheless 
believes to have committed the act with which he is charged,” which can sometimes result 
from a jury’s belief that the act committed is not in fact properly considered a violation of 
law, and in other instances from a jury’s belief that the punishment is inappropriate for the 
act committed.23  Nullification sometimes results from juries simply acquitting despite clear 
evidence, and sometimes in a more nuanced fashion from juries ignoring aspects of the 
judge’s instructions on law and how it should be applied to the facts.  Green outlines a 
tripartite typology of nullification, in which the jury in the strongest form acquits defendants 
because the jury considers the act committed not to be properly unlawful, an intermediate 
form in which the jury acquits because the punishment is considered excessive, and a weak 
form in which the jury acquits not because the punishment in general is excessive, but 
because the punishment under the circumstances would be.24  Ultimately, nullification 
                                                
21 Rubenstein, “Verdicts of Conscience, 973-74. 
22 Ibid. 983. 
23 Thomas Andrew Green, Verdict According to Conscience:  Perspectives on the English Criminal Trial Jury, 1200-1800.  
(Chicago:  University of Chicago Press, 1985), xiii. 
24 Ibid. xviii. 
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provides that “jurors in criminal trials have the right to refuse to convict if they believe that a 
conviction would be in some way unjust.”25   
Not all forms of nullification are appraised equally by scholars and other observers, 
of course.  Amar, as noted, distinguishes between jury nullification, in which jurors acquit 
contrary to factual evidence without making any particularized claim about the validity of the 
law, from jury review, in which the jury deems a law unconstitutional and refuses to apply it 
for that reason.26  In this connection, Amar argues that the Marbury v. Madison claim that the 
judiciary says what the law is can be squared with juries doing the same, by analogizing 
judges to the upper house of a legislature and juries to the lower house in a power-sharing 
arrangement.  In this sense, juries figured in his view as part of a coherent constitutional 
system designed to protect individual defendants in a “systematically anti-governmental, pro-
populist way.”27  But whether exercised in the limited way Amar envisions, or in any of the 
several ways Green lists, nullification was at least at the outset of the American republic a 
power intimately connected to the decision whether to functionally disintegrate the bonds 
between a convict and his community through criminal sanction, one that made juries 
sovereign in the US criminal context.28 
Jury nullification is possible in the US due to a confluence of features of American 
criminal jurisprudence.  First and foremost, the prohibition against placing a defendant twice 
in jeopardy of life and limb in the Constitution’s Fifth Amendment — the Double Jeopardy 
Clause — ensures that once a jury acquits a defendant, there can be neither an appeal nor a 
                                                
25 Conrad, Jury Nullification, 7. 
26 Amar, “Bill of Rights,” 1191. 
27 Ibid. 1194. 
28 Williams, “After the Gold Rush,” 65. 
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retrial.29  Thus if jurors acquit, even in a case where the facts are clear and so apparently in 
contravention of applicable law, the prosecution cannot appeal their verdict or otherwise 
seek a new trial, at least in the same jurisdiction.  Moreover, jurors are not generally required 
to swear to follow bench instructions on the law, which means that they cannot be punished 
for contempt of court, at least in most jurisdictions at present, for acquitting by failing to 
follow bench instructions on the law.30  The constitutionally-based concept that the Sixth 
Amendment’s jury-trial mandate includes the notion that juror deliberations must be kept 
secret further impedes judicial inquiry into the basis for a not-guilty verdict, and thus makes 
punishing or preventing nullification more difficult.31 
Nullification power is additionally rooted in the jury’s right to render a general, 
convict-or-acquit verdict in criminal cases rather than being subjected to step-by-step 
inquiries as to particular facts such that it might, having agreed that each element of a crime’s 
commission was supported by adequate evidence, feel compelled to convict.  It is also 
safeguarded by the judge’s inability to direct the jury to convict on the basis that no 
reasonable jury could do otherwise.32  These limitations on the bench’s ability to guide juries 
originated with the Magna-Carta era practice of juries rendering verdicts according to their 
consciences and the norms of their communities, fulfilling both the law-finding role now 
                                                
29 Friedman, Crime and Punishment, 255. 
30 Conrad, Jury Nullification, 239. 
31 See United States v. Thomas, 116 F.3d 606, 608 (2nd Cir. 1997); People v. Kriho, 996 P.2d 158, 165 (Colo. App. 
1999).  The Ninth and District of Columbia Circuit Courts have adopted standards similar to the Second 
Circuit’s in Thomas for determining whether jurors nullify outright, or simply do not believe the evidence 
supports conviction.  In brief, judges cannot inquire too invasively into jury deliberations, though how much 
inquiry is too much is incompletely defined.  Only if a juror is found to be voting against acquittal without any 
connection to evidentiary doubt may he be removed.  Brian Osimiri, “The Legacy of United States v. Thomas:  
Second Circuit’s Swing and a Miss Puts Defendants’ Rights at Risk,” The Review of Litigation 30, no. 1 (Fall 2010):  
167-69. 
32 Andrew J. Parmenter, “Nullifying the Jury:  ‘The Judicial Oligarchy’ Declares War on Jury Nullification,” 
Washburn Law Journal 46, no. 2 (Winter 2007):  379. 
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allocated to judges in the American system, and fact-finding role that remains the jury’s.33  
The US Supreme Court has affirmed that judges may not direct guilty verdicts regardless of 
the strength of the evidence.34  According to the Court, the Sixth Amendment requires an 
actual jury finding of guilt, supported by an appropriate bench instruction that the jury must 
find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  Judges may not substitute their own views about the 
sufficiency of the evidence in criminal cases where the jury acquits; such directed verdicts are 
not “sustainable on appeal.”35 
In addition to these features, because ordinarily US juries must vote unanimously to 
convict, if there is even a single holdout juror, she can effectively prevent conviction, and 
cause the trial to end in a hung jury.  A defendant whose case ends in a hung jury may be 
retried, however, at the prosecutor’s discretion.36  But while it only takes a single obstinate 
juror to hang a jury, the fact of face-to-face deliberation significantly diminishes the 
likelihood of this result.37  Kalven and Zeisel see the possibility of a hung jury, though it 
causes a mistrial and can, in the prosecutor’s discretion, lead to a retrial, as a “valued 
assurance of integrity, since it can serve to protect the dissent of a minority.”38  Still, because 
of the small number of jurors serving in any given trial, at least some minority viewpoints 
will often be unrepresented.39  According to Jeffrey Abramson, “hung juries are not 
necessarily a sign of [democratic] dysfunction.  After all, rational people may and do disagree 
                                                
33 Ibid. 380. 
34 United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America v. United States, 330 U.S. 395, 408-09 (1947). 
35 Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 280 (1993). 
36 Delmar Karlen, Geoffrey Sawer, and Edward M. Wise, Anglo-American Criminal Justice.  (New York:  Oxford 
University Press, 1967), 192. 
37 Conrad, Jury Nullification, 197. 
38 Kalven Jr. and Zeisel, The American Jury, 453. 
39 Ibid. 497. 
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about the evidence.”40  And unsurprisingly, the Fully Informed Jury Association (FIJA), 
about which I will have more to say below,41 argues that hung juries are a good thing in the 
abstract.42   
Recall that the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits appeal by the prosecution of 
acquittals, but not by the defense of convictions, because the former would, if sustained, 
subject defendants to a second trial for the same offense.43  Recall likewise, the court may 
never direct a conviction verdict, that is instruct the jury to convict, or impose a conviction 
over a jury’s acquittal.44  As a result of these facts, an acquittal, no matter how little 
supported by the facts, is effectively unreviewable.  Thus so long as it serves to acquit 
defendants, “alleged lawlessness by jurors who refuse to convict despite clear evidence of 
guilt remains not only unpunishable, but unreviewable and absolute.”45  This makes 
nullification functionally a one-way street:  nullification in the sense of failure to follow the 
law, when it leads to improper conviction, can be undone because judges have several 
options for resisting improper jury convictions, including directing an acquittal, requiring a 
new trial, or moderating the penalty.46  Nullification may thus more properly be considered 
                                                
40 Abramson, We, the Jury, xvi. 
41 See text accompanying notes 188 to 197. 
42 Fully Informed Jury Association, “If You Are Called for Jury Duty,” available via 
http://fija.org/docs/JG_If_you_are_called_for_Jury_Duty.pdf (last accessed 20 March 2013). 
43 Conrad, Jury Nullification, 7.  Interpreting the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Constitution’s Fifth 
Amendment, the Supreme Court has declared that a jury acquittal triggers the prohibition on retrial by the same 
court for the same offense.  United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 669-70 (1896).  In a recent Supreme Court case, 
however, the Double Jeopardy protection was held not to apply where a jury that ultimately hung on lesser 
charges appeared along the way to have found that the evidence did not support capital or first-degree murder, 
such that retrial for those charges was constitutionally permissible.  Blueford v. Arkansas, 132 S.Ct. 2044, 2052-53 
(2012). 
44 Conrad, Jury Nullification, 8. 
45 Ibid. 9. 
46 Kalven Jr. and Zeisel, The American Jury, 411 & n. 1. 
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suspension of law when exercised in the direction of lenity, rather than action in direct 
conflict with the law.47 
Under at least some forms of jury nullification instruction, the possibility exists that 
juries might improperly convict, though this can be ameliorated both by clearer instructions 
(to the effect that a jury must not convict except on clear evidence) and by trial judges’ (and 
appellate courts’) conscientious scrutiny of guilty verdicts for lack of sound evidentiary 
basis.48  Some argue, however, that it is the failure to instruct jurors specifically about jury 
nullification at all that is the more likely cause of nullification convictions.49  Indeed, 
according to James Duane, the fact that juries know that there are means for judges to 
overturn improper convictions may contribute to their occurrence, though Irwin Horowitz’s 
research seems to cut the other way.50 
Importantly, when a jury nullifies, it judges only the specific application of the law to 
the case before it, not its general propriety.  It does not make new law, it simply refuses to 
apply the law as explained to it.51  Nullifying juries do not overturn law as the Supreme Court 
does, but rather refuse to apply law to the specific cases before them.52 
Nullification, as noted, functions to infuse criminal trials with community mores.  
“[T]here are whole communities where support for official norms, and for what the police 
                                                
47 Alan W. Scheflin, “Jury Nullification:  The Right to Say No,” Southern California Law Review 45 (1972):  215. 
48 Irwin A. Horowitz and Thomas E. Wilging, “Changing Views of Jury Power:  The Nullification Debate, 
1787-1988,” Law and Human Behavior 15, no. 2 (April 1991):  172-73. 
49 James Duane, “Jurors’ Handbook:  A Citizens Guide to Jury Duty,” available via http://fija.org/docs/JG_ 
Jurors_Handbook.pdf (last accessed 20 March 2013). 
50 Ibid. 
51 Rubenstein, “Verdicts of Conscience,” 962. 
52 Conrad, Jury Nullification, 96. 
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have to do, is shallow or downright negative.”53  And “[i]n one stretched-out sense, many or 
most crimes are political:  they are conscious or unconscious acts of rebellion against the 
duly constituted order.”54  So if a community supports or at least does not detest actions the 
government labels criminal, jurors might nullify in prosecutions of such actions — perhaps 
even routinely — in order to substitute for the judgment of the government their own local 
norms.   
“The issue of jury independence usually surfaces where there are laws which are 
unpopular, especially when those laws are widely applied.”55  So for instance in Colorado, 
federal prosecutors have declined to prosecute medical marijuana purveyors or users under 
federal antidrug laws because of the near impossibility of successfully impanelling juries that 
would not simply nullify federal marijuana laws in any cases brought.56  I will examine this 
tendency and its political ramifications more closely in the following chapter.57   
On the other hand, however, “[c]riminal laws that are supported by a wide consensus 
of the population are in little danger of being rejected by the average trial jury.”58  Or at least 
this seems likely to be the case so long as such laws are not onerously or discriminatorily 
applied in the perception of the community from which the relevant jurors are drawn.  
Situations that might provoke a nullifying verdict include not only cases in which the jury 
disagrees with the law itself, but also prosecutions of defendants who the jury believes have 
                                                
53 Friedman, Crime and Punishment in American History, 360-61. 
54 Ibid. 365. 
55 Conrad, Jury Nullification, 75. 
56 Steve Kroft, “Medical Marijuana:  Will Colorado’s ‘Green Rush’ Last?”  13 min., 8 sec.  60 Minutes, 21 
October 2012. Available via http://www.cbsnews.com/video/watch/?id=50133577n (last accessed 8 April 
2013). 
57 See Chapter 8, text accompanying notes 62 to 73. 
58 Conrad, Jury Nullification, 143. 
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suffered enough already, cases in which it seems unfair or contrary to the public interest to 
convict, cases in which police or prosecutors are believed to have exercised their power 
improperly and in a persecuting way, and situations where the prescribed or expected 
punishments are seen to be excessive.59 
While the intersecting features of criminal law in America described above combine 
to give the jury the power to nullify, at present few governmental entities in the US 
recognize anything approaching a right, either of defendants or juries, to encourage or 
render nullification verdicts.  In both Indiana and Maryland, by state constitutional 
provision, judges are in at least some cases required to provide instruction to jurors that they 
may decide for themselves about the validity and reach of applicable law in criminal cases, 
but in no other jurisdictions is nullification even this secure.60  “Even critics of jury 
nullification concede that criminal juries have the raw power to pardon lawbreaking because 
there is no device for reversing a jury that insists on acquitting a defendant against the law.”61  
Nonetheless, judges, at least outside Indiana and Maryland, have many tools at hand to curb 
nullification.  Judges have great latitude in most American courts to purge the jury pool of 
jurors who can be determined to have an intent to nullify.  Some even attempt to eliminate 
jurors made aware of the power to nullify, though thus far this has not been held permissible 
as a matter of law.62   
                                                
59 Ibid. 153. 
60 Abramson, We, the Jury, 62. 
61 Ibid. 64 (emphasis added). 
62 Ibid. xx-xxi.  In a similar fashion, judges are permitted to “death qualify” jurors in death penalty cases by 
removing those who express under preimpanelment questioning (known to lawyers as voir dire) absolute 
opposition to imposing the penalty.  Yet if this and other even more arcane methods are necessary to ensure 
the imposition of the death penalty, perhaps this should tell us that public support for it, at least in actual cases 
rather than in the abstract, is not so strong as polling data tell us. Conrad, Jury Nullification, 237.  Likewise, if 
removal of would-be nullifying jurors is necessary to ensure convictions of particular crimes, perhaps this 
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Nonetheless, a juror’s or jury’s inclination to nullify can in many instances escape 
judicial scrutiny, even when judges seek to push the limits of jury deliberation secrecy.  
Juries, like any other group of humans, make decisions based on a number of factors, 
including deal-making and personal sentiment.63  Whether or not instructed that they may do 
so, jurors will in some cases inevitably nullify, reconciling law and conscience; “[t]his 
reconciliation is what the jury system is about, for better or worse.”64  Moreover, if jurors are 
aware of their power to nullify and willing artfully to conceal their intent to do so, there are 
almost no techniques judges can employ to prevent them from doing so.65  For instance, 
jurors seeking to nullify might fixate on evidence that on the surface appears to argue 
beyond a reasonable doubt for conviction but can be picked at to reveal trivial discrepancies 
in order to create enough “reasonable” doubt to acquit.66 
Yet the American public is by and large unaware of juries’ nullification powers.67  As 
a result, most courtroom disputes regarding nullification revolve around whether a judge will 
permit defense counsel to advertise to the jury its power to nullify.  In contemporary 
practice, the answer is generally no.  It is inconsistent to hold that defendants whose guilt is 
absolutely clear nonetheless have a right to a jury trial that can result in an unchallengeable 
acquittal, and simultaneously that jurors may not be informed of the possibility of acquitting 
                                                                                                                                            
undermines the assumption that the public supports the laws its representatives have enacted that criminalize 
the activities in question. 
63 Friedman, Crime and Punishment, 247-48. 
64 Abramson, We, the Jury, 95. 
65 Conrad, Jury Nullification, 164.  As I will explain in greater detail below, however, this difficulty has not 
prevented judges and prosecutors from attempting to wield their power to squelch nullification verdicts.  See 
text accompanying notes 193 to 201. 
66 James P. Levine, “The Legislative Role of Juries.”  American Bar Foundation Research Journal 9, no. 3 (Summer 
1984):  607. 
67 Conrad, Jury Nullification, 126. 
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such defendants.68  In practice, however, judges not only refuse to inform jurors, or allow 
them to be informed, of their ability to ignore the law in order to acquit, but indeed employ 
any number of techniques designed to imply to jurors that they do not have any nullification 
power, and that if they attempt to nullify, they may be punished. 
Judges routinely seek in voir dire to convince jurors that they are required to follow 
bench instructions on the law.69  Idaho jurors are required to sign oaths declaring that they 
will follow the law as instructed by the bench (though not that they must), and in at least one 
case that state prosecuted a juror who had both disputed the reliability of the prosecution’s 
evidence, and made reference to higher powers than the judge, for perjury for violating this 
oath.  While the charges were eventually dropped, Carol Asher, a former nun and 
schoolteacher, spent approximately sixteen thousand dollars fighting the charges, and faced 
up to fourteen years in prison had she been convicted on them.70  In a Colorado case, juror 
Laura Kriho was prosecuted for contempt for allegedly lying under oath during voir dire both 
for failing to disclose a prior but expunged drug conviction, and for allegedly failing to 
disclose that she would in deliberations resist the judge’s instructions on the law.71  She 
appealed her conviction, and the appeals court reversed in part because the judge had 
invaded the jury’s secrecy in inquiring about Kriho’s conduct during deliberations.72 
                                                
68 Scheflin, “Jury Nullification,” 219. 
69 Kriho, 996 P.2d at 162. 
70 Parmenter, “Nullifying the Jury,” 403. 
71 Kriho, 996 P.2d at 162-65. 
72 Ibid. 165. 
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Courts may remove jurors who on voir dire express willingness to ignore the law or 
follow judicial instructions.73  “It is common today for judges to excuse ‘for cause’ those 
venirepersons who reveal themselves as potential nullifiers during voir dire.”74  Moreover, 
“[r]ecent cases suggest that judges readily excuse for cause those potential jurors exposed to 
FIJA propaganda.”75  Judges sometimes even dismiss jurors mid-trial if their nullification 
proclivities become known,76 and increasingly, prosecutions are attempted against nullifying 
jurors.77  Dismissal of would-be nullifiers is almost never considered a proper basis for 
overturning a conviction.78  In federal criminal trials, judges may remove jurors at their 
discretion for “good cause,” reducing the jury to an agreed-upon number of jurors greater 
than six, or in the event of no prior agreement to eleven jurors.  Alternate jurors may also be 
seated to replace jurors who are disqualified from performing their duties.79  Were jurors’ 
understood to have an explicit right to nullify, of course, judicial interference of this kind 
would be preventable.80  Retaining jurors prone to nullification might also be considered a 
right of defendants, just as prosecutors may not dismiss jurors in death-penalty cases who 
are inclined against, but not absolutely unwilling to impose, the death penalty.81 
                                                
73 Lawrence W. Crispo, Jill M. Slansky, and Geanene M. Yriarte, “Jury Nullification:  Law versus Anarchy.”  
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Were it possible to prove that a juror outright lied in order to be impaneled despite 
having a firm intent to nullify, the Supreme Court has held that a juror who conceals or 
misstates the truth upon voir dire examination may be punished for contempt if she intended 
and acted to obstruct justice.82  Short of such fraud, however, jurors generally cannot be held 
accountable for their verdicts.83 
The situation has not always been thus, however:  once upon a time in America, jury 
nullification was not only assumed to be a right of the jury and of criminal defendants, but 
was also celebrated as a fundamental feature of American liberty and a pillar of American 
democracy.  In the next section, I will outline the history of jury nullification, beginning with 
its roots in England, and following its trajectory in America from colonial days through its 
significant role in the Founding, its decline throughout the nineteenth century, attempts to 
revive it in the late twentieth century, and up to its present-day status as ground of 
contestation between contemporary advocates for nullification and judicial and prosecutorial 
opponents. 
 
A Not-So-Brief History of Jury Nullification 
English Origins 
The jury now used in America was first invented in England after the Norman 
conquest.  Jury trials, complete with the power of the jury to decide not only the relevant 
facts, but the applicable law as well, reflect an even older Saxon tradition of community 
judgment in England incorporated by Norman rulers into their own criminal justice system.84  
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In England, nullification was often mobilized to prevent application of harsh royal penalties 
— especially death — for crimes most subjects considered petty, such as minor forms of 
theft.  Merciful nullification was, in the medieval period, inscrutable, because the mechanics 
of jury verdicts were shielded from public inquiry.85  In particular, the medieval jury was 
responsible for producing the evidence against the accused, and so could short-circuit judicial 
examination of verdicts by manipulating the evidence.86  Sometimes juries would nullify 
simply by massaging the facts to fit possible defenses to charges, such as ginning up evidence 
supporting the need for self-defense in cases of alleged murder, distorting the factual record 
in order to achieve a more merciful result.87   
The Magna Carta protected trial by jury, and under some contemporary 
interpretations was intended to guarantee that juries could decide both law and fact.88  
Nonetheless as the English jury developed in the Tudor period, its formal role began to be 
understood as purely one of fact-finding, not declaration of the true law.  But at the same 
time the imposition of greater judicial control over juries led to a backlash in which legal 
practitioners increasingly asserted once again that juries had the right to determine the law as 
well as the facts.89  Nonetheless, those jurors who appeared to be taking the law into their 
own hands were routinely menaced if not punished by agents of the crown throughout the 
Tudor and Stuart periods.90  By the end of the fifteenth century, jurors were being held 
accountable for their verdicts, upon pain of punishment, by the infamous Court of Star 
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Chamber.91  “The power of juries to correct oppressive or unjust laws was just beginning to 
be explicitly recognized by the mid-seventeenth century.”92 
Whether the jury would return a verdict clearly at odds with the evidence set forth by 
the prosecution, in the face of judicial charge and threat of punishment, was now the 
question upon which control of the [criminal] legal process depended.  The right of 
the jury to do so had now to be invented and given a place in political and 
constitutional theory.93  
 
This (re)invention of the jury’s right to decide the law began with the 1649 trial of John 
Lilburne, a Leveller leader opposed to Cromwell.  Lilburne called upon his jurors to judge 
both law and fact in his treason trial, and they acquitted him, apparently accepting his 
argument that they had precisely that right.94   
This claim to a local right to judge accused criminals according to community 
standards was perhaps the greatest political threat the Levellers posed to the Cromwell 
government.95  In particular, the Levellers argued that jurors should consider equity, reason, 
and conscience in determining whether laws should be applied to particular criminal 
defendants.96  “‘Conscience,’ of course, embodied the community’s sense of justice.”97  “For 
the radicals, the criminal law was a matrix of community mores, to be imposed communally 
— neighbors judging neighbors. . . . For them the criminal law was primarily a process of 
community self-identification and confirmation.”98 
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By 1670, the idea that juries had the right to determine the law according to 
conscience in particular criminal trials was widely disseminated, and was about to be formally 
acknowledged.99  The key turning point was the trial of prominent Quakers William Penn 
and William Mead in London for unlawful assembly and breach of the peace for preaching 
Quaker doctrine in the streets.  Their defense confessed that they had engaged in public 
preaching, but denied that to do so was a crime, and challenged the legality of the 
indictment.  The jury refused to convict, despite threats from the bench.  When the jury 
ultimately acquitted, the judge fined its members, and ultimately imprisoned juror Edward 
Bushell for refusing to pay his fine.  On a habeas corpus petition, Chief Justice Sir John 
Vaughn held that jurors could not be fined or imprisoned for their verdicts, even if 
seemingly against the law as given by the trial judge, because jurors, being ultimate 
determiners of the evidence, could have multiple unexaminable reasons for acquitting.100  
Vaughan’s opinion in Bushell’s case turned in part on the fact that if the court cannot inquire 
into the jury’s fact-finding, it “cannot detect whether the jury verdict was contrary to the 
courts’ instructions on the law.”101 
In the eighteenth century, many instances of jury nullification occurred in the 
context of perceived political prosecutions, which might involve overt political issues such as 
seditious libel, or less obvious instances of the crown prosecuting commoners for political 
reasons, e.g. for poaching on royal hunting grounds.102  Seditious libel trials were especially 
fertile ground for nullification verdicts, as juries were presented with clear evidence of the 
fact of publication, and then told that the publication constituted seditious libel as a matter 
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of law.  Acquittals in these cases offer clear examples of jurors siding with their fellow 
citizens against perceived political overreach by the crown.103  Jury nullification during this 
period in England led directly to such policy changes as the reduction in severe penalties for 
various crimes.104  In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in England, however, 
legal historians and other scholars tended to diminish the significance of the traditional jury’s 
right to determine the law.105 
 
American Colonial Practice and Nullification at the Founding 
Throughout the eighteenth century in colonial America, jurors were widely permitted 
to decide both the facts and the law.106  In colonial Massachusetts, for instance, juries 
effectively had more say in what the law was than the British Parliament, albeit only in the 
particular cases they decided.107  During this time while jury nullification was frequently a 
tool for preserving religious freedom in England, in the American colonies it was primarily 
used to resist perceived tyrannical parliamentary law.108  The most famous instance of 
nullification in the American colonial period was the 1735 cause célèbre trial of colonial New 
York printer John Peter Zenger for seditious libel.  Zenger had published articles critical of 
the colonial governor of the state, which though apparently true, were nonetheless libelous 
as a matter of law because they criticized the chief executive of the colony.  His lawyer, 
Andrew Hamilton, encouraged the jury to ignore the judge’s instructions and to acquit 
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Zenger, which it did, garnering Hamilton and Zenger hero status among colonists who 
desired independence from the tyrannical British government.109  But while the most famous, 
Zenger’s was not by any stretch the first or only case of jury nullification in colonial 
America.110  Notably, and consistent with the English experience, after the Zenger case, 
prosecutions for seditious libel declined dramatically.111  “Although the case did not have the 
force of precedent, Zenger’s trial became a paragon of American ideas regarding jury rights 
and freedom of speech, and effectively ended colonial prosecutions for seditious libel.”112  
“The Zenger trial established an early American preference for juries to possess the power, 
in criminal trials, to check governmental power by disobeying an appointed judge and 
deciding issues of law for itself.”113 
Given the case and its outcome, the Framers almost certainly thought that trial by 
jury by definition included nullification rights.114  Americans at the Founding understood the 
jury to be an important bulwark against government authority.  In colonial America, “[t]he 
jury provided the only significant means of democratic expression available to the people.”115  
“[The] vision of the jury as a rubber stamp is fundamentally at odds with the Founders’ 
conception of the jury as a protective mechanism against the dangers of unjust law.”116  
Thus, quite plausibly, the Sixth Amendment guarantee of trial by jury in criminal cases was 
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meant to enshrine the right to trial by a jury empowered to nullify the law in the direction of 
lenity toward defendants.  “The text of the Constitution does not define the scope of a 
criminal jury’s power.  There is no doubt, however, that by the time the Bill of Rights was 
drafted and ratified, the power to acquit against the evidence was well established.”117  
Specifically, “jury” as used in the Constitution probably would have been understood at the 
time of its drafting and ratification to mean a jury entitled to rule on law as well as fact, since 
that was what juries were doing before and at the time the Constitution was adopted.118   
And indeed, we have direct evidence that many of the Founders did understand 
nullification to have been part and parcel of juries’ properly exercised powers.  “During the 
early constitutional period many of the founding fathers specifically endorsed the idea of 
judicial review and linked it to the right of revolution.”119  John Adams famously wrote in his 
diary, in response to the question whether jurors must abide by a judge’s instructions on the 
law, that: 
Every Man, of any feeling or Conscience, will answer, no.  It is not only his right, but 
his Duty, in that Case to find the Verdict according to his own best Understanding, 
Judgment, and Conscience, tho in Direct opposition to the Direction of the Court.    
. . . The English Law obliges no Man . . . to pin his faith on the sleve of any mere 
Man.120 
 
In addition to Adams, Thomas Jefferson, John Jay, Benjamin Franklin and Alexander 
Hamilton all wrote in favor of the jury’s power to nullify.121  In general, the Founders 
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evinced a deep distrust of judges, preferring juries to decide law and fact in criminal cases.122  
Juries were understood by the Founders as bulwarks not just against overzealous 
prosecutors, but also against corrupt judges.123 
 
The Transitional Nineteenth Century 
“The power of the jury in criminal trials in the first decades after the constitutional 
convention appears to have been untrammeled,” and support for juries as independent 
interpreters of law peaked during the Jacksonian era.124  Nullification as a right of the jury 
survived throughout most of the United States until the 1895 Sparf and Hansen ruling by the 
Supreme Court,125 although during the nineteenth century, a line of Supreme Court cases 
gradually began to chip away at jury nullification power.126  In many cases, the right to nullify 
was even specifically enshrined in state constitutions, in language that in some instances 
remains, albeit in varying degrees of dormancy, today.127  In an 1835 case, Supreme Court 
Justice Story began the process of modifying the jury’s role from democratically sovereign 
finder of fact and law, to constrained finder of fact alone, on the basis of an emerging theory 
of the importance of equal protection of the law.128  Story, however, was actually insisting 
that the jury follow the law in a case in which he feared that it would nullify in order to 
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convict rather than acquit.129  Indeed, jury nullification began to fall out of favor in the 
nineteenth century in part because judges feared that juries could not be trusted to nullify in 
the direction of lenity without also wrongfully convicting defendants.130  Yet as I have noted, 
there are at least today multiple procedural safeguards against such an outcome.131 
“By the mid-nineteenth century the prevalence of jury instructions charging jurors 
with the responsibility for reviewing both law and fact began to give way to increasingly 
constrained instructions.”132  But this trend did not go without popular resistance.  A 
Massachusetts example is illustrative:  In 1853, Justice Curtis riding circuit in Massachusetts 
refused to allow defense counsel to argue nullification to the jury in a prosecution under the 
Fugitive Slave Act.  Curtis’s argument against nullification relied in part on a claim that it 
undermined uniform application of federal criminal law across the nation by encouraging 
inconsistent local verdicts, and that it thus ran afoul of the Supremacy Clause of Article VI 
of the Constitution, making federal law superior to conflicting state law.133  The state’s 
constitutional convention subsequently sought unsuccessfully to amend the Massachusetts 
constitution to enshrine nullification rights, in part as a reaction to Curtis’s holding (which, 
however, had relied primarily on federal, not Massachusetts law).  Two years later, the 
commonwealth passed a law to similar effect, but it was ultimately rendered inoperative in a 
dubiously grounded decision of the Supreme Judicial Court in Commonwealth v. Anthes.134 
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In the 1895 case Sparf and Hansen v. United States, the Supreme Court took an appeal 
from sailors convicted of murder in a trial in which the jury had sought to convict of the 
lesser charge of manslaughter, but was instructed by the judge that it could not do so 
because the facts did not support the lesser charge, effectively requiring the jury as a matter 
of law to either acquit or convict of the more serious murder charge, which carried the death 
penalty.135 Arguably, doing so contradicted the theory in Bushell’s case by depriving the jury 
of any role in complicatedly determining the facts in conjunction with the law.   
The Court held that while jurors indeed had the power to rule contrary to law, to do 
so was lawless, and contrary to the rule of law, and thus it was proper for the judge to 
instruct them that they should not do so.136  Only two justices dissented, relying heavily on 
an alternative reading of history from that of the majority, and arguing strenuously that 
allowing the jury to rule on the law was both proper and constitutionally protected.137  Roger 
Roots agrees with the dissent’s critique, arguing that the Sparf and Hansen plurality decision 
rests heavily on dicta and fictitious history in order to set precedent against a right in the jury 
to nullify.138  Even Gary Simson, a 1970s critic of jury nullification, has acknowledged that 
Sparf is poorly supported by history.139   
Importantly, the Sparf and Hansen decision did not prohibit judges from giving 
instructions informing jurors that they could nullify, nor prohibit nullification itself.  Indeed 
it acknowledged juries’ power to nullify.  Rather, it held that defendants did not have a right to 
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have their juries nullify.140  Specifically Sparf’s only holding with respect to nullification was 
that it was not reversible error for the court below to instruct the jury that it should follow 
the law as given by the judge.  It did not hold on the terms of the appeal before it that 
defendants had no right to a nullification instruction, although it has been subsequently 
applied as though it had.141  One could even read Sparf as standing only for the proposition 
that the jury cannot convict defendants of crimes for which they were not indicted, though 
this probably stretches the core meaning of the case a bit too far.142  Nonetheless, as a result 
of Sparf,  
[b]y the end of the [nineteenth] century, [ ] the power of the jury had been 
thoroughly decimated by a jealous judiciary eager to exert tighter controls over lay 
participants in the administration of justice. . . . Indirect emasculation of the jury’s 
right to nullify through procedural devices such as the directed verdict, special 
interrogatories, detailed jury instructions and a restricted reading of the law-fact 
dichotomy, occurred during this period thereby effectuating a redistribution of legal 
power.143 
 
Of these, the directed verdict and special interrogatories have of course since been deemed 
unconstitutional exercises of judicial power. 
Some speculate that the motivation behind the Sparf ruling was a fear that juries 
would nullify in antilabor prosecutions.144  Another reason for the attack on jury nullification 
that led to the Sparf outcome was fear on the part of lawyers for wealthy individuals and 
corporations that juries would convict corporate officers for economic malfeasance, even 
where such action was lawful, although again this fear discounts procedural safeguards 
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allowing for appeals and bench overrides of convictions not supported by evidence.145  
Jeffrey Abramson sees nullification’s decline as in part stemming from a change in the nature 
of American democracy from being controlled locally to being uniformly administered by a 
strong central government.146  “With the growth of heterogeneity, the function of the legal 
system itself changed.  From seeking to embody shared values and natural justice, law came 
to express the clash and compromises of competing interest groups.”147  That is, local 
diversity intensified, and was followed by a national response aimed at cabining this diversity 
through national, legislated, uniformity in execution of the law.  At the same time,  
[f]ederal judges worked out a political theory that severed the classical connection 
between liberty and self-government.  In this new theory, too much popular 
participation in the judiciary was a decided threat to freedom.  Liberty was a matter 
of receiving equal protection from the law, not necessarily a matter of making the 
law oneself.148 
 
Jury nullification’s wane is also attributable to increasing professionalization of the law 
through the nineteenth century, and the tendency to restrict nullification, largely pushed by 
judges, was initially, but ultimately unsuccessfully resisted by legislatures.149 
 
Nullification in Modern Times 
In the early and mid-twentieth centuries, states began eliminating nullification by 
statute, overriding their common-law practices permitting it.150  But between Sparf in 1895 
and the Vietnam War protest cases in the 1960s, federal courts did not address jury 
                                                
145 Mirkin, “Right of Revolution,” 61. 
146 Abramson, We, the Jury, 88. 
147 Ibid. 89. 
148 Ibid. 90. 
149 Horowitz and Wilging, “Changing Views,” 168. 
150 Conrad, Jury Nullification, 117. 
 
 
227 
nullification substantively.151  When they did rule on nullification in the war protest context, 
all federal appellate courts to address the issue held that neither jury nor defendant has a 
right to be instructed regarding the jury’s power to nullify by deciding law as well as fact.152  
The Vietnam War protest cases largely settled the state of the law on jury nullification.  
While all arose in the federal court system, the theories they espoused have been influential 
in state courts as well. 
The District of Columbia Circuit’s opinion in United States v. Dougherty is perhaps the 
most significant modern opinion on jury nullification, and in many ways the last word until 
the Supreme Court should elect to revisit the issue for the first time since Sparf.153  Arising 
out of the trial of several protesters against the Vietnam War who broke into and vandalized 
the Washington, DC offices of Dow Chemical, it addresses primarily whether juries must or 
can be informed of their power to nullify, which has been the most common question in 
litigated nullification cases from the 1960s on.154  In his opinion for the majority, Judge 
Leventhal both speaks highly of, and provides historical support for the use of jury 
nullification.155  Nonetheless, he makes the argument that though jury nullification can be a 
good thing, juries ought not be told of their power to employ it, because they might then 
overuse it.  Rather, he argues, it should remain in the twilight of legality, available to the jury, 
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but only on its own initiative.156  In part, this is because juries could wreak havoc through 
nullification in Leventhal’s view, by acting as minilegislatures or by paralyzing the criminal 
justice system through repeated deadlocks.  He further argues that the refusal to inform the 
jury of its nullification power serves to protect jurors by providing cover for their decisions 
in case they might not be well received by their fellow citizens.  A juror can always argue 
publicly that he was constrained by the law as given in the judge’s instructions, and thus did 
not simply exercise his own will with regard to the defendant.157   
In dissent, Judge Bazelon argues that the lack of candor involved in failing to instruct 
the jury of its nullification power is both harmful to the democratic system, and unjustifiably 
hypocritical.158  Moreover, Bazelon argues, the potential for jury nullification to lead to 
widespread anarchy is empirically unverified, and so at most a guess.159  Bazelon claims that 
nullification is not merely the happenstance result of various judicial constructions and 
constitutional provisions, but rather an intentionally democracy-preserving constitutional 
doctrine.160  Even the worst form of nullification — the failure of southern juries to convict 
white defendants of heinous crimes committed against African Americans and civil rights 
workers — proved to be valuable in Bazelon’s view, because it led to a popular democratic 
response in the form of protests, legislation, increased enforcement, etc., that helped 
overcome the corruption that led to the nullification itself.161 
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In another war protest case a few years before Dougherty, the defense argued that 
because juries have the power to nullify, they have a right to be informed of this power.162  
Despite agreeing with the defense that historically there had been a right to jury nullification, 
the Fourth Circuit held that the Sparf case had affirmatively settled the issue the other way.163  
In a similar case in the Ninth Circuit, that court likewise held that although not all 
nullification is undesirable, courts are not required to give juries instructions regarding their 
power to issue verdicts according to their conscience.164  The First Circuit, in yet another 
Vietnam War protest case involving celebrity defendant Dr. Benjamin Spock, demonstrated 
somewhat more respect for nullification, at least indirectly, by holding that propounding 
special questions to the jury (as opposed to requiring only a general verdict of guilty or not) 
constitutes judicial pressure to convict, and is contrary to the American jury tradition, as well 
as the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.165  That court in passing lauded the  
principle that the jury, as the conscience of the community, must be permitted to 
look at more than logic. . . . If it were otherwise there would be no more reason why 
a jury verdict should not be directed against a defendant in a criminal case than in a 
civil one.166 
 
Nonetheless, it did not contradict its fellow Circuit Courts’ holdings with respect to 
advertising the nullification power to the jury. 
Although the most recent attempts at systematic invocation of nullification came in 
connection with the Vietnam War and protests against it, in the early 1990s strong interest 
was revived in seeking to establish it in various states through legislative means, though all of 
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these efforts failed.167  Bills enshrining jury nullification were introduced but failed in seven 
states in 1991:  Washington, Arizona, New York, Massachusetts, Louisiana, Tennessee, and 
Texas.168 Advocates of these measures argued, among other things, that nullifying verdicts 
would provide legislators with popular feedback on criminal laws.169  California saw a bill 
introduced in 1996 allowing an instruction to juries that they could vote their consciences in 
criminal cases, but it too failed.170 
Meanwhile, in at least two states, nullification survives, protected by state 
constitutional doctrine, albeit in watered down form.  Indiana’s constitution instructs that 
criminal juries are to determine both the facts and the law in cases before them.171  The 
nullification right enshrined in Indiana’s constitution was watered down by the courts in the 
1950s, however, when they held that while the jury had the right to nullify, judges were 
permitted at their discretion to instruct them as though they did not.172  The current doctrine 
in Indiana is that jurors need not be reminded at every stage of a case that they have the 
right to nullify.  If at any point in a trial the jury has been told, even obliquely, of its right to 
decide upon the law, this suffices to prevent reversible error and thus a defendant’s appeal 
on this state constitutional ground.173   
Maryland also retains a constitutional right to nullification, which, however, it 
weakened substantially by restricting the jury’s power to judge the law to cases in which the 
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judge feels there is a sufficient basis for dispute regarding the law’s authority.  Maryland’s 
constitutional guarantee of the right of juries to nullify was also watered down in the 1970s 
and 1980s when courts there held that defendants did not have the right to have their 
attorneys argue nullification to the jury.174  Nonetheless, as recently as 1980, Maryland 
appellate courts have upheld the right of the jury to decide upon law and fact in 
combination, noting both that nullification operates only to acquit, and that it does not run 
afoul of the federal constitution.175   
While Georgia’s state constitution purports to allow nullification verdicts, that state’s 
highest court held in 1898 that despite its constitutional provisions, no jury nullification 
instruction was required.176  A FIJA reprint of a 2000 article by Tom Stahl asserts that not 
only the Indiana and Maryland, but also the Georgia and Oregon constitutions protect jury 
nullification rights.  But although he cites the provisions of each of those four, case law in 
Oregon as well as in Georgia appears to have diminished their constitutional provisions on 
nullification to the point that they are no longer practically operative.177  Kansas 
experimented with jury nullification in the early 1970s by statute, but its supreme court 
struck down the instruction informing juries of their power to nullify.178  Many other states 
have specific constitutional provisions preserving nullification rights in libel cases only.179 
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Given that, at least in a limited sense, Indiana and Maryland still allow nullification 
verdicts, how have their criminal justice systems fared?  Nullification as practiced in Indiana 
and Maryland does not appear to have caused much systemic difficulty for the states, their 
laws, or prosecutions thereunder.180  Indeed, limited Maryland-style conscience-of-the-
community jury nullification instructions appear not to change verdict outcomes much in 
simulations, while more explicit advertisement of the nullification power produced 
noticeable (though not always merciful) results.181  A 1975 survey of Maryland judges showed 
little dissatisfaction with jury nullification as implemented, albeit perhaps because it was seen 
as rarely used.182 
Soon, further evidence of the results of permitting nullification will be available.  
Starting 1 January 2013, the state of New Hampshire began implementing legislation 
requiring that courts permit defense attorneys to inform juries that they may judge law and 
facts and the interrelation of the two in particular cases, making New Hampshire’s 
nullification regime the most permissive in the US.183  Reflective of the positions taken 
regarding nullification nationwide, New Hampshire opponents of the legislation argue that 
legislators, not jurors, are properly tasked with making law, which jurors should apply 
uniformly.184  Proponents, on the other hand, argue that it is inconsistent and deceptive to 
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grant that jurors have nullification power but not to inform them of it or how it should be 
used, as well as that nullification was historically a right of the criminal jury.185 
 
Contemporary Battle Lines  
Some observers have claimed, albeit without clear evidentiary support, that jury 
nullification has been on the rise in the last several decades, and that jurors are increasingly 
taking the law into their own hands.186  By 1998, Clay Conrad observed that “[m]ore and 
more frequently, juries [were] finding that the laws they [were] asked to enforce [were] 
questionable, or even repugnant.”187  In any event, starting in the 1990s, there has been a 
resurgence in nullification as well as in judicial resistance to it.188  In particular the activity of 
FIJA stands out during this period.   
Founded in 1989, the Fully Informed Jury Association (FIJA) is a nullification 
advocacy group that seeks to educate members of the public about their powers as jurors 
through advertisements and leafleting targeting potential jurors ahead of key trials.  FIJA 
focuses especially on politically charged cases, and actively encourages would-be nullifiers to 
engage in deceptive tactics to achieve impanelment by avoiding advertising to the judge or 
counsel their willingness to ignore the law.189  FIJA’s pamphlets give prospective jurors 
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explicit advice about how to get impaneled without revealing their willingness to rule 
contrary to law.190  Specifically, FIJA advises that  
[n]othing in the U.S. Constitution or in any Supreme Court decision requires jurors 
to take an oath to follow the law as the judge explains it or, for that matter, 
authorizes the judge to “instruct” the jury at all.  Judges provide their interpretation 
of law, but you may also do your own thinking.  Keep in mind that no juror’s oath is 
enforceable, and that you may regard all “instructions” as advice.191  
 
This is mostly accurate as a statement of fact, but Supreme Court decisions such as Sparf 
certainly authorize, at least implicitly, bench commentary on the law, if not explicitly holding 
that such commentary is binding and thus worthy of the “instructions” label.  FIJA also 
provides a roadmap in one of its publications for defendants and their attorneys on how to 
attempt to trigger nullification verdicts, while at the same time warning against activity likely 
to lead to contempt charges.192 
Judges and prosecutors have fought FIJA efforts vigorously.193  Among other things, 
FIJA has been ordered, in a ruling sustained by the Ninth Circuit, not to distribute literature 
within one hundred fifty feet of San Diego County courthouses.194  FIJA has been active 
with respect to trials of Branch Davidians for murder, of alleged possessors of large amounts 
of marijuana, and of pro-life protestors accused of trespassing, among others.195  Meanwhile, 
judges have begun spending more of their time attempting to control jurors and select those 
who would reliably comply with their instructions.196  And as part of this backlash against 
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independent jurors, prosecutors have pursued criminal charges against jurors and FIJA 
leafletters among others, though in almost all cases these prosecutions resulted in dismissals 
or acquittals.197 
Some instances of this backlash appear especially egregious.  For example, eighty-
year-old retired Penn State chemistry professor Julian Heicklen was indicted for jury 
tampering for standing on the plaza outside the federal courthouse in Manhattan and 
handing out pro-nullification brochures, charges that would seem to implicate First 
Amendment free speech rights.  The case against him was ultimately dismissed on exactly 
those grounds by federal judge Kimba Wood, who found that a plain reading of the 
antitampering statute meant that Heicklen would have had to have been communicating 
with jurors specifically about issues pending before them, rather than providing general 
information, in order to have run afoul of the law.198  Heicklen had not targeted jurors, and 
argued to the court that his activity was protected by the First Amendment, which argument 
Judge Wood ultimately accepted by reading the jury tampering statute narrowly.199   
In other instances, nullification advocates are not prosecuted, but rather subjected to 
obloquy, almost always of a particular kind:  In San Diego in 1990, abortion opponents 
placed ads in a local newspaper encouraging jurors to nullify in the trial of pro-life protesters 
who trespassed on abortion clinic property in violation of law.  In resisting the impanelment 
of any jurors who knew of the ad, the deputy city attorney noted that the only cases of 
nullification of which he was aware were those in which white juries in the American south 
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failed to convict KKK members on trial for murdering blacks.200  This comparison is 
especially of interest, given that references to repugnant race-based nullification verdicts 
dominate the rhetoric of nullification opponents.201 
The upshot of these developments is that today, “[f]or the first time in almost three 
and a half centuries, the principle first announced in Bushell’s Case — that jurors cannot be 
punished for their verdict — is beginning to face attack.”202  Some federal courts now allow 
dismissal of jurors merely for correctly asserting that they functionally have the power to 
nullify, without otherwise indicating any intent to exercise that power.203  Judges also 
routinely seek to punish attorneys seeking to achieve nullification verdicts.204  Despite rulings 
that lawyers may not exercise peremptory challenges to remove jurors based on race, 
prosecutors now increasingly seek to unseat minority jurors by demonstrating that they have 
an intent to nullify.205  California briefly instituted a jury instruction that sought to inform 
jurors that they were expected to tell the court if any fellow jurors sought to nullify.206  And 
appellate courts of late have both stripped trial judges of discretion to inform jurors of their 
nullification power, and also have sought to deny them the power to admit evidence that 
might lead juries to nullify on their own.207 
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This ongoing resistance to jury nullification arguably threatens defendants’ Sixth 
Amendment rights.208  At least some of the techniques courts have used to oppose 
nullification appear to violate dicta, if not actual holdings, of Supreme Court opinions 
unrelated to nullification, but ruling more generally regarding the right to a jury in criminal 
trials.209  Tactics aimed at squelching nullification also threaten the jury’s secrecy.210  “No jury 
can be impartial when they are threatened, investigated, encouraged to ‘snitch’ on one 
another, and even prosecuted in an effort to prevent them from bringing their consciences 
to the courtroom.”211 
Developments on the federal level continue to demonstrate judicial hostility to jury 
nullification.  Since the Vietnam War cases, the Second Circuit has declared jury nullification 
to be an illegal act, though it limited courts’ ability to intrude into the secrecy of jury 
deliberations in order to ferret out nullifying jurors.212  The District of Columbia Circuit, an 
especially influential appellate court, has likewise continued to hold that jury nullification is 
not a right of defendants or juries, and that refusal to instruct thereon is proper.213   
The Second Circuit has been especially active in leading the charge against would-be 
nullifiers.  In United States v. Thomas, perhaps the most significant case regarding jury 
nullification in recent years, the Second Circuit held that insistence on casting a nullification 
vote is sufficient ground for dismissing a juror if such insistence can be detected.  But 
because of the need to safeguard jury secrecy, the record must be “clear beyond doubt” that 
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the juror is refusing to apply the law, rather than merely disagreeing about the sufficiency of 
the evidence, leaving at least some wiggle room for savvy would-be nullifiers.214  In the trial 
below, there had been testimony by several jurors that the alleged nullifier expressed 
concerns about the sufficiency of the evidence against defendants, and this sufficed to make 
dismissal of the dissenting juror improper.215  Intent to nullify for the Second Circuit 
amounts to jurors’ refusing to abide by their oaths to render a true verdict according to the 
law and evidence, and so constitutes just cause for removal under Fed Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 23(b);216 thus within strict limits, judges may, if necessary, inquire into jury 
deliberations in an attempt to determine whether a juror is intent on nullifying.217  But too 
much inquiry into jury deliberations would undermine the jury system itself, and judges can 
neither engage in excessive invasion of jury secrecy, nor dismiss jurors who make a credible 
claim to disbelieve evidence, nor dismiss jurors solely to avoid deadlock.218 
Clarifying its holding in Thomas, the Second Circuit has subsequently held that jurors 
can be dismissed for refusing to deliberate at all if reported to be doing so by fellow jurors, 
but not if they are simply not persuaded by the evidence, and refuse to vote to convict while 
still being willing to engage in deliberation.219  At the same time, the court reemphasizes the 
holding in Thomas that judges cannot go too far in inquiring of jurors regarding the nature of 
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their deliberations, without, however, providing much specific guidance as to how far is too 
far.220 
Illustrative of the Second Circuit’s clampdown on nullification verdicts is a recent 
wrenching case from New York City, United States v. Polouizzi.  An accused possessor of child 
pornography appeared to have collected images and videos out of an obsession with child 
abuse sparked by himself having abused sexually as a child in Sicily, and at least in part an 
attempt to try to identify the abusers and aid police in catching them (though he ultimately 
was too ashamed of revealing his own past to do so).  His trial judge, Jack Weinstein, sought 
to allow a retrial after conviction in which the judge himself intended to advertise the right 
to nullify to the jury.  On appeal from his grant of a retrial, without addressing the 
nullification issue at all, the Second Circuit vacated the retrial order, holding that since the 
evidence presented to the jury would be the same as in original trial, no retrial was 
justified.221   
Following the first trial, nearly all the jurors had informed judge that they believed 
the defendant needed mental health treatment, and that if they had known he would be 
mandatorily sentenced to prison, they would have voted to acquit, effectively nullifying in 
order to achieve appropriate penal results.222  The judge at that point resolved to order a 
retrial, during which he planned to inform the new jury of the mandatory sentencing in 
instructions, citing the Sixth Amendment as support for the jury’s right to know these 
facts.223  The Second Circuit had already once overturned the retrial order and remanded for 
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further consideration of sentencing on other grounds.224  The trial court on remand again 
granted a new trial, in part because of the appellate court’s ruling that defendant was 
overindicted, but in part as well because he planned yet again to inform jury of mandatory 
minimums.225  The trial judge’s view that the Sixth Amendment required notice to the jury 
regarding sentencing relied on the fact that such information was historically given to the 
jury in practice at the time of the Sixth Amendment’s adoption and was thus central to the 
original intent of guaranteeing criminal jury trial rights.226  In so holding, Judge Weinstein 
even respectfully requested the Second Circuit to reconsider whether the Thomas opinion 
might be contrary to Supreme Court precedent, which, of course, the Second Circuit 
declined without comment to do.227 
One final recent case provides an example of how jury nullification is often opposed 
by the bench in conjunction with rhetoric evincing concern over lack of bench control with 
regard to courtrooms and proceedings.228  It also helps connect nullification’s historical roots 
in America to the ways in which courts reinterpret history in order to minimize nullification’s 
significance.  In an especially full-throated opinion arguing against jury nullification, 
Massachusetts District Court Judge William Young removed a juror for refusing to apply the 
law as instructed to a case in which a defendant was being prosecuted for possession of 
cocaine with intent to distribute.  Though doing so was unusual, Judge Young was, 
according to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, entitled to remove a juror for 
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misconduct, including unwillingness to consider the evidence in light of the law.229  After 
first determining that a recalcitrant juror’s refusal to apply drug laws because he believed 
them to be unconstitutional amounted to an attempt to nullify,230 Judge Young opined that 
judges’ role in dictating the law to the jury is part of a delicate balance that ensures the 
survival of the jury as an institution, apparently not viewing the Sixth Amendment as 
sufficient to safeguard jury trials.231  While admitting that the jury’s determination of law was 
perhaps more important before the development of a professional legal class,232 Young went 
on to recite mistaken historical claims to the effect that nullification had ceased to be within 
the jury’s purview in Massachusetts by 1810.233   
The Luisi opinion continues by lauding Justice Samuel Chase’s arguments against 
nullification, omitting to mention that these very arguments led in part to his 
impeachment.234  Young then quotes from both John Marshall’s opinion in Marbury v. 
Madison and John Adams’s contribution to the Massachusetts Constitution to the effect that 
“ours is a government of laws not of men,” implying that jury nullification is inappropriate 
because it puts men in charge rather than the law itself, ignoring in the process the fact that 
both Marshall and Adams strongly supported nullification.235  While writing favorably of the 
jury’s role in democratizing the legal process,236 he argues that nullification jeopardizes not 
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only the rule of law, but democracy itself.237  Further, Young claims, any “notion that 
nullification will change the law is drivel.  Those who would characterize it as a noble form 
of civil disobedience are deeply delusional.”238  Famous cases of nullification leading to 
positive change, including the Zenger case, are, in Young’s view, outdated and 
unrepresentative, while southern civil rights cases are more truly representative of the nature 
of run-of-the-mill nullification.239 
Judge Young’s Luisi opinion is just a single example, but it demonstrates the degree 
to which judges often oppose nullification, even to the extent of distorting historical 
evidence in an attempt to demonstrate its harmfulness to the American political system.  
Such opinions turn the view of the Founders on its head:  for them, nullification was a 
means by which popular sovereignty could be expressed in the context of criminal trials, a 
context otherwise dominated by government actors, specifically prosecutors and judges.  
Moreover, the Founders, while asserting that ours is a government of laws and not of men in 
the sense that no one is above the law, not even government actors, also understood that law 
is not self-executing or self-interpreting, and believed that ordinary citizens acting as a jury 
had a critical role to play in interpreting the law in criminal trials, and in either executing it or 
not according to their consciences.240  These twin themes, the importance of exercising 
popular sovereignty over the decision whether to label someone a criminal (and thus an 
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enemy), and recognition that law is a tool operated by human deciders, rather than an 
automatic machine for generating verdicts, resonate strongly with Carl Schmitt’s theories.  I 
will examine these homologies in the following chapter.  First, however, I discuss prominent 
examples of nullification in American practice. 
 
Examples of Jury Nullification 
As a general matter, jury nullification thrives where formal law diverges from public 
opinion, whether nationally or locally.  This does not, of course, imply that where a jury 
refuses to convict despite clear evidence of lawbreaking, and because it disfavors the law as 
applied rather than favoring the defendant, it reflects a majority sentiment that the act 
committed is not properly considered a crime.  But as a general rule, it is unlikely that a jury 
would outright acquit a defendant (rather than hanging due to one or more holdout jurors) 
absent substantial agreement in the local community that the law does not reflect community 
values.  And indeed, the evidence suggests that where juries routinely nullify, they are 
expressing disfavor with government efforts to regulate behaviors deemed permissible by the 
community in question. 
In their landmark 1966 study of the American criminal jury, Kalven and Zeisel found 
that where juries demonstrated significant disagreement with trial judges polled after the fact 
as to the proper verdict, in only one third were those disagreements limited to conflicting 
evaluations of the factual evidence.  In the remaining two thirds of the cases, judge-jury 
disagreements turned on jury value judgments regarding either the defendants or the law.241  
Moreover, they found that “[i]n the world of jury behavior, fact-finding and value judgments 
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are subtly intertwined.”242  That is, although cases of disagreement could be categorized as 
primarily relating to facts or law (or the defendant himself), in most instances some interplay 
between the two was at work in guiding the jury’s decision contrary to how the judge would 
have ruled if the defendant had chosen a bench trial.  Nonetheless, in most such cases, jurors 
convinced themselves that they were ruling based on the evidence, not their personal views 
of the law.243  Kalven and Zeisel opine that this is true precisely because judges conceal from 
jurors their power to nullify, such that jurors while motivated by opinions about the law (or 
defendants) seek to couch their decisions in terms of insufficiency of the evidence.244 
Kalven and Zeisel’s study showed “no crime category in which the jury [was] totally 
at war with the law, as it probably was in the [nineteen] twenties with respect to the 
prohibition laws, and as it is said to have been in the eighteenth century with respect to 
prosecutions for seditious libel.”245  They might well have added as a situation in which 
jurors waged a kind of war against the law that in colonial America, juries nullified to prevent 
the British from convicting alleged smugglers seeking to avoid taxes, leading the British in 
turn to try smugglers in juryless maritime courts, which then led to a specific grievance in the 
Declaration of Independence.246  During Prohibition, of course, juries often failed to convict, 
and even more frequently reached compromise verdicts convicting on lesser offenses 
contrary to the facts as a way of ameliorating the much-disfavored law’s effects.247  Examples 
of routine nullification short of total war against the law include cases involving prosecutions 
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for sale of liquor to minors,248 prosecutions for homicides and assaults where a credible but 
perhaps not legally cognizable claim of self-defense was at issue,249 prosecutions for violently 
resisting arrest where the arresting officer appears to have acted out of line with jurors’ 
expectations of governmental restraint,250 prosecutions for crimes allegedly committed 
against unsympathetic victims, including those seen to have been sexually immoral according 
to juror values,251 prosecutions for offenses in general seen as not serious enough to warrant 
criminal sanction,252 prosecutions for violation of unpopular laws, especially antivice laws 
prohibiting victimless activities,253 prosecutions in which the prescribed punishment was 
deemed too severe,254 prosecutions where the facts indicated police or prosecutorial abuse or 
overreach,255 and prosecutions for crimes against members of discriminated-against 
groups.256 
Obviously some of these categories of frequent nullification are of particular 
concern:  the idea that sexually active rape victims or members of racial minorities harmed 
by white Americans might see their attackers acquitted because of prejudice is repugnant to 
norms of fairness and equality, and this presents the most significant challenge to advocates 
of nullification.  I will return to this point below, but it is clear that nullification can indeed 
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often reflect racist or other discriminatory values.257  Thus, for instance, the acquittal of Los 
Angeles police officers accused of beating Rodney King in violation of the law is seen as 
likely example of racially motivated jury nullification, given the clarity of the evidence of 
misconduct.258  Cases in the American South in which juries refused to convict white 
defendants of murder and other heinous acts against blacks and civil rights workers, 
including the infamous trial of Emmett Till’s murderers, further show the morally repugnant 
side of jury nullification.259  Nullification in those cases, however, was at least in part the 
result of a jury system in the south that absolutely excluded blacks from participation, not 
only on juries, but in the legal system in general, other than as defendants.260  Nor is there 
anything about nullification that necessarily generates undesirable outcomes such as this in 
all cases.  For instance, nineteenth century juries frequently refused to convict in cases 
brought under the Fugitive Slave Act, demonstrating the conscience of their communities 
against slavery as a form of intensified racial discrimination.261 
In many instances, nullification serves not to acquit the privileged, but to express 
leniency toward those who are underprivileged.  Nullification would sometimes be used to 
acquit women who committed infanticide when they were economically or otherwise unable 
to raise children and abortion was outlawed.262  And even when abortion was flatly illegal as 
opposed to morally contested, juries in general would often refuse to convict abortionists 
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unless their patients died.263  Many trials of anarchists, Bolshevists, and labor organizers 
under laws forbidding advocacy of criminal syndicalism ended in hung juries, a sign of 
nullification impulses on the part of one or more jurors.264   
Today, nullification is routinely deployed in cases where conviction could lead to 
significant punishment under three-strikes laws or other mandatory sentences perceived to 
be excessive, as well as in assisted suicide and drug and firearms possession cases.265  Many 
juries in Los Angeles and San Francisco in particular are believed to have deliberately 
nullified in cases implicating a three-strikes punishment.266  Similarly, juries in the eighteenth 
century often nullified simply to avoid imposition of the death penalty.267  Juries were 
notably reluctant in early nineteenth century America to convict young persons who 
committed minor offenses, as they were concerned over the effects on them of time in the 
penitentiary with other, older, more hardened offenders.268  Drug possession prosecutions 
and other perceived minor or victimless crimes are especially ripe for nullification where the 
jury is made aware — in court or through general knowledge — of the harsh penalties likely 
to be imposed upon conviction.269 
Jury nullification often expresses a clear political message.  Nullification in part led to 
the failure of the Embargo Act during Thomas Jefferson’s presidency when juries refused to 
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convict alleged violators.270  As we have seen, trials of Vietnam War draft resisters and 
protesters often triggered attempts by defense attorneys to achieve nullification verdicts.271  
In some of these instances, juries nullified even without being made directly aware of their 
power to do so.272  In cases arising from both the Korean and Vietnam Wars, empirical 
research demonstrates a significant correspondence between popular disapproval of those 
wars, and the degree to which juries were willing to acquit draft resisters during each of 
them.273 
Many controversial criminal cases in recent memory resulted in probable nullification 
verdicts.  Acquittals of Jack Kevorkian for violating Michigan law against assisted suicide, of 
Washington, DC Mayor Marion Barry for cocaine use, and of O.J. Simpson for murder of 
his ex-wife were all likely examples of jury nullification, although only in the first instance 
was the jury clearly expressing disapproval of law.274  In the O.J. Simpson case in particular, 
defense lawyer Johnnie Cochran made a clear, albeit somewhat subtle appeal to the jury to 
nullify by calling out the jury’s power to implement law according to its members’ 
consciences.275   
Other particularly infamous cases also appear to have been instances of nullification 
verdicts.  The trial of the Menendez brothers for murdering their parents, in which the 
brothers made uncorroborated claims of abuse by their parents and were acquitted, may 
have been an example of nullification, though it is hard to see how this instance does not 
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qualify as reasonable doubt among jurors as to self-defense.276  Branch Davidian defendants 
involved in the standoff with the FBI in Waco, Texas may well have been acquitted of 
murder in the deadly raid on their compound due to nullification on the basis of government 
persecution, as nullification proponents distributed fifty thousand fliers outside the 
courthouse where they were tried.277  But one must be careful:  sometimes what might 
appear on the surface to be a nullification verdict in fact turns on questions of sufficiency of 
the evidence.  The outcome of the Simpson case is arguably ambiguous on this front, for 
instance.  And in another more recent example the holdout juror in Illinois Governor Rod 
Blagojevich’s first criminal trial, which ended in a mistrial due to a hung jury, stated publicly 
that her refusal to vote to convict was entirely based on her reasonable doubts about the 
evidence, in particular prosecution witnesses’ potential incentives to testify falsely.278   
Probably the strongest arguments against nullification refer to various cases 
involving racial animus in which the jury acquits defendants who are members of groups 
with whom the jury is sympathetic even though they have clearly committed harmful 
crimes.279  Nonetheless, “[h]istorically, independent juries have more often been agents of 
change opposed to racism than the tools of racists.”280  And other factors, including refusal 
to impanel members of minority races on juries, and racism by other actors such as 
prosecutors, court officers, and even judges have contributed to race-based nullification 
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verdicts.281  Racist prosecutors can even “throw” a trial by signaling to juries that they should 
acquit.282  In short, while jury nullification can certainly be deployed to racist ends, this is not 
a particularly strong critique of nullification itself, which in point of fact is only a tool — one 
that can be used for good or ill (though recall, it can only ever be used to acquit a defendant, 
and so spare her from the heavy hand of the law).  Whether it is more dangerous than 
beneficial is an open empirical question, although the many examples given herein I believe 
demonstrate that it is not.  In any event, race-based nullification verdicts are symptoms of 
greater systemic problems, and not themselves the disease. 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have outlined the mechanics and history of jury nullification in 
American criminal cases, with emphasis on particular examples to provide context for the 
remainder of my argument.  In short, as should by now be clear, the practice of allowing 
juries to decide both the law and the facts in criminal cases has a rich historical pedigree, and 
appears to have been assumed by the Founding Fathers to have been part of the nature of 
the jury itself.  With the development of a professionalized bar, however, judges and 
prosecutors sought with increasing success to prevent juries from deciding on their own how 
and whether to apply criminal laws to defendants.  While the intersection of defendants’ 
right to a trial by jury, even where the facts are not substantially in dispute, the secrecy of 
jury deliberations, and the prohibition on double jeopardy ensure that criminal juries in the 
US retain a vestigial power to acquit in the teeth of the evidence, most judges refuse to allow 
juries to be told of this power, or to allow defense attorneys to seek nullification verdicts 
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openly.  And indeed, with the rise of FIJA and increased interest in nullification in general, 
judges and prosecutors increasingly seek to punish nullifying or would-be nullifying jurors.  
In the next chapter, I apply Carl Schmitt’s theories of sovereignty and the friend-enemy 
distinction as the central political axis to the practice of jury nullification, and argue that in 
squelching it, we have abandoned in America an important element of popular sovereignty 
in favor of “rule of law” liberalism of a kind that Schmitt would characterize as part and 
parcel of the “cloak and dagger” game of liberal politics that hides actual decisions on 
exceptional cases by government actors behind a claim that they are merely acting 
subordinate to the workings of the law itself. 
 252 
CHAPTER 8 
 
JURY NULLIFICATION AS POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY  
OVER THE FRIEND-ENEMY DISTINCTION 
 
 
Introduction 
Having in the prior chapter explained the mechanics and history of jury nullification 
in American criminal law, I now connect that practice to Carl Schmitt’s theories of 
sovereignty and the centrally political friend-enemy distinction.  I argue that the jury is the 
actor in the American criminal justice system best positioned to exercise democratic popular 
sovereignty in Schmitt’s terms, and moreover that when it is empowered to nullify, it 
engages in sovereign decision making precisely at the key political locus — the moment of 
determining who will remain a noncriminal friend, and who will become a criminal enemy.  
In this chapter, I discuss application of Schmitt’s theory of sovereignty as decisional 
authority at the micro level, show how jury nullification aligns with Schmitt’s theory of 
democratic sovereignty exercised over the political friend-enemy distinction in the criminal 
law context, point out some arguable discontinuities between Schmitt’s theory and 
nullification, and show how nullification can correct democratic deficiencies in the American 
system caused by an excessive reliance on the rule of law that covers over the actual 
operation of governmental sovereignty in the criminal context.  I conclude by showing that 
nullification plays a key role in preserving democratic sovereignty over the friend-enemy 
distinction, one that America’s Founders intended to be exercised vigorously, not because 
“the people” were to be sovereign entirely, but because they were to exercise sovereignty at 
this particularly important juncture.  I argue that this role has been diminished primarily by 
the actions of governmental actors — judges and prosecutors in connection with criminal 
trials, and legislators and law enforcers in connection with the proliferation of regulatory 
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crimes  — who have gradually accrued this power to themselves in the name of the rule of 
law in a process that has generated a multitude of criminal enemies in America, many of 
whom, if judged democratically, would not be constructed as such. 
 
Sovereignty and Microsovereignty 
The core of Schmitt’s theory of decisional sovereignty involves its exercise by a 
single leader of a state, over all exceptional or emergency events, for a substantial period of 
time.  So can one apply this theory to the decision of a criminal jury?  The jury operates 
microscopically by comparison, along two dimensions:  First it decides whether an exception 
exists and what to do about it (acquit or convict) only in a specific criminal case, typically as 
to one defendant (or in rare cases more than one, if they are tried together for the same 
acts); it thus does not exercise sovereignty over an entire state, but rather over a tiny subset 
of its citizens.  Second, the jury disbands forever after exercising its limited sovereignty; it is 
thus a temporally fleeting sovereign actor. 
Schmitt asserts that all legal orders are based on a decision which is an irreducible 
and animating political basis of such orders.  The decision is basic in the sense that it 
is not a mere judicial decision or a decision by a parliamentary majority to enact a 
statute, but is a decision constitutive of the legal order[, e.g.] of liberalism.1 
 
Jury nullification clearly does not involve a decision that is constructive in any complete 
sense of the legal order in general, but only informs it.  It is itself constructive only of an 
outcome in a particular case. 
Thus in order to consider jury nullification as a sovereign act, one must extend 
Schmitt’s core definition of the state of exception as one in which the state is either 
endangered or one that is fundamentally constructive of its legal order, and adopt a more 
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flexible understanding of exceptional circumstances giving rise to decisions that, while 
serious, do not involve the state as a whole existentially.2  Can one appropriate Schmitt’s 
grand theory for such small matters?  While not all Schmitt scholars agree, many have 
applied him in just such ways.  Discussing the decisional aspects of child custody cases, 
Michael Salter and Susan Twist argue that the concept of microsovereignty — application of 
his theory of sovereign decisionism to more mundane situations and less powerful actors 
than heads of state — is directly implied in Schmitt’s work.3  And consistent with Salter and 
Twist’s focus on legal matters, scholars applying Schmitt in microcosmic contexts have been 
especially willing to do so with respect to the law and its interpretation and implementation, 
a position that coheres well with Schmitt’s own focus on law and the necessity to decide 
about it at all levels. 
So, for instance, liberal decisionist Hermann Lübbe appropriated Schmitt’s 
decisionism within a rule-of-law framework in an attempt to reconcile sovereignty of law and 
sovereignty of human actors by arguing that “legitimacy based on legality, or commonly 
agreed procedures, has to supersede a ‘pure legitimacy’ staked upon claims to the truth . . . . 
These kinds of legitimacy, according to Lübbe, relate to each other like normal political life 
to the state of exception.”4  Thus formal legal legitimacy trumps, at least in normal situations, 
sovereign decision.  But implicit in this relation of ordinary legal procedures to normal 
political life, and pure legitimacy to the exception, is the idea that decisionism remains 
available as a second-choice means of compensating for procedural legal lacunae.  Every 
situation upon which a decision grounded in pure legitimacy becomes necessary is a small 
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state of exception, and exercising such exceptional decisionism incrementally helps stave off 
the need for real political states of exception or emergency.  In this way, decisional 
sovereignty, if exercised at a micro level, can actually serve to bolster the liberal rule-of-law 
state and forestall the need for a Leviathan-like sovereign decider.5  In a similar vein, David 
Dyzenhaus describes English legal scholar H.L.A. Hart’s “penumbra of uncertainty,” which 
refers to the necessary marginal indeterminacy accompanying any positive law, as a “kind of 
mini state of emergency for a positivist theory of law,” that requires a decision, though not 
necessarily by a state sovereign.6 
Concrete applications of the theory of decisional sovereignty to micro contexts have 
proliferated among Schmitt scholars.  Daniel Williams has described the discretionary power 
US military authorities subordinate to the President exercise over criminal enemies detained 
in Guantanamo Bay as a form of microsovereignty.7  Austin Sarat uses Schmitt’s theory of 
sovereignty to explain the political ramifications of executive clemency exercised through the 
pardon power, seeing sovereign decisions in exercises that do not amount to acts in time of 
emergency, but rather are exceptional.8  Executives exercising pardon power are, in his view, 
engaged in core sovereignty, as the right to deploy decisional power in particular over life 
and death in addition to the power to commute prison sentences.9  The parallels to jury 
nullification as a similar kind of exceptional sovereign decisionism in microcosm are fairly 
obvious.  The limited sovereignty inherent in the exercise of jury nullification power mirrors 
that of the executive pardon power in many ways, including especially in its particularity and 
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non-precedential effect.10  Finally, Leonard Feldman argues more generally that the 
emergency as described by Schmitt need not always equate to total emergency, but may be 
applied to analyze petty emergencies as well.11  Feldman’s own analysis of sovereignty is 
deployed to encompass any results of the ordinary changeability of the world that cannot be 
anticipated in advance through static legislation, and thus must be addressed through ad hoc 
human decision.12 
Even commentators not steeped in Schmittian theory unwittingly cast jury 
nullification in terms of microsovereignty.  Following Washington, DC Mayor Marion 
Barry’s trial, the judge, expressing displeasure with the acquittal apparently against clear 
evidence, argued that it was both inappropriate and anarchic for a jury to act as a 
minidemocracy or minilegislature in refusing to apply the law to the defendant’s conduct.13  
And nullification advocate Clay Conrad urges defense attorneys to deploy language designed 
to inform the jury of its microsovereign role, arguing that  
[v]enire-members should be aware that the jury is the only entity in the entire edifice 
of government with the power to convict a citizen accused of crime, and that so far as 
the defendant is concerned, they are more powerful than Congress, the Supreme Court 
and the President all put together.14   
 
He also advises defense attorneys to object to prosecutors’ attempts to characterize 
themselves as representing the people rather than the government, in order to make clear to 
                                                
10 King, “Silencing Nullification,” 460. 
11 Feldman, “Banality of Emergency,” 138. 
12 Ibid. 148. 
13 Abramson, We, the Jury, 66. 
14 Conrad, Jury Nullification, 277 (emphasis added). 
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the jury that it is the popular representative in the courtroom, empowered to resist 
prosecutorial abuse.15   
Understanding decisional sovereignty as aptly descriptive of exercises of political 
discretion at levels below that of the ruler of a state helps shed light on the role of 
prosecutors in the American criminal justice system.  In America, lead prosecutors, often 
known as district attorneys, act with a great degree of autonomy in deciding which cases to 
prosecute and which not to prosecute.16  Their decisions, not surprisingly, are often 
politically inflected, both in the ordinary sense of having political motivations and 
consequences, and in the Schmittian sense in that they involve deciding whom to ask a jury 
to declare to be a criminal enemy, and whose potential crimes to let pass.17  But as Conrad 
points out, unlike jurors, prosecutors are not directly of the people — in the federal system 
they are appointed, and while they are elected in many states, this makes them 
representatives of the people granted broad discretion over an extended time, akin to 
legislators in that sense, rather than representatives drawn at random directly from the 
community and acting only on a single case before disbanding. 
Other political theorists, although writing substantially prior to Schmitt and not 
adverting to his specific definition of sovereignty, have described juries as engaged in 
sovereign activity when convicting or acquitting in historical contexts in which nullification 
power was widely assumed, if not yet confirmed at law.  As Thomas Hobbes noted in 
Leviathan, in a claim echoed and amplified by Schmitt, “[a]ll Laws, written and unwritten, 
have need of Interpretation,” and that interpretation “dependeth on the Authority 
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Sovereign.”18  Writing some nineteen years before Bushell’s Case, Hobbes further noted that 
juries were judges “not onely of the Fact, but of the Right” meaning the rightfulness of the 
accused’s actions and of the application of criminal law to him.  He went on to note that 
juries have the functional power not to follow the judge’s instructions on the law in the 
course of determining not only the facts, but also whether the facts amount to a valid crime, 
because so long as they do not violate their consciences or become corrupted by reward, the 
judge cannot punish them for so doing.19  Besides Hobbes, Tocqueville, whom Schmitt also 
cited favorably, cast the jury as a popular sovereign actor: 
The jury is the most powerful and the most direct application of the dogma of the 
sovereignty of the people.  Because the jury is nothing but the people made judge of 
what is allowed and of what it is forbidden to do against society.  From this point of 
view the jury is an eminently republican institution (democratic or aristocratic 
depending on the class from which the jurors are chosen).  All governments which, 
in practice if not in theory, are not based on the sovereignty of the people, have been 
obliged to destroy the jury, or to modify it in such a way that it no longer represents 
public opinion.  That is, notably, what Bonaparte did.20   
 
On Tocqueville’s view, in America, the people “form the jury which punishes breaches of 
the law. . . . Therefore, in reality it is the people who rule.”21   
Like Hobbes and Tocqueville, the Founders understood the jury’s power to acquit in 
the teeth of the evidence as a fundamental element of popular sovereignty in American 
democracy.  There is strong evidence that the Founders believed that the jury’s role as 
bulwark against government’s infringement of liberty arose from its nullification powers.22   
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For the revolutionary and founding generations, the criminal jury reliably stood 
between the individual and government, protecting the accused against overzealous 
prosecutions, corrupt judges, and even tyrannical laws. . . . Jury control over the law 
no doubt decentralized justice, politicizing it to some extent . . . . But these were 
welcome features of jury trials.23 
 
Moreover,  
 
[t]he [colonial and early American] jury served freedom not only by getting the facts 
right but also by getting the people right.  Local citizens were empowered to control 
the actual administration of justice — thus, the jury was our best assurance that law 
and justice accurately reflected the morals, values, and common sense of the people 
asked to obey the law.24 
 
That is to say, the American jury at the founding was understood as an institution that quite 
deliberately assigned a sovereign role to subsets of the people in particular cases:  the role of 
bending the law to ideas of justice shared at the popular level, and incapable of being 
codified as law because of the need for such norms’ flexible application to particular cases.25  
Indeed, there is substantial evidence that the Framers saw juries as in fact precisely entitled 
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to exercise sovereignty as minilegislatures in particular cases, contrary, for instance, to the 
Barry trial judge’s characterization.26   
Though contemporary judges often oppose nullification on the grounds that it will 
lead to anarchy,27 jury nullification can at least equally well be seen as a populist counterpart 
to aristocratic judicial review, and as an alternative to revolution by virtue of preventing 
enforcement in appropriate individual cases of laws that if uniformly applied might trigger 
large-scale popular resistance.28  Juries are better equipped politically to exercise discretionary 
nonenforcement than law-practicing elites (lawyers and judges), in part because juries are not 
elected officials and are not answerable to anyone; that is, they do not have institutional 
pressures operating against them — pressures ordinarily operating only in favor of 
conviction.29  Not surprisingly, nullification seen as sovereign decisionism tends to be 
coincident with popular dissent from particular laws.30  The reason for having jury trials at all 
in criminal cases is “to subject law to a democratic interpretation, to achieve a justice that 
resonates with the values and common sense of the people in whose name the law was 
written.”31  Thus the nullifying jury not only decides in micro context about whether an 
exceptional case exists before it such that ordinary law might properly be suspended, but 
also decides whether to suspend it by acquitting, all within the context of applying popular 
community norms instead of formal law.  Thus “the jury version of democracy stands 
almost alone today in entrusting the people at large with the power of government . . . . [F]or 
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most of us the jury remains our only realistic opportunity to participate in governing 
ourselves.”32  “What jury nullification is about is particularized justice; it is about citizen 
oversight of prosecutorial discretion; and it is about limiting the power and intrusiveness of 
the legislature and of the criminal sanction.”33  Jury nullification can be seen as sovereign 
decision on exceptional cases in this context in that it can prevent misapplication of the law 
in ways not anticipated by lawmakers.34  Nullification power is also especially crucial in 
political trials because it is in these that governmental and popular sovereignty come into 
their most direct conflict.35  
The concern that nullification undermines equal protection has some bite, given that 
defendants accused of the same crime in circumstances where the evidence of guilt is equally 
clear might obtain differing verdicts depending upon the attitudes of their respective juries 
toward themselves, their prosecutors, and the crime charged.36  But at the end of the day, 
unless all instances of any given crime will be both detected and prosecuted according to the 
same terms, and tried before the same judge or jury, who will rule upon them consistently 
despite human fallibility, there is and can be no such equal protection at criminal law.  
Moreover, overemphasizing equality under the law vitiates discretionary decision-making in 
particular factual contexts, a development Schmitt derides.  “For Schmitt, the impact of ‘who 
decides’ spills remorselessly into every juristic arena.”  But for liberal legal theorists, 
discretion and personal judgment become an unwelcome intrusion of the political into the 
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legal realm.37  Such liberal legal theorists, however, overlook other sites of discretionary 
sovereignty.  Jury discretion is no worse than police or prosecutorial discretion as 
microsovereign action, and indeed is more benign because it is permitted to operate only in 
favor of members of the public rather than the government.38  Thus to the extent that rule-
of-law liberals decry the jury’s nullification power, they do not so much further equality 
under the law as favor sovereignty in governmental rather than popular hands.  In 
Schmittian analysis, decisional sovereignty is not avoidable, because law is not self-executing.  
The question instead is who decides, and whether the makers of such sovereign decisions are 
made patent, or are obscured in the cloak-and-dagger game. 
Arguably, rather than because of equal protection issues, judges resist nullification 
because it trenches on their power, accrued throughout the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries, to say what the law is.39  Were the results of this trend merely greater power for 
judges, this might be troubling, but not especially so.  But the consequences of squelching 
nullification are not just a shift in sovereignty from lay popular juries to professionalized 
bench and bar.   
[T]he transformation of jurors from deciders of both law and the facts into mere 
evaluators of facts. . . . has wrought drastic ramifications upon the development of 
law during the past century.  Indeed, it may be said that the elimination of the jury’s 
traditional lawfinding role has paved the way for a wholesale enlargement of 
government in American personal affairs.  Today’s gargantuan criminal justice 
landscape, with its hundreds of penal institutions and expansive offender registries, 
could not have been possible but for they jury’s decreased role as a check on the 
power of the state.  And because juries are no longer allowed to openly cast votes 
against bad laws, the criminal codes of every American jurisdiction have exploded in 
length, triviality, and complexity.40 
                                                
37 Salter and Twist, “Micro-Sovereignty.” 
38 Scheflin and Van Dyke, “Contours of a Controversy,” 87. 
39 Roots, “Rise and Fall,” 25-26. 
40 Ibid. 5.  See text accompanying notes 156 to 164 for a discussion of the proliferation of regulatory crimes of 
the sort to which Roots alludes here and of the role juries could potentially play in resisting that tendency. 
 
 
263 
 
Some have indeed argued that the increase in judicial expertise throughout the nineteenth 
century justifies letting judges have exclusive say on the law, and denying juries this role.41 
But this analysis fails to understand precisely what Schmitt’s theory of sovereignty makes 
clear, that expertise-driven power to decide on exceptional cases is a form of sovereign 
power, allocated by the Founders to juries rather than judges, which allocation has been 
inverted with the decline of nullification, a point actually made by the dissenters in Sparf.42 
In sum, jury nullification is sovereign action because it comprises the jury’s powers 
to decide what the law is and how to apply it in criminal cases.43  As Schmitt also argued, 
“[i]n a democracy, the people are sovereign.”  Thus “[t]he jury, as representative of the 
people, constitutes democratic self-rule.”44  “Bringing the law closer to the people may not 
make it more just in all cases, but it will make it the law of the people, which is what it 
should be in a constitutional democracy.”45   
Having argued for an understanding of jury nullification as an instance of Schmittian 
decisional sovereignty at the micro level, I next discuss the role of juries as popular delegates 
engaged in democratic popular sovereignty.  In so doing, I emphasize Schmitt’s 
understanding of properly functioning democracies as homogeneous states where the people 
fundamentally rule, whether through acclamation or through acts of tumult or at the extreme 
revolution and reconstitution. 
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Nullification, Democracy, and Tumult 
While visiting America, Alexis de Tocqueville observed an instance of what we might 
consider the worst kind of jury nullification.  In a footnote, Tocqueville vividly describes a 
jury acquitting defendants despite clear evidence that he characterizes in terms of despotism 
of the majority.  A Baltimore newspaper published editorials opposing the war of 1812, and 
a mob of citizens who viewed this position as treasonous killed one of the offending 
journalists.  All those tried for the murder were ultimately acquitted by a jury of their peers, 
despite that — or more accurately because — their roles in the killing were well known to 
the community.46  One might expect that, having observed an instance of jury nullification in 
which animus toward the victim rather than opposition to the law motivated the acquittals, 
Tocqueville might, like rule-of-law liberals today, have come to oppose the jury’s power to 
acquit contrary to clear evidence.  Instead, Tocqueville’s attitude toward the law and the 
criminal jury in the context of a democracy was more nuanced and complex. 
The American legal system, on Tocqueville’s read, was constructed largely to impede 
majority democratic rule — that is, in Schmitt’s terms, it is seemingly aligned with the liberal 
element of the US polity.47  In one sense, then, it failed in the Baltimore case, because the 
mob, presumably representative of majority sentiment, ruled in contravention of the law.  
And yet in another sense, even this sort of tumultuous overriding of established law — here 
against murder, and by extension in favor of the freedom of publishers to express unpopular 
views — was consistent both with Tocqueville’s beliefs about the importance of localized 
government and popular sovereignty, and with the idea that the law operates to resist 
majoritarian tendencies.  Tocqueville thought American democracy would best survive if it 
                                                
46 Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 294, n. 4. 
47 Kramnick, “Introduction,” xxx. 
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continued to avoid centralization of government, which in turn would foster individual 
apathy, by remaining dedicated to localism, which jury nullification — even of the sort 
Tocqueville witnessed in Baltimore -- would further by keeping verdicts in line with local 
mores.48  Nullification operates in the opposite direction of the kind of governmental 
centralization that “isolates [individuals] and then submerges them one by one into the mass 
of the community.”49   
Indeed, the tendency of nullification to promote local values over state sovereignty is 
bound up with its history:  In medieval England, juries exercised their nullification power to 
counter centralized sovereign authority with local community standards.  As the king became 
more powerful, he relied less and less on juries, and consolidated his own authority over 
criminal trials.50  There is thus a kind of zero-sum tradeoff between jury power and the 
power of the crown or other state sovereign, that plays out even today.  Ordinary Americans 
still regard juries as being reflective of local community values, and as acting on the basis of 
them, despite that rule-of-law judges and lawyers would object that this undermines 
uniformity and equality under the law.51  Local jurors are thought better able to judge cases 
arising from their communities than complete strangers because they can apply laws in 
harmony with the common sense and moral values of their localities.52  
Tocqueville recognizes that the law as a countermajoritarian bulwark is, in America, 
operated by many hands.53  Among the relevant actors in the American legal system, 
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“American aristocracy is found at the bar and on the bench.”54  Even in the early nineteenth 
century with the jury’s powers at their peak, Tocqueville could see lawyers and judges as an 
emerging professional class, exercising elite forms of power in the criminal legal context.  
The jury, however, played a complementary role, bringing the people back into the 
professionalizing legal system.  “[I]n America,” according to Tocqueville, “people obey the 
law not merely because they made it but also because they can alter it, if it ever happens to 
harm them.”55  This claim has relevance not so much to the legislative process, which in 
point of fact does not directly involve the people in altering their laws but rather requires 
that representatives sensitive to their wishes alter the law for them, but especially to the role 
of citizens on criminal juries, through which they are empowered to alter the law, though 
only in individual cases, to prevent its doing unjust harm.  Not surprisingly then, in 
discussing the tyranny of the majority that the law is in place to resist, Tocqueville compares 
a nation to a jury, and opines that refusal to obey an unjust law is not denial of the majority’s 
right to command, but rather an appeal to the sovereignty of the human race over the 
sovereignty of the people of the state — that is, jury nullification as a rejection of applicable 
law is itself countermajoritarian sovereignty in action.56  Or put differently, Tocqueville 
identifies the jury empowered to nullify with his conception of the rule of law itself.  By 
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understanding American law in this way, he actually blends in his understanding what 
Schmitt sees as the distinct and contradictory elements of rule-of-law and popular 
sovereignty, or writ large, of liberalism and democracy. 
At the same time as it operates counter to the majority will of the citizens of the 
nation or of the state, nullification is still am expression of popular sovereignty, only at 
closer proximity to smaller communities of citizens.  “[Q]uestions about the law’s justice or 
the wisdom of enforcing it against a particular defendant can and should not be avoided in 
any system designed to leave law’s final enforcement to the people.”57  But as discussed in 
Chapter 4, “the people” is an elusive and shifting concept in American democracy.  In the 
context of a jury applying the law according to its members’ consciences, “the people” 
means a small subset of the local community delegated the power to engage in critically 
evaluating the fit between law as passed by state or federal legislatures (or law as derived 
through judicial interpretation or executive practice at either level), and justice as understood 
locally. 
Put another way, juries are not the agents of the people, elected and subject to 
popular pressures (which agents may find ways to ignore, or to shape through political 
rhetoric).  Instead,  
[t]he hypothesized linkage between public opinion and jury decisions is not the result 
of public pressure keeping jurors in line, as might be the case with politicians who 
bend to popular will to protect themselves from the wrath of voters.  Jurors have no 
tangible self-interest in rendering verdicts, so they can ignore commonly held views 
with impunity.  Rather, the jury responds to public opinion because it is the public; 
its voice is everyone’s voice (despite some degree of unrepresentativeness resulting 
from jury selection procedures).  The events and ideas that shape the public’s mind 
simultaneously affect the perspectives of jurors.  The polling of jurors is in some 
measure a poll of the public.58 
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Further, as a temporary body with no political ambition, the jury is free to do what it believes 
is right.  It is thus immune from political process failures of the kind associated with 
legislating and enforcing law.59 
Jurors are, on this understanding, representatives of people affiliated locally in part 
through relatively homogeneous attitudes toward law and justice because of the close 
personal ties that local affiliations produce.  These affinities of attitude toward centrally 
political matters — as we have seen, deciding who is a criminal enemy in the sense that she 
does not share important views as to justice and obedience to law, and thus must be 
banished from political community with her neighbors, is a core political act in Schmittian 
terms — are in turn fostered and developed in the context of jury deliberations.  Because of 
these factors, Tocqueville viewed the jury as a source of instruction in civic life, and as a 
means of popular participation in the administration of justice, on a par with suffrage itself.60  
Likewise for John Calhoun, the jury was a preeminent deliberative body because of the (now 
no longer universal) requirement that it return a unanimous verdict.  In his view, the 
unanimity requirement would lead to rational debate and discussion about the most 
fundamental moral and political matters in order to apply both the law and community 
standards to the facts at hand, and to arrive at a just verdict.61   
But juries empowered to decide as to law and fact do not only serve as laboratories 
for democratic deliberation.  They also serve to allow the governed to check the sovereignty 
of those who govern.  “Adjudication by juries is a means of rendering the lawmakers, law 
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administrators, and law enforcers accountable to the larger body politic.”62  It can serve as a 
feedback mechanism, informing branches of government of public distaste for law as written 
or as applied.63  “If a law is frequently nullified, it probably is not reflective of people’s will 
and the jurors, as representatives of the people, are saying so.”64  Even an avowed 
nullification opponent such as Andrew Leipold recognizes that nullification can serve a 
valuable feedback role in encouraging repeal of harsh or outdated criminal law, or at least 
more judicious prosecutions thereunder.65 
This feedback mechanism is especially important where the public might not have 
strong reasons in the abstract to object to generally applicable laws, and especially might not 
be sufficiently concerned with them to bring pressure to bear on elected officials to end 
criminal prohibitions or enforce them loosely, but where members of the public exposed to 
these laws and their consequences in concrete circumstances find themselves opposed to 
such laws as applied, and have the opportunity as defendants to fight them by appealing to 
the jury’s conscience, and as jurors to nullify them so as to express to elected representatives 
that such laws as applied are inappropriate in light of community values.  While some argue 
that the reelection drive and popular vote together serve to constrain lawmakers,66 this 
argument ignores the fact that reaction to general laws may be quite different than reaction 
to their particular application, and moreover that the public is rarely focused on particular 
criminal enactments and particular lawmakers’ roles therein.  Indeed, to the extent that the 
costs of relocation are not prohibitive, juries’ refusal to enforce particular kinds of law in 
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local circumstances according to community norms may actually facilitate greater local 
attitudinal homogeneity.  People may consciously move into communities in which they 
understand that the prevailing values accept and tolerate acts that would otherwise be 
considered violations of law, on the theory that they will be able to engage in these acts with 
impunity, as where someone who would be helped by medical marijuana moves to a college 
town with a reputation for marijuana tolerance and failed attempts to convict ordinary users 
of possession.67 
It is in these ways that the jury in America serves as a safety valve that curbs the 
courts’ and legislatures’ power to punish “well meaning or morally blameless defendants” 
and protect the people from oppressive or tyrannical law or law enforcement, but it can only 
play this role if it is able to rule at least in part on the applicability of law.68   
[T]he jury trial often functions as . . . an opportunity for ordinary people to advance 
their political causes and [ ] jury verdicts in considerable measure reflect the balance 
of power among conflicting points of view.  The jury is thus a mechanism that 
permits the infusion of popular opinion — a unique forum for citizens to express 
their ideas about public policy and actually put them into practice.69  
 
When jurors nullify, even in the limited sense of convicting of lesser included crimes, or 
finding ways to reduce punishment of criminals where facts are not at issue, they substitute 
community values in individual cases for one-size-fits-all legislation.70  On the other hand, 
[w]hen jurors feel they have been coerced into returning an unjust conviction, or 
when they feel obliged to implore the court to be merciful because the believe the 
defendants have been treated unfairly, the jury has not been empowered to truly 
perform the function for which juries are intended:  to protect the accused against an 
oppressive act of government.71  
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This protection does not only benefit defendants, but benefits the state as a whole by 
mooring law to community ideas of justice.  “To keep the law from becoming too rigid and 
losing touch with the society it regulates, some method for achieving flexibility is 
necessary.”72  And while this need for flexibility does not by itself require empowered juries, 
“[w]e value the jury because it can introduce common sense and conscience when the law 
and governmental officials may not be in touch with those values.”73   
Nullification also serves separation of powers interests because it allows the people 
to check the judiciary directly.74  “Criticisms of the jury are radically undemocratic, striking at 
the very root of citizen autonomy and self-government:  the ability of the average citizen to 
make good, informed, rational and unprejudicial judgments.”75  Resolution of legal disputes 
necessarily involves evaluations from a moral stance of right and wrong, and there is no clear 
reason why the jury, more closely positioned as it is to the citizenry, should be excluded 
from incorporating such moral views in particular cases, especially when such moral views are 
in conflict with rulings by judicial elites.76   
With this role of the jury as representative of community values in mind, consider 
again that the jury’s power to override law can only be reliably exercised in the direction of 
lenity toward criminal defendants.  Nullification thus helps ameliorate “over-legislation, 
overuse of plea-bargaining, mass incarceration, and the growing threat of wrongful 
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conviction.”77  “Because the jury serves as the ‘conscience of the community,’ it is uniquely 
suited for patrolling the gap between law and justice to ensure that the latter is not unduly 
sacrificed for the former.”78  Given the one-way direction of the jury’s power to ignore the 
law, this clearly implies that the gap between law and justice refers to law’s tendency to lead 
to overprosecution and excessive punishment.  Nullification simply does not operate to 
support vigilantism, absent the complicity of bench and bar, in which instances there is a 
political problem at work much more extensive than the jury’s actions.   
All of this functionally combines to make nullification not only an exercise of 
microsovereignty with respect to the friend-enemy distinction, but also to make it a tool of 
resistance to the government in the mode of microrevolution.  Recall that the Framers did 
not intend the fictive “people” to be sovereign.  But nonetheless they clearly intended the 
people as represented by juries drawn temporarily from among them to engage in 
microsovereignty arrayed against government actors. 
The [Supreme Court’s] sentencing cases demonstrate that the principles underlying 
the right to a jury trial, namely prevention of despotic application of law and the 
introduction of democratic elements into the justice system, must be protected 
against encroachment.  Jury nullification is ideally suited to further these ends; 
indeed, without nullification, the jury is largely powerless against despotic law, and its 
democratic value is merely symbolic.79 
 
But the Framers did not intend the jury to act in merely symbolic ways.  It was, in their 
understanding, meant to be the means of involvement of citizens directly in their 
government at the critical moment at which government determines a citizen to be an enemy 
of the state.  The Founders saw jury nullification as a popularly based means of 
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accomplishing change to the law as an alternative to revolution.80  The Founders’ solution to 
the problem of the threat of violent revolution was “to write a constitution that elaborated a 
series of intermediate, quasi-revolutionary steps that would become operational before the 
‘right of revolution’ could be utilized,” and jury nullification constituted one of these quasi- 
or microrevolutionary steps.81  In this way, empowered juries could help maintain the fragile 
balance of sovereignty in the diffuse American system. 
One can thus characterize nullification as resistance to uniform application of law in 
terms of Machiavelli’s conception of the tumult — an occasion when the people (or some 
subset thereof) run riot, not in a way that centrally endangers the state or citizens, but in a 
way that actually strengthens the state by pointing out critical corruptions in the mechanisms of 
government and demanding their correction.  Similarly, “[j]ury nullification can have a 
stabilizing effect on government by preventing the application of unjust laws that might 
otherwise give rise to revolt.”82  In Machiavelli’s view, when custom and law become out of 
step with one another, a society is in existential danger.83  One way to remedy this disconnect 
is to provide limited mechanisms for popular resistance to the law, in favor of upholding 
custom.  As Machiavelli sees it, it is better to give the people legally sanctioned means of 
challenging violations of their liberty by fellow citizens or rulers so as to avoid the kind of 
destructive violence that causes the whole republic to fall.84   
Critics of jury nullification, as we have seen, routinely argue that it is tantamount to 
anarchy.  But “[a]dvocates of the ‘anti-anarchy’ position over-dramatize what jury 
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nullification means.”85  And Machiavelli would agree.  In his view, republics are not 
unregulated where we can observe instances of good conduct, good education, and good 
laws, even if there is dissent or tumult.  Dissension in such republics is conducive to public 
liberty rather than productive of violence.  Disorderly tumults that scare people who read of 
them are not in fact destructive, but rather constructive of better laws.86  Popular 
disturbances can lead to positive change.87  “[W]here the matter is not corrupt, uprisings and 
other disturbances do no harm.  Where it is corrupt, well-planned laws are of no use, unless 
indeed they are prepared by one who with the utmost power can enforce their 
observation.”88   
Here Machiavelli’s thought approaches Schmitt’s:  if a single ruler is sovereign, the 
character of the citizens matters little, but where the citizens rule, it is of vital importance 
that they share a commitment to core values constructive of homogeneity.  When the 
mechanisms of the state lose touch with those values to an extent that the rift cannot be 
repaired through tumult, popular sovereignty may need to burst through the procedural 
barriers of normal times and enact full-fledged revolt.  In Schmitt’s theory, street 
demonstrations — i.e. tumults — can serve as a form of popular acclamation (which can 
express a yes or a no to government acts, and to the extent followed by the government 
obviate revolution).89  
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According to Giorgio Agamben, Machiavelli’s tumult refers to disturbances in 
ancient Rome caused either by external war or by internal insurrection or civil war, and is 
properly defined as “the caesura by means of which, from the point of view of public law, 
exceptional measures must be taken.”90  From this point of view it is possible to see jury 
nullification not only as itself a form of constrained or channeled tumult in terms of popular 
reaction to law out of joint with the will of the demos, but also as an exceptional measure in 
reaction to the tumult that such law out of joint produces.  The latter pattern applies when 
juries react to prosecutions of protesters or other tumultuous political actors by acquitting 
them, despite that they have broken the law. 
Tumult of the overt kind seems to be a particularly important feature of American 
democracy.  Tocqueville saw American politics as tumultuous by nature,91 adding that “[a] 
nation whose only requirement of its government is the preservation of good order is already 
enslaved at heart.”92  Some states even incorporate amorphous rights to rebel against the 
government in their charters.  For instance, New Hampshire’s state constitution guarantees 
the right to revolution, as follows:   
Government being instituted for the common benefit, protection, and security, of 
the whole community, and not for the private interest or emolument of any one 
man, family, or class of men; therefore, whenever the ends of government are 
perverted, and public liberty manifestly endangered, and all other means of redress 
are ineffectual, the people may, and of right ought to reform the old, or establish a 
new government. The doctrine of nonresistance against arbitrary power, and 
oppression, is absurd, slavish, and destructive of the good and happiness of 
mankind.93  
 
                                                
90 Agamben, State of Exception, 42, translating and quoting Adolph Nissen, Das Iustitium:  Eine Studie aus der 
römischen Rechtsgeschichte.  (Leipzig:  Gebhardt, 1877), 76. 
91 Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 283. 
92 Ibid. 628. 
93 N.H. Const. Art. 10. 
 
 
276 
Tumult can lead to real political change, as when civil disobedience and other forms of 
protest in the American south led to the Civil Rights Act.94   
Whether formally recognized or not, tumult and revolution are fundamental aspects 
of political life.  “The instituted society is always subject to the subterranean pressure of the 
democratic, instituting society.  Such a pressure posits limits to the tendency toward the 
political dispossession of the people from its political powers.”95  Jury nullification fits this 
pattern.  “Although liberal constitutionalism struggles to subdue extraordinary acts within a 
closed and self-referential system of abstract legal norms in order to stifle the originating 
power of the people and to tame democracy, it cannot entirely evade the underground 
presence of popular sovereignty.”96  “Jury independence is a sunspot in the law, 
appropriately flaring up when the criminal law exceeds the limits of social consensus, dying 
away when the law has been reformed, only to flare up anew when legislative ambition 
overtakes its legitimate bounds.”97  In this sense, nullification is tumult.  It does not destroy 
and rebuild the government, it simply protests a perceived disconnect between the people 
and the government — between popular justice and governmental law — in individual cases.  
Moreover, jury nullification is a localized form of tumult that supports a kind of federalism, 
empowering jurors as representatives of local communities against overweening federal (or 
state) intervention contrary to local community standards.98  It thus can be used to give local 
communities the power to resist law short of outright rebellion, without disturbing state or 
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national law.99  In short, it can provide incentives to state or federal governments to repair 
rifts between the will of the people and formal law, but without requiring full-scale 
destruction and rebuilding of the polity, and always in a context of setting defendants free. 
Having detailed the microsovereign, directly representative, and tumultuous nature 
of jury nullification, in following section I will apply Carl Schmitt’s theories of sovereignty 
and the political to nullification, noting important discontinuities as well as significant 
homologies between them. 
 
Nullification in Schmittian Analysis 
There is no evidence that Schmitt was aware of jury nullification, much less that he 
analyzed it according to his theories of sovereignty or of the political.  As already noted, he 
envisioned sovereignty as almost exclusively a power vested in a single leader of a state, or, 
alternatively albeit complexly, in the “people” however defined of a democratic state.  And 
as also noted, he sought to distinguish between the ordinary criminal and the enemy in terms 
of his definition of the political, though this distinction may not apply as well to the 
American criminal context as to continental European practice.  This dissertation thus 
applies Schmitt’s general theories outside his intended context, and produces certain 
discontinuities with respect to orthodox Schmittian analysis.  In this section I will tease out 
ways in which jury nullification as an exercise of sovereignty over the generation of criminal 
enemies maps onto Schmitt’s thought, as well as ways in which it does not.  This in turn will 
help illuminate how nullification as a component of popular sovereignty once played an 
intended role in the American political structure that it now no longer fully performs, and 
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how the loss of a robustly politically sovereign jury has implications for the balance in the 
American polity between democracy as popular sovereignty and liberalism as the rule of law. 
Recall that “[o]n Schmitt’s account, politics is before the law.”100  This is another way of 
saying that sovereign decisions precede and underlie any formal law, and that the law itself 
cannot decide in all cases, but must sometimes recede in favor of sovereignty exercised by 
human actors.  In this light, and despite that jury nullification is limited in scope and in time, 
it arguably constitutes a “pure act of sovereignty” in Schmitt’s terms.101  In part, this is 
because Schmitt saw criminal matters as especially important sites of sovereign political 
decision making.  In the classic bourgeois Rechtsstaat, of which America is an example, “there 
must be a procedure for every type of disagreement and dispute.”102  That is, in most cases, 
the rule of law suffices in the liberal polity to resolve conflict.  Yet Schmitt identifies in the 
context of truly political disputes — that is those that are disputes regarding who the state’s 
friends and enemies are, including in American practice explicitly criminal matters — a need 
even in the bourgeois Rechtsstaat for special consideration of the political nature of such 
disputes (a need that goes unmet when government actors deny the decisionist aspects of 
dispute resolution, claiming instead that the law can handle them by itself without the need 
for exercise of sovereign power).  And the American jury’s role in ruling on such disputes in 
a way that mixes decisions on facts and law comports with what happens when the sovereign 
decides what to do in a state of exception, at least as Schmitt’s interpreters have understood 
that process.  In the state of exception, fact and law blur in an undecidable threshold.103  In 
jury nullification, where the jury issues a verdict contrary to fact and law, but without stating 
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in its verdict whether it refuses to believe the facts or refuses to apply the law, it too blurs 
fact and law in issuing a decision. 
For Schmitt, this is “the actual problem of political justice.”104  He notes that while 
this problem emerges rarely in private disputes, it is certainly a regular feature of criminal 
law.  “The issue, in other words, is the consideration of the political character of legal 
disputes in reference to organizational or other peculiarities, through which the Rechtsstaat 
principle of conformity to general judicial formality is weakened.”105  In this connection he 
identifies examples including political crimes such as high treason.106  Nullification, at least 
with respect to centrally political crimes, is thus fairly considered a sovereign political act 
according to Schmitt’s theory even in a polity chiefly characterized by adherence to the rule 
of law. 
In contrast to the operation of criminal law in the Rechtsstaat, a democratic concept 
of law is self-consciously political.  It “means that law is everything that the people intend,” 
without limitation.  Thus “[i]njustices and even inequalities are possible. . . . For in the 
absolute democracy the will of the people is sovereign and . . . highest law.”107  This insight 
notably mirrors the claims of nullification opponents that allowing juries to decide to ignore 
the law in exceptional cases leads to nonuniform verdicts.  Indeed, Schmitt seems to be 
saying, the trade-off for popular sovereignty is a certain level of inequality, reflecting the 
actual decisions of the people, in whatever form they may be rendered.  Schmitt certainly 
understood that juries — which were relatively rare in Germany when he wrote — could be 
means of bringing the people in a democracy into the political process.  For Schmitt, the 
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participation of laypersons as jurors is one way of signifying a participation of the people in 
adjudication, where “the people” here are not those who govern, e.g. professional civil 
servants, elected officials, etc., but rather the locus of ultimate sovereignty.108  And though 
Schmitt does not appear to be referring directly to any specific understanding of the jury’s 
potential role in exercising sovereignty in the criminal law context, he does note that “[o]ne 
can control adjudication by way of the political concept of law,” and that “[o]ne can further 
demand that justice should be ‘in accord with the people.’”109 
Schmitt specifically connects this demand for people’s justice in a democratic state to 
effectuation of the popular will in criminal trials, which could in theory be done through lay 
juror delegates.110  Speaking directly to the role of the people in a state constituted according 
to popular sovereignty, Schmitt argues that 
If a democratic state requires that justice be “people’s justice,” the will of the people is 
made the defining perspective for settling litigation.  That is a simple matter when 
the will of the people is only expressed in the general norms of the Rechtsstaat 
statutes.  In a democracy, however, the people are sovereign.  They can violate the 
entire system of constitutional norms and settle litigation like the prince in an 
absolute monarchy . . . .  The people are the highest judge, just as they are the highest 
legislature.111 
 
Omitted from this picture, which at least superficially appears to accord with jury 
nullification in the American criminal context, is any detailed discussion of the specific 
mechanisms through which the people might settle litigation like princes, although action 
through participation in lay juries seems a reasonable route, provided such juries consist of 
delegates rather than representatives. 
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Schmitt does, however, put more meat on the bones of “people’s justice,” illustrating 
it thus: 
[T]aken most generally, people’s justice can signify a popular justice in the sense of 
an agreement of court judgments with the legal sensibility of the people.  So long as 
judges are dependent on statutory law, it is first of all a matter for the legislature to 
make popular laws, and, in this way, to create the foundation for a popular justice.  
During the interpretation of statutes, in particular the application of indeterminate 
statutory concepts, the judge should conform to the fundamental legal views of his 
time and his people.  In normal times and with a people that is homogeneous 
culturally, socially, and in terms of religious doctrine, that is not a difficult task.  If 
this homogeneity diminishes, then reliance on fundamental legal views of the people 
is not a solution to the difficulty.112 
 
There is a good deal to unpack here.  First, note that Schmitt emphasizes in this passage the 
primacy of formal law as enacted by the legislature, even in a democratic polity characterized 
by popular sovereignty.  He further places interpretation of the law in the hands of judges.  
But then he clarifies this scheme by reference to “normal times.”  In a properly constituted 
democracy, popular sovereignty’s primacy comes at the founding moment, and then (mostly) 
is quiescent, with the people’s role reduced to one of approving (or disapproving) of 
government action through acclamation.113  But we have also seen that Schmitt envisions a 
role for the people in determining the propriety of particular applications of law through 
participation in juries.  Setting aside the complications that arise from translating Schmitt’s 
views from Weimar Germany to the American criminal law context, I believe the best way to 
make sense of Schmitt’s seemingly contradictory arguments here is to read them in light of 
the aforementioned Machiavellian tumult. 
To see how this argument works, consider first that for Schmitt in the passage 
above, homogeneity is a prerequisite for judges to properly interpret the law passed by the 
people’s representatives, and that where homogeneity is lacking, there are no relevant 
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fundamental legal views of the people for the judge to apply in his interpretation.  This itself 
is a hint that while Schmitt is focused on homogeneity in racial, linguistic, ethnic or religious 
terms, the importance of homogeneity turns as well on normative views regarding law and 
justice.  Thus, though Schmitt himself might not agree, a democratic polity can apparently be 
grounded upon shared legal and normative values.  Assuming homogeneity among the 
people, however, a judge should be able to interpret the laws in accordance with the 
homogenous political views thereof.  But arguably in the American context judges do not do 
so, and, to the extent appointed for life, and socialized into a professional law-interpreting 
elite, have little incentive to do so.114  Nonetheless, assuming sufficient homogeneity among 
the people for popular sovereignty to be operative, if dormant, “normal” operations of the 
criminal law do not require popular intervention.  The opposite of normal being the 
exceptional, however, in exceptional circumstances, it seems reasonable to conclude 
according to Schmitt’s theory, a jury might have to take the reins with respect to deciding 
whether a defendant will be made a criminal enemy. 
Again, this comports with the Machiavellian idea of the tumult.  Where the law and 
popular ideas of justice are sundered, the time has come for the quiescent people to exercise 
their dormant sovereignty.  Reading Schmitt through Agamben, and applying his ideas to the 
American criminal law context, nullifying juries exercise auctoritas (as distinct from potestas) 
when they nullify, that is, in Agamben’s terms “a power that suspends or reactivates law, but 
is not formally in force as law.”115  Just as acts committed during the iustitium — the state of 
                                                
114 One might expect that elected judges would be more in tune with popular views of justice, but by and large 
their campaigns do not turn on how they would interpret or apply various laws, but rather how tough they 
would be in sentencing convicted criminals.  That is, judicial elections in the US, where held, typically are won 
or lost — if at all on democratic terms rather than based on fundraising success — on the terrain of how 
harshly a candidate will treat criminal enemies, not on whether he will properly apply the law in exceptional 
cases so as to avoid creating criminal enemies in contravention of community mores. 
115 Agamben, State of Exception, 79. 
 
 
283 
exception in reaction to tumults — occur in a juridical void, and are legally unexaminable, 
similarly jury nullification in America is legally unexaminable as a result of criminal 
procedural rules.116  Thus instances of nullification can be seen as what Schmitt calls 
“apocryphal acts of sovereignty,” which “take[ ] place at the margins of normal 
constitutional life.”117 
Let us return for a moment to Tocqueville’s description of the American jury, which, 
written as it was during nullification’s heyday, is instructive as to the political position of the 
jury in that context.  Tocqueville saw juries as having a political function beyond just being a 
judicial instrument.118  For him, the jury system gives control of the society to the ruled.  
“Thus the man who judges in a criminal trial is the real master of society,” and the jury plays 
this role in the American system.119  “[T]he jury is above all a political institution; it must be 
considered as one form of the sovereignty of the people.”120  Cognizant that Tocqueville and 
Schmitt are using “sovereign” and “political” in somewhat different ways, the parallel 
between Tocqueville’s explanation of the American jury’s role and Schmitt’s focus on the 
exercise of sovereign political power is nonetheless striking.  In particular, note the emphasis 
in Tocqueville on the unity of rule and the ruled.  This especially coheres with Schmitt’s 
theory of democracy, which in his view is substantially fulfilled in the identity between rulers 
and ruled.121  The jury in this sense appears to be the most ready site, short of the moment of 
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revolution, of democracy as popular sovereignty in action, and, as discussed in Chapter 6, 
popular sovereignty enacted at a centrally political moment. 
All these parallels notwithstanding, there are some ways in which jury nullification 
seems not to fit so well with Schmitt’s theories.  Perhaps the most obvious point in this 
regard is that sovereignty, for Schmitt, is not something ordinarily exercised at the local level 
in competition with the laws of the state and directives of its sovereign (be that a single 
leader or the homogeneous people).  Indeed, the idea that people on juries representing 
differing values across localities within a state could impose those values in cases tried by the 
state would appear itself to contradict the homogeneity requirement, especially if, as I have 
here, one understands homogeneity in terms of a shared adherence to a body of law.  In the 
context of a state led by a single sovereign, Schmitt might not have favored jury nullification 
because it would interfere with political determinations by a powerful president, but in a 
homogeneous democratic state, he would presumably have no problem with its corrective 
effect on liberal elements, if any, in such a state.122   
To the extent that juries enforcing local norms are seen as aligned against the norms 
of the majority of a state, however, nullification might undermine democratic homogeneity.  
Or, given Schmitt’s willingness to accept federalism provided it subsists within a 
homogeneous democracy, nullification might again be a symptom rather than the disease:  
where a jury must acquit to express community dissatisfaction with the law of the state as a 
whole, it is demonstrating that the state is no longer homogeneous, at least with respect to 
the law in question.  To the extent that juries nullify to check government out of touch with 
the popular will, they are engaged in a form of popular sovereignty, but to the extent that 
they do so to check the state itself, they act in conflict with Schmitt’s view that the minority 
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is bound by the majority’s vote.  As much as anything, this discontinuity between Schmitt’s 
theory and the practice of nullification by American juries is reflective of America’s 
federalism and fractured, diffuse sovereignty, and thus can be attributed to the elements of 
the American state that do not cohere well with Schmitt’s ideal democratic practice. 
There are other, more peripheral senses in which Schmitt might find application of 
his theories of sovereignty and the political to jury nullification to be inapt.  First, his central 
interests tend to lie well outside details of how ordinary criminal procedure works.  
“[E]mphasis on mere functioning and mere procedures could not have been more alien to 
Schmitt.”123  But that does not necessarily mean that he would not have recognized the 
decisionist and friend-enemy constructive aspects of criminal juries, but rather that these 
aspects would have interested him much more than the constitutional factors that make it 
possible for jurors to exercise these powers.   
Schmitt’s disapproval of parliamentary discussion might lead one to believe that jury 
nullification too, because based on deliberation and attempts by jurors to convince one 
another regarding evidence and outcomes, is flawed in similar ways.  Jurors, however, do not 
represent party interests, and are not repeat players in negotiations such that they can engage 
in tradeoffs or “business calculations and negotiations” of the kind into which parliamentary 
discussion deteriorates in Schmitt’s view.124   
Schmitt also opined that “[f]or the distinctly political questions directed to the people 
as a whole, especially in regard to the existential distinction of friend and enemy, technical, 
specialized information and details of technical expertise must be settled by the competent 
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and responsible technical experts.”125  This would seem to parallel in some ways the technical 
legal instructions given to juries, which they must ignore in order to nullify, and which judges 
and lawyers seek to keep within their professional provinces.  And yet Schmitt does not go 
so far in this context as to assert that these technical questions, once settled for 
communication to the people, are decisive of the political questions the people must decide.  
For if the technical resolves the political, then the political (and the sovereign people) loses 
primacy.  Such a conclusion would fly in the face of Schmitt’s theory writ large.   
Finally, Schmitt claims that it “would be senseless to wage war for . . . purely juristic  
. . . motives,” which might be understood to imply yet again that the mere criminal should 
not be confused with the political enemy.126  However the American attempt to fight crime 
seems to rise above “purely juristic” motives, as witness, at least in the US context, such 
language as the “war on drugs” or “war on terror.”  Schmitt, taking note of such rhetoric, 
might well conclude that contemporary America has improperly conflated the criminal and 
the enemy.  Such a belief does nothing to vitiate the fact of American practice.  If America 
indeed treats the criminal as enemy or absolute enemy, this might or might not be a mistake 
according to Schmitt, but if that is the reality of the matter, then the jury that renders 
sovereign decisions decides who is friend and who is enemy within that system, however 
potentially mistaken it is as a matter of Schmitt’s theoretical distinctions. 
 
Consequences of Nullification as Sovereignty over the Friend-Enemy Distinction 
Thus far I have addressed primarily the relationship of Schmitt’s theory of 
sovereignty to the jury’s act of acquitting defendants who appear clearly to be factually guilty 
                                                
125 Ibid. 304. 
126 Ibid. 36. 
 
 
287 
in order to express the view that the defendants, the circumstances, or the law in general or 
as applied warrant exceptional treatment.  In this section I focus on the effects of juries’ 
sovereign decisions on the fundamentally political friend-enemy distinction. 
Recall that jury nullification operates to overturn statutes in the legal sense, but only 
as applied to particular criminal cases.  Like other friend-enemy decisions, such as the 
decision to go to war against another state, jury nullification “does not refer to any 
normative benchmarks beyond the concrete situation in which the decision about the enemy 
is taken.”127  Jury nullification works in the opposite direction of purely normative law in the 
abstract, by deciding on concrete cases after the fact rather than categorizing them in general 
and in advance.  It can, however, also serve as an arbitrary declaration of particular friends 
and enemies when applied in an unprincipled manner — that is, it can be motivated by and 
express not a legal determination, such as disavowal of a given law or its purposes and 
refusal therefor to deploy it to generate enemies, but also a more nakedly political 
determination that a particular defendant is not to be considered an enemy based solely on 
who she is, or on her conduct’s political (in Schmittian terms) expressiveness.   
The intent of the jury, which is of course unknowable with certainty, but can in many 
cases be correctly guessed at based on context, can be understood in Schmittian terms as 
either an intent to refuse to declare a criminal enemy — where the jury rejects the law or its 
application — or an intent to protect a defendant by characterizing him as a noncriminal 
friend through acquittal — as where the jury bases its verdict on an affinity, race-based or 
otherwise, for the person being tried, or a lack of affinity for the defendant’s victims.  
Considered in this light, one could conceive of jury nullification as a means by which popular 
sovereignty as enacted by the jury could work to police democratic homogeneity in Schmitt’s 
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terms, by insisting that “friends” (conceived of in identity group form) and only friends will 
escape punishment even for heinous crimes.  In these instances homogeneity seems to have 
a primarily racial dimension, though other possibilities are conceivable.   
On the other hand if we take seriously the Schmittian argument that the friend-
enemy distinction is never one properly made by identifiable groups within society, but 
instead belongs to the sovereign people in a democracy, then such verdicts are not truly 
political exercises because they seek to retain as “friends” those who have pursued private 
group enmity through violations of criminal law.  Again, the clearest way out of this dilemma 
in a plural society such as America is to remind ourselves that we are not a homogeneous 
democracy in the sense of the classic Schmitt categories of race, ethnicity, language or 
religion.  Rather, in an extension of Schmitt, we are, if homogeneous at all, homogeneous in 
terms of respect for the laws of the land, in the context of a broader concept of justice.  It is 
this homogeneity that jury nullification as rejection of inappropriate or inappropriately 
applied law polices.  Schmitt might, then, laud jury nullification as refusal to apply the law to 
declare an enemy, but decry it when it amounts to declaration of a friend based on affinity 
with the defendant himself. 
Interestingly, this sheds further light on a primary argument of nullification 
opponents, who tend to focus on situations in which juries acquit out of bias, though this is 
only one of many categories of nullification possible.128  When juries nullify out of racial or 
other bias in a community context that is already heavily racialized or otherwise divided, 
these verdicts occur in a situation in which the rule of law already has failed.  They are not 
                                                
128 Darryl K. Brown, “Jury Nullification within the Rule of Law,” Minnesota Law Review 81, no. 5 (May 1997):  
1171. 
 
 
289 
themselves the cause of the problem, but rather a symptom.129  “Closely examined, [ ] those 
instances are likely to involve circumstances in which the rule of law would fail regardless of 
juries’ involvement.  It fails not for lack of authority by legally trained jurists, but for lack of 
a supportive, sustaining political and moral culture.”130  In other words, it fails because the 
democracy is insufficiently homogeneous in terms of commitment to legal values.  And 
while often nullification critics focus on instances in which defendants who are members of 
privileged classes and commit crimes against members of underprivileged classes are 
acquitted by juries expressing class affinity with the defendants, race- or other class-based 
nullification can work in the other direction.  According to Paul Butler, many urban 
prosecutors believe that they routinely lose criminal trials they should win given the evidence 
because of race-based jury nullification operating to acquit black defendants.131  Butler argues 
that black jurors’ acquittal of black defendants is an appropriate response to a criminal 
justice system that is inherently biased against black citizens, as evidenced by, among other 
things, incarceration rates both by race and for nonviolent crimes, especially drug-related 
crimes.132 
Regardless, however, whether nullification serves to acquit members of dominant or 
subaltern groups, if it is deployed in this way, it undermines democratic homogeneity in 
terms of adherence to law, and to a particular political system as a way of life, in favor of 
privileging homogeneity based on race or other group affiliation.  So in Schmittian terms, 
one might identify race-based and other group-based forms of friend-identifying nullification 
as improper, while celebrating nullification based on community views of the law as 
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fostering homogeneity.  And at the same time, applying Schmitt, nullification’s political 
benefits would seem to outweigh its potential for misuse, as again, group-based nullification 
is not the result of nullification itself, but of homogeneity failures that nullification brings to 
light for potential correction. 
We have seen that judges often oppose allowing juries to fulfill this role, arguing that 
to do so is contrary to the rule of law.  But even judges, when applying or interpreting the 
law, must decide about its meaning, thus engaging to at least that degree in rule of men not 
of law, albeit couched always in terms of ruling on the law itself rather than on the 
defendant.133  Nothing, however, about the characterization of a decision as being “on the 
law” guarantees that such a decision will not be motivated by a judge’s attitude toward the 
defendant, any more than the jury’s acknowledged role in ruling on factual evidence can be 
fully cleansed of personal or political motivations regarding the defendant, lawyers for either 
side, the judge, the police, or the law itself. 
To the extent that centrally political decisions on the friend-enemy distinction in the 
criminal context are taken out of the jury’s hands, by insisting that the jury act according to 
the law as presented by the judge rather than bringing to bear its own views as to the 
blameworthiness of the defendant’s actions, political power is placed in other hands.  
Specifically, contemporaneously with the decline of nullification since the late nineteenth 
century, prosecutorial power has expanded at the expense of such other actors in the 
criminal system as judges, defense attorneys, and juries.134  Indeed, a “prosecutor today can 
effectively eliminate a person from the community for a generation,” thus exercising her 
own sovereignty over the characterization of such a person as an enemy requiring functional 
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banishment.135  Prosecutors, who operate at a significant remove from immediate popular 
control, are thus now the predominant actors involved in determining who will be pursued 
as a criminal enemy of the state, and who will not be subjected to prosecution, and therefore 
remain a friend.  Law enforcement through criminal sanction is always selective, and thus 
discretionary.136  In terms of Schmitt’s theory, such law enforcement amounts to 
governmental rather than popular exercises of sovereignty to construct criminal enemies, 
and thus represents a failure of popular sovereignty. 
Ironically, while prosecutorial discretion is largely tolerated, and amounts to 
discretion to seek to construct enemies or not, “[o]nce discretion in some government 
function is associated with leniency toward criminals and increased risks for victims, it 
becomes [characterized as] illegitimate.”137  Jury nullification only operates in the direction of 
refusing to declare an enemy (or declaring a friend).  It thus is deemed illegitimate by 
governmental actors who compete with the people for sovereignty in the American system.  
Likewise governors and presidents are often excoriated for exercising their pardon powers, 
again because these only operate in the direction of leniency.  One way to look at this irony 
is to understand that mercy — whether engaged in by juries or leaders of states — is an 
inherently risky enterprise.138  It is “beyond the complete discipline or domestication of law, 
something essentially lawless.  It is this lawlessness that law both authorizes and finds 
troubling.”139  Notably, rule-of-law liberals find both the pardon power and jury nullification 
equally troubling, though the former is rooted in executives’ explicitly granted powers, and 
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the latter emerges only in the secrecy of jury deliberations, and in most contexts is no longer 
exercisable by jurors as a matter of right. 
For Austin Sarat, exercising mercy in criminal matters contrary to complete equality 
under the law “means acknowledging the limits of law and justice, and of the ability to 
guarantee genuine moral deliberation rather than arbitrariness, fairness rather than 
discrimination.”140  Put differently, 
One person’s risk of discrimination is another’s opportunity for leniency.  One 
person’s fear of prejudice is another’s hope for subtle moral deliberation.  And 
neither law nor any set of fixed moral norms can forbid the former or ensure the 
lat[t]er.  This is the risk that embracing mercy requires we take.141 
 
Put more starkly in Schmittian terms, embracing mercy in the context of jury nullification is 
also a means of giving back to the sovereign people through those of them who serve on 
juries a role in making the centrally political decision on friend and enemy, which is 
dangerous both for the Rechtstaat, and for its commitment to rule of law.  For Schmitt, “[t]he 
loss of the political is [ ] one and the same thing as the loss of the friend/enemy 
distinction.”142  If criminal convictions can properly be seen as enemy-generating exercises, 
then the loss of jury nullification turns out to be a form of removal of political power from 
the people participating as jurors in criminal trials. 
Slavoj !i"ek has argued that “if those still excluded by the rationalist consensus of 
the liberal establishment could assert their humanity, [ ] the political itself [would] break 
through.”143  Such a political breakthrough might be something to fear, as Agamben fears the 
merger of exception and law in the person of a human sovereign as the moment at which 
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“the juridico-political system transforms itself into a killing machine.”144  But the scope and 
temporal limitations of jury nullification should help ameliorate any such fears, and 
moreover, the fact that juries can only nullify in the direction of mercy makes them a more 
cautious means of distinguishing particular friends from particular enemies according to 
norms of justice.  In a similar vein, Leo Strauss, analyzing Schmitt’s Concept of the Political, 
argues that “[t]he political is threatened insofar as man’s dangerousness is threatened.  
Therefore the affirmation of the political is the affirmation of man’s dangerousness.”145   
A perfectly effective criminal law would, in providing for perfect security, eliminate 
man’s dangerousness and thus the political, in favor of a total security state that substitutes 
government actors’ sovereignty for that of the people, thus stripping the state of its 
democratic element — possibly in ways that obscure that whatever popular sovereignty 
remained in the American system was being usurped.  Jury nullification, even if used in 
objectionable ways, preserves some of man’s dangerousness (and even approves of it in 
specific instances) and thus fends off the total state, while at the same time not elevating that 
dangerousness above the level of the tumult.  It is thus consistent with the Framers’ 
intended fragile balance of sovereignty, which was originally to include elements of popular 
sovereignty without making such sovereignty primary. 
In this way, jury nullification can serve the same functional purpose as civil 
disobedience.146  In Andreas Kalyvas’ view, including nullification or other forms of civil 
disobedience within the formal legal system would make them vulnerable to the same laws 
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both seek to challenge, neutralizing their vital force.147  In a sense, this is what happened over 
time in the American context, as the right of the jury to act outside the law, itself protected 
by the law, gradually eroded to the point of being a power the jury is not even to be 
informed it has.  In any event, Kalyvas, interpreting Schmitt, argues that “phenomena such 
as civil disobedience, irregular and informal movements, counterinstitutions, protests, 
insurgencies, street fighting, and illegal upheavals,” and, I would add, jury nullification, “are 
as (if not more) important to democracy as normal politics.”148  They “testify to the creative 
capacity of collective actors to develop spontaneous self-organized counterinstitutions.”149 
Nullification proponents tend to agree with this characterization.  Nullification is a 
process that can bring the popular will back in to a process that is dominated by prosecutors 
who have a generally unreviewable discretion with respect to whether to prosecute particular 
defendants, how to charge them, and when, if at all, to end prosecutions.150  Prosecutorial 
discretion effectively short-circuits democratic accountability.151  And while a jury is not 
rightly speaking accountable to its community, it is so intrinsically of its community that it is 
capable of exercising democratically based sovereignty over the decision to construct an 
enemy or not, in Schmitt’s terms. 
In the next section, I argue that nullification can even be seen as consistent with the 
rule of law, provided one looks beyond a strictly positivist, liberal understanding of that 
concept, and that it can do so precisely by acting as a check on a particular democratic 
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deficiency that is endemic to the representative system and to the growth of the power of 
the American state as against its people. 
 
Nullification as Rule of Law Counter to Expansion of the Regulatory State 
Though I have generally accepted for the sake of argument the idea that jury 
nullification operates as a democratically sovereign antithesis to liberal ideas of the rule of 
law, nullification need not be understood as contrary to the rule of law, as the discussion of 
Tocqueville’s thought above illustrated.152  While legal formalism, and indeed Kelsenian 
liberalism, see law’s application as a mechanical and thus nonproblematic matter, a 
conception of the rule of law borrowed from Ronald Dworkin would hold that law includes 
unwritten community values as part of its structure, and in particular with respect to the 
means by which formal law should be interpreted and applied.153  Jury nullification, as 
application of community standards in particular cases to written law, comports with this 
Dworkinian conception.154  And even the Supreme Court has, albeit in passing, “repeatedly 
described the criminal jury as an important check on biased prosecutors and judges,” and 
thus as an agent of law arrayed against governmental actors who threaten rule-of-law values 
in a paradoxical way by too closely adhering to the law detached from its social and political 
contexts.155 
The Dworkinian move with respect to redefining the rule of law brings the will of 
the people back into the process without affirming a specifically Schmittian concept of 
sovereignty, and without stressing the political significance of the friend-enemy distinction.  
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And thus while it might appeal to rule-of-law liberals willing to expand the notion of what 
law is beyond formalist boundaries, it still does not, in my view, fully address deep systemic 
problems with the American criminal justice system.  To illustrate how this is so, I now 
apply jury nullification seen through Schmittian analysis to a category of prosecutable actions 
known as regulatory or strict liability crimes. 
These are not the kinds of crimes that the public fears, and thus pushes government 
to prevent through punishment and isolation of (enmity towards) those who commit them, 
but rather are acts that are made criminal largely for the convenience of the government in 
enforcing its regulations.156  Not coincidentally, regulatory crimes began proliferating at an 
accelerated pace starting during and after the New Deal, with the dramatic expansion of 
federal governmental powers.157  They have tended both, without much public warning, to 
proscribe behavior that was entirely legal (and customarily common) prior, and to involve 
extensive and especially complicated provisions whose content is practically inaccessible, and 
certainly counterintuitive, to ordinary citizens.158   
In Schmittian analysis, regulatory crimes recall the “four-hundred-year-long process 
of mechanization” that Schmitt traces back to Hobbes, that empowers the state with tools of 
communication, information, and violence enabling a mechanistic-technical functioning that 
Schmitt sees as resonant with the Kelsenian-positivist conception of the rule of law as a 
function of the state that, cloak-and-dagger style, appears to be purely automated, but in fact 
requires often unacknowledged sovereign decisions.159  In particular, Schmitt feared that a 
legislature empowered without limit to generate laws would eventually destroy the unity of 
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the laws, such that they would lose touch with the values of the state and become 
fundamentally commands, rather than norms that ordinary people could intuit based upon 
their homogeneity along whatever front.160 
If proliferating regulatory crimes are a problem for the state in Schmitt’s view, then 
again jury nullification appears to be a solution he might embrace, with the continuing caveat 
that it operates only in very limited ways.  FIJA leaders have long expressed the belief that 
were jury nullification advertised to jurors, convictions for regulatory (also known as malum 
prohibitum) crimes would decline precipitously.161  Nullification advocates often argue that it is 
needed as a form of resistance to the government “oppressing the people with excessive and 
often ridiculous laws and regulations.”162  Or, as Roger Roots puts it, 
Today’s fabric of criminal codes is both lengthier and more complicated than it 
would be if jurors were instructed of their right to nullify inequitable laws.  This is 
because modern lawmakers no longer generally worry over whether their enactments 
can be sold to and understood by lay jurors.  The ancient maxim that ignorance of 
the law is no excuse may have been workable in an era when it was at least 
conceptually possible to know what the law was.  But today’s criminal and regulatory 
statutes — with their many sections and subsections, their exception clauses and 
their complicated application provisions — make the law a great mystery even to the 
most learned legal scholars.  Even the finely honed legal minds on the nation’s 
highest courts regularly disagree over what the law is.163 
 
Roots’s and other nullification advocates’ reactions, illuminated by Schmitt’s reference to a 
tendency on the part of modern states to proliferate laws out of touch with popular 
conceptions of justice, point back to the same process failure I have examined already with 
respect to ever-increasing criminal penalties and to the passage of criminal laws that meet 
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with popular approbation in the abstract, but revulsion when they are applied concretely to 
family, friends and neighbors.164   
Even in the context of representative democracy, at some level of development, 
legislators and executive branch actors make laws not solely because their constituents, the 
people, demand them, but as support for other laws, public policies, etc., and these laws, if 
truly unknown to the vast majority of the people, are utterly untethered from any concept of 
popular sovereignty that does not simply assume the people’s acclamation.  One way to 
ameliorate this democratic dysfunction is to allow the people back in at the moment when 
such laws are being applied to particular defendants who, if convicted, become enemies of 
the state.  Jury nullification, once assumed to be a right fundamental to the concept of the 
American criminal jury, could accomplish this. 
 
Conclusion 
Machiavelli, in a democratic mode, claimed that “the people, if it is deceived about 
generalities, is not deceived about particulars.”165  The American people have long been 
generally unaware of the extent of the laws under which they live.  But when brought as 
jurors face-to-face with prosecutions under them, and if empowered to express their 
judgments not only as to whether the defendants before them have committed the acts of 
which they are accused, but also whether such defendants’ contraventions of law are indeed 
worthy of conviction and punishment, and indeed of their being functionally constructed as 
enemies, they are remarkably well positioned to do justice according to their own lights.166 
                                                
164 See Chapter 6, text accompanying notes 49 to 53; Chapter 7, text accompanying notes 53 to 54. 
165 Machiavelli, Discourses on First Decade, vol. I, 295. 
166 In line with this observation, jury nullification can also serve to ameliorate the American tendency to 
conflate the ordinary criminal with the enemy or the absolute enemy.  One who commits a regulatory crime, 
 
 
299 
In this chapter, I have argued that when jurors do exercise their power to determine 
the law and its applicability to particular criminal defendants, they engage in popular 
sovereignty as Carl Schmitt defined it, and so, albeit in micro form, engage in a centrally 
democratic act.  Moreover, they do so at the moment at which the state seeks to render 
defendants its enemies, meaning that they have the opportunity — some would say duty — 
to issue the most political of judgments.  When judges and prosecutors seek to strip jurors of 
this role, they uphold, in the name of the rule of law, the sovereignty of the state as against 
the sovereignty of the people.  After generations of war against the jury’s nullification power, 
we are left with a state that increasingly proliferates regulatory and victimless crimes that are 
in deep tension with popular ideas of justice, and that as a result proliferates internal enemies 
— to the extent that it leads the world in imprisonment rate.  In the concluding chapter, I 
will bring together the strands of the argument to show that while sovereignty remains 
fractured and diffuse in the American polity, tea party and other activists who insist on the 
foundational primacy of popular sovereignty are not entirely off the mark.  It is just that the 
means by which such sovereignty was to have been exercised most fully — popular 
participation in criminal juries empowered to act contrary to the law in the direction of lenity 
— has been whittled away to the vanishing point. 
                                                                                                                                            
the nature of which does not actually violate the homogeneous adherence to shared legal values, might be 
acquitted because it simply doesn’t make sense to lump him together with those who existentially threaten the 
state, and certainly not with those who are essentialized as habitual or career criminals, and thus subhuman 
absolute enemies. 
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CHAPTER 9 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
To recap the argument of this dissertation in brief, Carl Schmitt’s theories of 
sovereignty and the political provide valuable insights into the arrangements of American 
democracy — both its failures and its successes.  His complicated understanding of 
sovereignty helps show why American democracy is always unstable as it surfs the tension 
between rule-of-law liberalism and popular sovereignty to decide on exceptional or 
emergency circumstances, including what to do about them when they arise.  His focus on 
the friend-enemy distinction as the centrally political axis, when applied to the functional 
operation of criminal law in the American context, shows that our convict population in fact 
comprises internal enemies.   
Combining these two strands of Schmitt’s theory, I have sought to show that jury 
nullification, by which American juries were once fully empowered to decide in exceptional 
criminal cases both that an exception exists and whether to react to it by acquitting a 
potential criminal enemy against whom the evidence is clear, but which is now denigrated as 
anarchic action contrary to law, was a means by which the Founders intended to retain 
elements of popular sovereignty as a check on the tendency of government to acquire too 
much power against citizens. 
The American jury is capable of representing the best and worst of what democracy 
has to offer a polity.1   
The direct and raw character of jury democracy makes it our most honest mirror, 
reflecting both the good and the bad that ordinary people are capable of when called 
                                                
1 Abramson, We, the Jury, 1. 
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upon to do justice.  The reflection sometimes attracts us, and it sometimes repels us.  
But we are the jury, and the image we see is our own.2 
 
Reflective as it is of the people, the jury is capable of engaging in a limited form of popular 
sovereignty in Schmitt’s terms:  it can decide, in individual cases, whether to give effect or 
not to criminal law as promulgated through liberal, rule-of-law procedures by diffusely 
sovereign actors beholden only indirectly to the American people itself, however imagined.   
But as we have seen, the jury has increasingly been denied this role due to the 
professionalization of judges and lawyers, and their acquisition to themselves as institutional 
sovereign actors of the sole right to say what the law is.  Juries now can act to refuse to 
declare enemies, or to declare friends, only in the shadows of criminal law.  To the extent 
that one values equality of results in criminal trials over allowing the people to engage in 
decisions reflecting community norms in evaluating law, one will likely conclude that I have 
put too much faith in juries.  I argue, however, that the danger of unequal results — already 
present due to police, prosecutorial and judicial discretion — is worth risking due to the 
importance of retaining some role for ordinary citizens in deciding which of their fellows will 
be subjected to the full force of criminal sanction. 
It was not always so, and I believe I have shown that the Framers did not intend it to 
be so.  The American system is indubitably muddled on Schmitt’s view of sovereignty, 
combining as it does claims that the people are the ultimate source of power that remains 
latent next to the ordinary operation of government with liberal rule-of-law procedrualism. 
But I part ways with Schmitt’s maximalist view that this tension is fatal, and must be 
resolved either by erecting a completely procedural state that hides sovereignty from view 
and thus presages tyranny, or by openly placing sovereignty in some human hands such that 
                                                
2 Ibid. 250. 
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the rule of law and individual rights are never capable of being protected from unfettered 
and potentially arbitrary discretion.  Instead, with such left-leaning Schmitt scholars as 
Chantal Mouffe and Andreas Kalyvas, I have sought to apply Schmitt to the American 
context to show that there is a way to retain a balance between liberalism and democracy.   
By giving back to the criminal jury its original role in deciding whether and how to 
apply the law at all, it would be possible, I believe, to restore the Framers’ intended balance 
among sovereign actors.  Sure, sovereignty would still be complexly diffuse.  But when 
exercised in the direction of lenity by criminal juries, it would always be visible in that limited 
context.  Despite the secrecy of the basis of a jury’s verdict, its result, and — assuming an 
empowered jury — the source of that result, are clear.  Moreover, giving the jury back its 
role to resist the steady creep of regulatory and other laws that are enacted largely out of 
clear view of ordinary folk, by refusing to apply such laws to defendants, would go a long 
way to addressing the complaints of tea party adherents among others.  While they are 
wrong to claim that America is a nation founded solely or even primarily on popular 
sovereignty, they are absolutely right that elements of that sovereignty central to the 
founding balance have been lost. 
Specifically, the “trial by jury” that we all are guaranteed has come to bear a meaning 
the Founders would not recognize.  What once was sovereign jury discretion regarding the 
law now rests with professional, elite judges.  And its exercise is nearly impenetrable by the 
ordinary citizen who is not trained in the arcana of the law.  Restoring the jury’s right to 
nullify won’t fix everything.  But it could bring the people back in, and provide a wake-up 
call short of outright revolution to institutional actors from legislators, to prosecutors, to 
police, to judges.  It could also serve to reduce the number of fellow citizens subjected to the 
horrors of the American penal system, and rendered criminal enemies thereby. 
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In short, I cannot say it better than Andrew Parmenter does below:  the nullification-
empowered jury, while no panacea for America’s ills, could play an important role in giving 
ordinary people sovereignty to say no to the mechanistic operation of criminal law, 
particularly where that law is poised to render defendants enemies — even to the point of 
being subhuman absolute enemies to be put to death, locked away for long periods of time, 
and stigmatized forever as less than worthy of full citizenship. 
If America is committed to a jury system, it must believe in its jurors; if America is 
committed to a democracy, it must believe in its people.  If I must present myself to 
an executioner, I would lay my neck under the axe long before I laid it under the 
guillotine.  A guillotine, like the law, can malfunction because it is a mere mechanism.  
The human executioner, like the jury, must make the decision to strike.  If they 
cannot deliver that blow in good conscience, they should not be compelled to do so.3 
 
The risks to the survival of the American polity of continuing to subject citizens to a 
guillotine operated seemingly inevitably by unseen hands — the law, we are told, but Schmitt 
shows us that this cannot really be — are, in my view, greater than the risks of letting the 
people decide, if sometimes unreliably or inappropriately, when to refuse to strike the 
enemy-making blow. 
                                                
3 Parmenter, “Nullifying the Jury,” 428. 
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